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ARTICLES
MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION
James S. Liebman* & Brandon L. Garrett**
James Madison is considered the "Fatherof the Constitution," but his
progeny disappointed him. It had no effective defense against self-government's "mortal disease"--the oppression of minorities by local majorities.
This Article explores Madison's writings in an effort to reclaim the deep conception of equal protection at the core of his constitutional aspirations. At
the Convention, Madison passionately advocated a radical structural approach to equal protection under which the "extended republic's" broadlyfocused legislaturewould have monitored local laws and vetoed those that were
parochialand "unjust." Rejecting this proposal to structure equal protection
into the "interior"operation of government, the Framersinstead adopted "exterior" admonitionsagainststate ex post facto laws, impairment of contracts,
and the like. Expanding this strategy, the Fourteenth Amendment admonished states against all denials of "the equal protection of the laws." Exactly
as Madison predicted, however, protection of local minorities cannot be entrusted to "dim and doubtful" words enforced after the fact by courts that are
inaccessible to minorities and too distantfrom the people at large to have the
knowledge and confidence to resist powerful local majorities. This is particularly so of late, as the courts have placed vast spheres of activity off limits to
the extended republic and denied it the power to enlist state officials in implementing nationalpolicy. By rediscoveringMadison's neglected thinking on
equal protection, and his elaborate design for a constitution that was never
enacted, this Article sheds new light on seemingly intractableproblems of
federalism and equal protection and paves the way for a modern revival of
Madisonian Equal Protection.
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INTRODUCTION

The framing of the original Constitution reveals far more about
equal protection than the doctrine's absence from the document would
seem to imply. Indeed, a vision of equal protection deeply motivated the
actions of James Madison, the "Father of the Constitution,"' at the time
of the framing. As Madison wrote to George Washington before the Constitutional Convention, one of the main innovations he sought in the
newly constituted government was a national negative or veto of state law
1. Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution,
and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 215, 215 (1979)
(stating that Madison "has been justly acclaimed 'Father of the Constitution'"); see also
Edward McNall Burns, James Madison: Philosopher of the Constitution 10-11 (1938)
(noting Madison's disproportionately large contribution to the framing); Jack N. Rakove,
James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic, at 53 (1990) [hereinafter
Rakove, James Madison] ("None of the fifty-five members of the Federal Convention
contributed more to the framing of the Constitution than James Madison.").
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by Congress to curtail state-level
"aggressions of interested majorities on
2

the rights of minorities."
The constitution Madison envisioned, however, is not the one the
Framers wrote. To his great disappointment, the nation's first constitution omitted any explicit equal protection constraint on the states, and it
excluded the national negative he had fervently promoted. Nor, as we
will see, did Madison's constitution emerge eighty years later with the
Equal Protection Clause and the other postbellum amendments.
This Article recalls the constitution Madison wanted in order to enrich our understanding of Madison's thinking and to credit his prescient
belief that the constitution the nation originally framed was-and the
one that replaced it in 1868 remains-gravely defective for lack of an
effective equal protection constraint. In so doing, the Article does not
contend that Madison's support for a national negative exhausted his
views on federal-state relations, 3 nor that his ideas on equal protection
2. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 The Papers
of'James Madison 382, 383-84 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter Papers of
Madison].
3. We focus on Madison the Framer in the period from 1783 to 1788. Whether his
views changed during his years as an opposition politician with a states' rights bent,
Secretary of State, President, or elder statesman is a question we do not systematically
address. A few observations on the issue are in order, however. To begin with, Madison
never disavowed any of the views he held at the time of the framing. On the contrary, he
continued to believe in the importance of his and other's ideas discussed at the
Convention, and he took careful steps to preserve his notes recording those ideas. See
Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 173-74 (discussing Madison's efforts to preserve
his notes even though he "did not believe that the 'intentions' of the framers should fix
[the Constitution's] 'legitimate meaning").
In addition, our analysis here suggests considerable consistency between Madison's
earlier and later views, with the missing link supplied by his belief in the need for the
carefully structured daily interaction and competition among the organs of government to
provide ongoing protection of minorities against majority oppression. Although we focus
here on the need to protect minority interests from neglect by state governments, the
Madison of 1788 was quite clear that structural steps were also needed to protect minorities
from the national government. See infra Parts IV-V. He simply believed that the
Constitution achieved the latter protection-including through the action of the states in
advocating and mobilizing support for the rights of local majorities that were in the
minority nationally-while neglecting the former protection. See infra notes 256-286 and
accompanying text. We are not aware of anything the "states' rights"James Madison of the
Virginia Resolutions said or did a decade later that departs from this view. In point of fact,
Madison wrote the Resolutions in service not of states' rights but of the rights of aliens and
putative seditionists-unpopular minorities on whose behalf he sought to enlist Virginia
and other states to rally public opinion against federal oppression. See, e.g., Rakove,Jarnes
Madison, supra note 1, at 127-29. Not surprisingly, Madison was displeased by Jefferson's
implication in earlier drafts of the Resolutions that states might be able to nullify federal
law, and he toned down Jefferson's language raising the implication. Id. at 129 (stating
that "disunion was the absolute evil Madison could never imagine").
Although Madison continued later in life to invoke the power of the states, acting in
their daily constitutional role within the union, to protect unpopular groups against
national majorities, he also energetically struggled against the notion of separate state
sovereignty. And he was "pained by [the] repeated appeals to the Virginia and Kentucky
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eclipse all the other (not always consistent) filaments of political thought
with which he is more usually associated. 4 On the contrary, this account
of Madison's deep reservations about what so many consider to be his
constitution is intended to debunk monochromatic views about what
Madison stood for. In particular, we show how badly the one-dimensional portrayal of Madison by the current Supreme Court5 and much
recent scholarship 6 has misunderstood him-ignoring his passionate
conviction that routine national monitoring of the actions of state majoriour federal system if the nation was to fulfill
ties had to be structured into
7
its constitutional potential.
resolutions" by Southern protosecessionists such as John C. Calhoun. Id. at 177-78. The
consistency between Madison's earlier and later views is obscured by an assumption that
Madison's framing-era nationalism was the same as Hamilton's. Although the two were
allies at the Convention and immediately afterwards, Hamilton cared far more for
protecting national prerogatives and the public good against state incursions and less
about protecting individual and minority rights and justice than did Madison. See infra
Part IV.C.1. In neither period did Madison show an affinity for Hamilton's effort to eke
out every nationalist inch in the text of the Constitution so it could be used (including by
Hamilton himself as Secretary of Treasury) to steal a nationalist mile when the government
began.
4. For a helpful discussion of the different, contradictory strains of constitutional
thought that are often associated with Madison, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 38-45 (1985).
5. See, e.g., infra Part VI for a discussion of the current Supreme Court's ongoing
misappropriation of Madison's thinking in its recent decisions undercutting Congress's
ability to legislate pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev.
1957, 2004, 2033-36 (1993) (characterizing Madisonian constitutional thought as rejecting
need for federal government to supervise state legislative decisionmaking); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 523, 535 (2001) (citing
Madison's fear of tyranny of the majority as reason for the Court to police Congress's use
of its Section 5 powers); see also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 815,
817-22 (1995) (conceding that Madison's views provide justification for federal court
review of state laws under federal antidiscrimination statutes but nonetheless arguing that
because of normative reasons, federalism does not support a national judicial role in
overseeing state laws regulating criminal procedure and "social and cultural issues,"
including issues of speech, reproductive rights, and prison conditions); cf. John C. Yoo,
The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1311, 1361-62, 1366-80 & n.242
(1997) (stating that "the views of Madison, Hamilton, and the other Framers are
important, notjust because they reflect the original understanding, but also because they
represent penetrating lines of thought whose force has endured to this day," but elsewhere
arguing that Madison's atypical concern with minority rights and his unsuccessful efforts,
via the national veto, to limit state power make him an unreliable source for views about
how the Constitution was expected to operate and should be interpreted).
7. We are not alone in trying to set the record straight on Madison's sympathy for
governmental arrangements that are often assumed to be at odds with his notions of
federalism and states' rights. See Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of
American Federalism 2-8, 23-25, 261-64 (1993) (responding to Ronald Reagan's "New
Federalism" attack on large national government by locating foundations of New Deal
activism and the welfare state in the "extended" and "energetic" republic "for increase"
that Madison and Hamilton desired); David Lawsky, Would Federalists Like Their Fans?,
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This Article begins in Part I with an overview of Madison's proposed
national negative, its reception at the Constitutional Convention, and
how the scholarship, both legal and historical, has ignored the bearing of
Madison's constitutional theorizing on contemporary thinking about
equal protection. Part II attempts to synthesize that contemporary thinking by presenting a vision of harmonized liberty, equality, and fraternity
that our existing constitutional structure aims to realize through the
equal protection principle. It then returns to the eighteenth century and
links that vision to Madison's. Part III discusses the structural equal protection constraint that the extended republic was designed to build into
the first Constitution, a constraint based on Madison's recognition that
"interior" or structural constraints on parochial exercises of majority
power were a constitutional necessity. Part IV reveals both the incompleteness of the extended republic, the first Constitution's only equal
protection constraint, and Madison's prescient recognition of the defect.
In doing so, Part IV compares the great Federalists' actual proposal for
structural equal protection to the flawed-because more federalist-product that emerged from the Convention in 1787.
Part V applies a Madisonian critique to the Equal Protection Clause
of 1868, finding it an ineffectual, "exterior," or merely admonitory, step
in the fight direction. Part VI assays the additional damage the modem
Supreme Court has done to Madisonian equal protection by dismantling
the extended republic and, along with it, the incomplete structural protections against oppressive state action that Madison did manage to build
into the Constitution. The Article ends by reflecting on possible applications of Madison's theory to our modem constitutional system, noting
some grounds for optimism. 8
I.

RECLAIMING MADISON'S CONSTITUrIONAL MOTIVATION

Nearly all of Madison's greatest works of constitutional theory-his
writings leading up to the Convention, his speeches there, and Nos. 10
and 51 of The Federalist,following the Convention-focus on the problem
N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1995, at E3 (citing The Federalist in support of balanced budget
amendment; contrasting modern "federalist" opposition); see also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 945-46 & n.4 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Beer, supra, and
describing how, contrary to the Court's modern insistence on separation between federal
and state functions, Madison expected that the federal government would govern in
cooperation with, and through decentralized use of, state officials); Henry Paul Monaghan,
We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 121, 122-24 (1998) (documenting continuous controversy since the beginning of the
republic over the nature of the Founding and the nature of the relationship between state
and federal government); infra Part IV.C.4.
8. A companion piece more fully explores modern application of Madison's theory,
by way of the thought of John Dewey. See Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman,
Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. (forthcoming June 2004,
expected at 22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 235) [hereinafter Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist
Equal Protection].
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of equal protection. His overarching concern-what he called the most
"dreadful class of evils" besetting the new nation under the Articles of
Confederation, more dreadful even than the weak national government-was the "factious spirit" in the states which chronically drove stable and interested majorities to enact "unjust" measures benefiting themselves while systematically neglecting or harming weaker groups and the
public good. 9 In a more modern tongue, the most serious problem the
new constitution had to solve was discrimination against persistently disfavored groups through state action lacking a sufficient relationship to legitimate state ends.
Particularly in his role as a constitutional architect, Madison was
equally convinced that admonitory rights-such as those he later wrote
into the Bill of Rights (despairing of their effect) and those John Bingham and his colleagues eventually wrote into the Fourteenth Amendment-provided at best a "precarious security" for "the rights of the minority." 10 Even when committed to energetic enforcement by the
judiciary-the least transient and most "independent" "member of...
government""lsuch "exterior" constraints on government would inevitably be "inadequate" 12 and ineffectual1 3 responses to the virulent temptations toward factionalism, discrimination, and defiance of the common
good that plague republican government.
On the eve of the Convention, Madison believed he had discovered
an "interior," or deeply structural, solution to the problem of equal protection, and he worked tirelessly to draft and promote a constitution that
embodied his solution. The idea was twofold. First was to create an "ex9. Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole House, The NewJersey Plan, Tuesday,
June 19, 1787 (James Madison) [hereinafter Madison, June 19, 1787], in 1 The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, at 312, 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937), available
at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html
[hereinafter Farrand]; see also
Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the
Federal Republic 76-107 (1995) (noting Madison's "alarm about abuses in the states ...
traced to the debilities of the Confederation"); Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 45
("At the heart of Madison's thinking lay a deep concern with the process by which laws
were enacted, enforced, and obeyed, and an overriding conviction that the legislatures
created by the state constitutions of 1776 had failed to discharge their duties fairly or
responsibly."); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at
467 (1969) ("[Tlhe move for a stronger national government thus became something
more than a response to the obvious weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. It
became as well an answer to the problems of the state governments.").
10. The Federalist No. 51, at 323-24 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11. Id. at 324 (rejecting as "precarious" a "power independent of the society").
12. Id. at 320.
13. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 163, 163-64 [hereinafter Madison, Sept. 6 Letter to Jefferson]
("[T]he plan should it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national object nor
prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts agst the state governments."
(emphasis omitted)); see also infra Parts III.B, IV.C; infra notes 241-243 and
accompanying text.
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tended Republic" 14 and place at its helm a broadly focused and empowered Congress over which local majorities could never expect to hold
sway. 1 5 Second and more crucial was a "Power of the [National] Legislature to Negative State Laws" in "all cases" even if the state law impinged
on no matter of national concern.' 6 Only a plenary power to veto unjust
state law, Madison believed, could force state lawmakers, however grudgingly in the short term, to heed minority interests and the public good.
And only such a national negative, as Madison called it, could actually
transform parochial local oligarchs over the long term, instilling a habitual concern for locally subordinated interests as well as the public-spirited
perspective that, by Madisonian design, would motivate the extended republic's legislators in applying the negative. During the Convention, as
described in Part IV, Madison labored to convince his colleagues to adopt
his national negative. Although his radical proposal enjoyed some early
success, the negative foundered as a coalition of delegates balked at giving Congress such broad power over state legislatures. After two contentious debates, the Convention shelved Madison's negative and unanimously adopted the Supremacy Clause as an acknowledged substitute.
Even then Madison did not give up, but his repeated efforts to revive his
proposal were all defeated.
A. Setting Straight the Scholarly Record
The negative thus was not, as many historians and legal commentators have dismissively assumed,' 7 "some theoretical will-o'-the-wisp that
Madison the practical politician quickly abandoned" or a "curious aberration" that he rejected along with the other Framers as "unrealistic."18 To
14. Beer, supra note 7, at 279.
15. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 83 (James Madison).
16. James Madison, Power of the Legislature to Negative State Laws, Speech at the
Convention (June 8, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 41, 41 [hereinafter
Madison, June 8 Convention Speech]. The "all cases" language was Madison's frequent
description of the power required. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George
Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 382, 383 [hereinafter
Madison, Letter to Washington] (endorsing negative in "all cases whatsoever"). Charles
Pinckney's June 8, 1787 motion at the Convention on Madison's behalf stated "that the
National Legislature shd. have authority to negative all Laws which they shd. judge to be
improper." Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra, at 41 (citation omitted).
17. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 1, at 10-11, 98-102 (dismissing as unimportant
Madison's advocacy of the negative); Hobson, supra note 1, at 215-17 (finding as of 1979
that the history and importance of the national negative was "veiled in relative obscurity"
and noting the absence of attention to it in important works on Madison and the framing
of the Constitution by Douglass Adair, Clinton Rossiter, and Max Farrand). But cf. Irving
Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800, at 12-13, 36-38, 104-05,
127-29 (1950) (recognizing national veto as an important component of Madison's plan
for a new constitution, while making no effort to ground the veto in Madison's thinking
about the nature or needs of republican government).
18. Hobson, supra note 1, at 216. Hobson's article was the first to emphasize the
centrality of Madison's national veto proposal.
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the contrary, the negative "occupied a central place"'19 in Madison's constitution and can be seen as the "central innovation" 20 on which everything else was to "hinge." 2' Notwithstanding his success in creating the
extended republic and its broadly focused Congress, Madison believed at
the time that the negative's defeat had ruined the new Constitution. As
he wrote Thomas Jefferson at the close of the Constitutional Convention,
"the plan should it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national
object nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts
agst the state governments. '22 And even as he defended the new Constitution publicly in The Federalist, he worked behind the scenes to have
something like the negative restored. When the states ratified the Constitution without including the negative among the changes they demanded, he used his seat in the First Congress and stewardship of the
very Bill of Rights demanded by the ratifying conventions to constrain the
federal government to propose his own amendment- prophetically num23
bered "fourteenth"-to create important rights as against the states.
24
This last ditch effort also failed.
A handful of commentators have recognized the negative's central
importance to Madison. 25 None, however, has emphasized its significance to equal protection. 26 And none has recognized the sophistication
19. Id.
20. Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 245,
253 (1990) [hereinafter Rakove, Madisonian Theory].
21. Banning, supra note 9, at 118.
22. Madison, Sept. 6 Letter tojefferson, supra note 13, at 163-64 (emphasis omitted);
see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 24, 1787), in 10 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 205, 212-14; infra notes 238-239, 286 and accompanying text.
Given the uninviting alternative of continuing to operate under the Articles of
Confederation, the fact that the Constitution failed to address the most important "vice" of
the existing arrangements and was likely doomed to failure was not enough to set Madison,
"the practical statesman," against it. See Hobson, supra note 1, at 233 (concluding that
Madison "preferred the risk of the Constitution, defective as it was, to the anarchy he was
certain would result from continuing under the Articles of Confederation").
23. See infra Part V.A.1.
24. Last ditch it was, because it relied on "exterior" constraints of the sort Madison
believed to be ineffective. See infra Parts III.A, V.A.1 (discussing Madison's fourteenth
amendment); infra notes 249, 386-388, 398 and accompanying text (detailing Madison's
doubts about "exterior" or admonitory constraints).
25. E.g., Banning, supra note 9, at 117-19; Brant, supra note 17, at 12-13, 36-38,
104-05, 127-29; Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 51-52; Hobson, supra note 1, at
217-19; Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 627-28, 634-36,
649-53 (1999) [hereinafter Kramer, Madison's Audience]; Jack N. Rakove, The
Madisonian Moment, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 473, 497-98 (1988) [hereinafter Rakove,
Madisonian Moment].
26. In an early article, Professor Rakove included protection of the rights of
minorities, along with deterring the states from subverting the national government, as
Madison's goals in proposing the veto. Rakove, Madisonian Moment, supra note 25, at
497-98. In later articles, however-in an analysis carried forward by Professor Kramer, see
infra notes 30-31, 33-34 and accompanying text-Rakove linked Madison's concern with
"populist legislation" adopted by "factious majorities" to fears about the sanctity of
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and wisdom of Madison's view that it was only through a structural device
like the negative-and not, for example, through the extended republic
by itself, or through the judiciary's enforcement of an "exterior" admonition to treat minorities equally-that effective protection could be
secured.

27

property rights and other republican liberties. See Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1,
at 51-52; Rakove, Madisonian Theory, supra note 20, at 247 (arguing that "the most
Madisonian element of the Constitution is arguably the fourteenth amendment" insofar as
it protects individual rights against the states).
27. One scholar who has described Madisonian theory as sounding in equal
protection is Vincent Blasi, in an essay on Madison's very earliest writings, on religious
tolerance. Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783, 806 (2002). Professor Blasi's
effort to give Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance its rightful place in current legal debates
about religious freedom provides a precedent for our own effort to restore the national
veto to its proper place in modern equal protection scholarship.
Other observers have noted the link between Madison's conception of the extended
republic in The FederalistNo. 10 and equal protection principles. But contrary to Madison's
own conclusions, see supra note 22 and accompanying text; infra notes 232-233, 277 and
accompanying text, these writers have tended to see that republic's establishment through
the new Constitution as having largely succeeded in accomplishing all of Madison's equal
protection goals. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523-24
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1190 (1977) (arguing that Madison was prescient to point out
importance of diversity in guarding against "tyranny of the Majority" and in concluding
that judicial review was weaker protection for minorities than safeguards built into political
process through creation of a stronger national government); Note, A Madisonian
Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 Yale L.J. 1403, 1429 (1982) (linking
Madison's conception of the extended republic to equal protection goals but concluding
that the new Constitution's rearrangement of powers between state and national
government largely achieved those goals); Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise:
Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1059,
1087 (1995) (relying on Madison's theory of faction and the extended republic as basis for
criticizing Supreme Court's "colorblindness" limitations on benign racial categories and
arguing that factions may "be controlled through structural means and constant
competition" among various entities of government that may produce appropriately
benign race-conscious legislation).
Still other commentators have recognized that the attempt to afford sufficient equal
protection through the extended republic has failed, but have assumed that the republic
exhausted Madison's mechanisms for affording such protection-thus ignoring Madison's
national veto and his anticipatory criticism of these commentators' favored solution:
"exterior" constraints of the sort adopted by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 79-81 (1980) [hereinafter
Ely, Democracy] (linking Madison's discussion of faction in The Federalist to equal
protection, but assuming that Madison expected the extended republic by itself to solve
the problem and implying Madison's lack of foresight with the comment that "it didn't
take long to learn that from the standpoint of protecting minorities [the Constitution's
safeguards were] not enough"); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535,
536-37, 539-40 (1986) (noting link between equal protection and Madison's extended
republic but concluding that it took the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve the needed
protection); infra notes 408-409, 559 and accompanying text; see also Robert A. Goldwin,
From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights to Save the
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Most analysts who have taken the national negative seriously have
classified it under the heading of "federalism"-the allocation of power
between the national and state governments-and assumed that Madison
intended the negative to enable the national government to bring the
states to heel, 28 or to abolish state sovereignty altogether by putting states
at the bottom of a national hierarchy.2 9 Like Madison of the Virginia
Resolutions, however, Madison the Federalist was no hypercentralizer
bent on making states toe the national line. The main "vice" he wanted
the new constitution to correct was not the states' insufficiently
subordinate relationship to the national government, but their chronically dismissive treatment of their own minority citizens and failure to
govern themselves in the general interest. 30 Madison's solution was not
to cow the states-which he hoped would play a crucial role in cabining
federal power-but instead to structure lawmaking incentives so that
state officials would take a broader view of their publics and the public
good. 3 1 Although Congress would have sweeping power to veto unrightConstitution 59 (1997) (assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment was the kind of
negative Madison had in mind).
28. "Madison was convinced that the fundamental defect of the Confederation was
that Congress lacked the sanctioning power necessary to make the states carry out its
decisions." Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1044 (1997) [hereinafter Rakove, Origins]; see also Rakove, Madisonian
Moment, supra note 25, at 497-98 (noting that Madison believed that rejection of national
negative undermined Constitution's power over the states).
29. See, e.g., Hobson, supra note 1, at 218-19 (claiming that "Madison proposed
nothing less than an organic union of the general and state governments" and sought
"consolidation" of state and national governments); Yoo, supra note 6, at 1365 n.242,
1366-67 (claiming, by way of arguing that Madison's views are not a reliable indication of
how the Constitution ought to be interpreted, that his concern for local minorities and
defeated national veto proposal was the motivation and "centerpiece of an effort [by
Madison] to transform the states from their status as independent sovereigns under the
Articles of Confederation to something more akin to the 'lesser jurisdictions,' of a 'large
Government"' and concluding that "[t]he opposition of Madison and others to the power
of the states.., highlights their manifest failure to convince the Philadelphia Convention
to undermine, eliminate, or significantly reduce the scope of sovereignty" (citations
omitted)); cf. infra Part IV.C.4 (describing complex interaction between state and federal
governments that Madison envisioned).
30. See infra Part LV.A; see also Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 634
n.98, 649 ("Madison apparently never contemplated [consolidation of the states into the
national government] and sought only a negative power to guard against abuses-a point
too-often overlooked .... ).
31. See infra Part 1V.B-C. Madison has been misunderstood on this point from the
beginning. With the exception of Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson, the other
conveners inaccurately assumed-sometimes sympathetically; mostly not-that Madison's
real goal (like Hamilton's and Wilson's) in proposing the veto was to strengthen the
national government. As Professor Kramer has shown, Madison's contemporaries often
failed to understand his arguments, even those by which they claimed to be convinced.
See Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 647-71. Hamilton's notes from the
Convention show that he understood Madison's arguments about the dangers of faction in
a republican state and the capacity of a national veto to avoid the problem, but that he
disagreed with Madison on the point and supported the veto for the reason the other
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eous measures enacted by state lawmakers, the goal was not to shove national priorities down the throats of the states. Rather, the "happy effect"
of local legislators operating under the watchful eye of a "disinterested &
dispassionate [congressional] umpire" was to be the end of factional discrimination by stable and interested local majorities against chronically
32
disempowered minorities.
More recently, Professor Kramer has recognized Madison's fixation
on the national negative, while challenging the view that it was meant to
weaken the states. 3 3 In Kramer's view, Madison intended the negative to
do work we now assign to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause: "preventing abuses of republican liberty in the states." 3 4 This
interpretation moves the negative into the proper hemisphere of constitutional analysis-relations between the governed and the government,
not those among the government's parts. However, it still leaves the device on the wrong continent.
To be sure, Madison was a great partisan of republican liberty-individuals' freedom to pursue their own interests. 3 5 He agreed with the
other conveners that enabling individuals to govern themselves in their
daily affairs (what he called "civil" liberty) 36 required citizens first and
foremost to be able to govern themselves in their political affairs. 37 A
new constitution accordingly had to empower individuals to vote in frequent elections, and to play the state and national governments (and the
branches of the latter) off against each other so government power would
38
never be concentrated enough to threaten individual liberty.
But, anticipating Bingham and the other Fourteenth Amendment
framers, Madison also realized that too much self-government is a bad
thing. Even when mobilized to keep elected representatives from tyrannizing their electors, an excess of self-government can allow stable and
interested majorities to tyrannize minorities. That power, in turn, can
dangerously destabilize the polity, as lawmakers defect from a commitdelegates wrongly assumed Madison had proposed it: to give the national government a
broad power to coerce the states. See id. at 641-42, 645 & n.141, 657-58 nn.201-202; infra
note 203. For Wilson's understanding of Madison's thinking and alternative view, see infra
Part IV.C.2; infra notes 338, 388 and accompanying text.
32. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 317, 318 [hereinafter Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson];
Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 382-84.
33. See Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 649-53; supra notes 31-32.
34. Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 642.
35. See infra Part II.B.1.
36. By "civil rights," Madison meant all of the rights and liberties exercised by selfgoverning individuals in their personal lives, in their social activities, and in their
interactions outside the realm of government and politics. See The Federalist No. 51,
supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison); id. No. 10, at 79 (James Madison).
37. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
38. See infra Part II.B.
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ment to a common good transcending all groups, and members of disfa39
vored groups defect from the polity.
Recognizing these dangers, Madison did not design the national
negative primarily to shield individual liberties from state abuse. He saw
that the "tyrann [ization] ,,,40 or "oppression," that needed curbing was an
exercise of individual liberty and self-government, albeit one he considered
the embodiment of "injustice." 4 1 For Madison, therefore, "injustice" was
not principally the deprivation of individual rights by the government,
but instead the majority's use of its liberty via the vote and the mobilization of its representatives to threaten the interests of groups chronically
in the minority through legislation with no justification in the common
good. 42 "Injustice" was what we today call discrimination 43 -"the majority trampling on the rights of the minority."' 44 Every example of "vicious
legislation" Madison gave involved laws disadvantaging people based on
their personal status, religious beliefs, economic interests, and geographic location-laws whose degrees of "injustice" Madison categorized
in a manner strikingly akin to modem equal protection "tiers. '45 For
Madison, therefore, the negative's objective was not due process but
equal protection-and through it the binding together of a nation of individuals and factions into a cohesive whole with a common good. 46 The
goal was not liberty, but equality and fraternity.

39. See infra Part IIB; infra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
40. The Federalist No. 47, supra note 10, at 301 (James Madison).
41. See James Madison, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 989, 990 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter Madison, Debate].
42. See infra Part II.B.2.
43. See infra Part II.B.2.
44. Madison, Debate, supra note 41, at 989-90.
45. See infra Part II.B.2.
46. In drawing a bright line between the equal protection considerations at the core
of our own analysis and the due process considerations at the heart of Professor Kramer's,
we risk overstating our case and understating Professor Kramer's insight. Madison
certainly recognized that discrimination can manifest itself in the denial of individual
liberties to members of minority groups, that deprivations of personal liberty by the states
are a bad thing no matter whom they affect, and that a national veto would discourage the
adoption of laws impinging upon individual liberties generally and not just the liberties of
minorities. At the core of Madison's thinking, however, was the insight that in a republic,
popularly enacted laws are unlikely to impinge equally on everyone's individual liberties,
and that if they do, the truly common sacrifice that results is not as troubling as harm
selectively targeted on members of particular minority groups. See infra Part II.B.2. This
view convinces us of the importance of the distinction we are drawing between equal
protection of what today are called "civil rights"-which we take to be Madison's principal
concern-and the due process protections of "civil liberties" that Professor Kramer
emphasizes. See infra Part V.A.1 (noting that even when Madison proposed to include a
provision very like the modern Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in the Bill of
Rights, he justified the provision in equal protection, not individual rights, terms).
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B. Appreciating Madison's Skepticism About "His" Constitution
It is time, therefore, to disassociate Madison from the Constitution
he is esteemed for having fathered but in fact disowned as it went out into
the world. 47 True, the blueprint for the Constitution was Madison's "Virginia Plan," based on his theory of sound government and study of the
48
vices of ancient republics and the confederation of former colonies.
And true, it was he who "mastermind [ed]" the Constitutional Convention
and was its "dominant personality";49 who, along with Hamilton and Jay,
sold the resulting Constitution to the public; 50 who shepherded it
through the all-important Virginia ratifying convention; and who implemented the bargain that assured its ratification by drafting the Bill of
Rights and securing its acceptance by Congress.
But all that said, "Madison's" constitution departed decisively from
his design and his theory of sound republican government. And he said
so, not only privately near the end of the Convention but also publicly in
his post-Convention masterpieces of political theory and public propaganda in "support" of the Constitution-Nos. 10 and 51 of The Federalist.
As we demonstrate below, these documents, particularly No. 51, beg the
conclusion-indeed, they seem intended to beg the conclusion-that the
Constitution was tragically flawed for lack of an effective protection
51
against abuse and oppression of minorities by the states.
47. See supra note 17; infra notes 238-239, 286.
48. Cf. Burns, supra note 1, at 10-11, 98-102 (describing Madison's nationalist
position at the Constitutional Convention, which resulted from his concerns about the
'evils" created by the Articles of Confederation).
49. Hobson, supra note 1, at 215.
50. [T]he central problem [in studying Madison the Framer] is to reconcile
divergences between his public and private positions-or to put the point
another way, to set the public defense of the Constitution in The Federalist in the
context of Madison's prior and private analyses of what he called the "vices of the
political system of the United States" and the specific remedies he sought, and
often failed, to convince the Federal Convention to adopt. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, supra note 25, at 478; see also EditorialNote to Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra
note 2, at 205 (noting that "because 'Publius' did not need to discuss the negative, JM's
essays in The Federalist are an incomplete statement of his political thought").
51. See infra Part III.B. This is not to suggest that Madison the propagandist risked
much by baring his doubts as a political theorist. Readers of The Federalist who were
disposed to think the Constitution already took too much power from the states hardly
would have been moved to exploit Madison's implication that the Constitution ought to
have constrained the states even more. See William H. Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric:
Campaigning for the American Constitution 39-42 (1996). And nationalist readers like
Hamilton, who very well may have recognized what was implicit in Madison's contributions
to The Federalist,were too intent on sealing the nationalizing deal the conveners had struck
to worry about what more they might have gotten. See also supra note 3; infra notes 373,
389 and accompanying text (noting that Hamilton and other nationalists tended to
subordinate Madison's equal protection worries to desire for more favorable balance of
power between federal and state governments). See generally infra Part LV.C.1-2.
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It thus takes only a little imagination to hear Madison the prophet
foretelling the Civil War, Jim Crow, Massive Resistance, and the other instances of virulent American factionalism, xenophobia, and discrimination. And it takes only-an honest reading of his masterpieces to find him
52
and ineffectualness 53 of
explicitly predicting both the "inadequa[cy]"
the constitutions of 1868, 1937, 1954, and 1964, given their reliance on
inherently weak "exterior" or admonitory, as opposed to "internal" or
structural, constraints against discrimination. 54 For Madison, that is, the
Fourteenth Amendment's stillbirth in the Slaughter-House Cases,55 and the
recent stifling of equal protection enforcement by the courts 56 through
doctrines of subjective intent, 5 7 "incremental" causation, 58 remedial limits, 59 qualified immunity, 60 local control, 6' separation of powers, 62 and
52. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 320 (James Madison).
53. Madison, Sept. 6 Letter tojefferson, supra note 13, at 163-64 ("[T]he plan should
it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local
mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts agst the state governments." (emphasis
omitted)).
54. Id.
55. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
56. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 12-15 (1972).
57. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-43 (1976) (discussing requirement in
school desegregation cases of racially discriminatory purpose and noting insufficiency of
racial impact for invalidation of a law); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973)
(emphasizing "purpose or intent to segregate" as distinguishing factor between de jure
segregation and de facto segregation and holding that de facto segregation does not alone
violate equal protection clause).
58. E.g., Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
496 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,
434 (1976).
59. E.g., Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585 (1983) (describing
limits of, and public resistance to, modern civil rights injunctions, such as foot dragging of
officials, boycotts, "white flight," and other hostility, and criticizing federal courts for
failing to be candid when limiting remedies in reaction to such resistance).
60. E.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 205 (2001) (holding that threshold inquiry
as to whether defendant public officials are entitled to qualified immunity is distinct from
subsequent inquiry into merits of constitutional claim; in order to satisfy former doctrine,
plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant public officials violated constitutional rights so
clearly established that defendants' conduct could not have been result of a "reasonable
mistake[ ]" about what the law required).
61. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (holding, based in part on
local-control considerations, that interdistrict school desegregation orders exceed limits of
federal equitable authority, even when adopted to remedy intentional, state-sponsored
racial segregation, unless every school district encompassed in the plan was itself
responsible for segregation in another district).
62. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-24, 536 (1997) (holding Religious
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional on grounds that it violated separation of powers
between Congress and federal judiciary, and holding that judiciary alone, not Congress,
defines constitutional rights and thus the remedial reach of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
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states' rights, 63 are the inevitable results of defective constitutional
design.
Raising up Madison the equal protection theorist and constitutional
prognosticator means knocking down Madison the idol of the New Federalism. It is of course true that history may "suppl[y] an original Constitution, from which much 20th century political innovation," including the
protection of minorities against abusive state power, may be "seen as an
unacceptable departure. '64 But it is inaccurate for the current Court and
sympathetic commentators to associate James Madison with this complaint.65 Although Madison would almost certainly question the equal
protection currently afforded to minorities against factional oppression
by the states, his "insufficiency" worries would be the opposite of New
Federalist complaints about "excessive" national intervention on behalf of
local minorities.
II. HARMONIZING LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY

Much of this Article is about Madison the prophet of doom, a Cassandra who pointed a different way toward equal protection than the
rocky and dangerous path to that goal that the nation has instead taken.
But in conceptualizing that goal, Madison's thinking at the time of the
founding was prophetic in a different way, anticipating what is now becoming the accepted wisdom about equal protection's crucial role in a
democratic polity. We begin with this second feat of successful prophecy
to make clear why it remains important to heed Madison's first, doomsaying warning about the dangers of the wrong path to equal protection. By
describing the role of equality (really, equal protection) in preventing the
freedom of a liberty-loving polity from destroying society's capacity for
fraternity-and by then noting how thoroughly Madison anticipated this
crucial move in republican theory and how convincingly he justified itwe can begin to suggest how attentive we ought to be to Madison's perhaps equally prescient and convincing views about how to achieve equal
protection.
A. The Emerging Synthesis of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity
66
On one view, liberty, equality, and fraternity are inconsistent goals.
Liberty promotes accumulation or aggrandizement, and individualism;

Amendment); see also infra notes 574-578, 613 and accompanying text (discussing Boerne
in relation to Madison's views).
63. E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-43 (1973)
(finding no fundamental right to equal financing of public education, in part on the basis
that education and state taxation are subjects as to which federal courts have traditionally
deferred to state legislatures).
64. Robert W. Gordon, The Struggle over the Past, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123, 124
(1996).
65. See supra note 5; infra Part VI.
66. James S. Liebman, Desegregating

Politics:

"All-Out" School

Desegregation
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equality and fraternity require the opposite-redistribution and communal control. A contrary view, now becoming dominant, is that the three
objectives are consistent, indeed mutually necessary, in a particular kind
of liberal polity-including, arguably, the polity toward which our own
government aspires through the medium of the judicially enforced Equal
Protection Clause. 6 7 This alternative account accepts the conventional
liberal view that liberty is the preeminent goal or, in Madison's words,
"essential to political life." 68 By "liberty," what is meant is the individual's
ability to choose values and plans and, equally important, the progressive
extension of that ability to ever more individuals and ever more public
and social spheres of human endeavor. This conception recognizes, however, that liberty is its own worst enemy. Liberty invites, and even promotes, accumulation and aggrandizement. In the process of accumulating and aggrandizing, individuals or groups of them are permitted and
tempted to advance their own values and interest to the exclusion, and
eventually the destruction, of the values and interests of other individuals
and groups. Insecurity and alienation result.
In this emerging view, economized conceptions of equality and fraternity provide a cure for these self-defeating excesses of liberty. These
economized conceptions inform and help explain the Equal Protection
Clause as interpreted by courts during the last several decades. The conception of equality is economized in the way that the preeminence of
liberty dictates-the aspect in which all individuals are equal is their qualitative capacity to choose values and plans.6 9 Or in a more postmodernist
vein, individuals are equal because they have the same capacity to be
70
different.
The conception of fraternity or community is likewise economized in
the way that liberty and equality dictate. Consistent with the demands of
liberty, individuals are not required to fraternize at all-unless they
choose to have public as well as private lives, in which case they are reExplained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1552-56 (1990) [hereinafter Liebman, Desegregating
Politics].
67. Id. at 1541-65.
68. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 78 (James Madison); see infra Part III.A;
infra note 102; see also David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist113-14, 148
(1994); John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 9, §§ 123-124, at 65-66 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1980); Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the
Laws, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 156-66 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1989) (1748); id. bk. XII, ch. 2, at 188 (claiming that civil, not political, liberty is the
preeminent goal of government).
69. This conception of equality is economized, inter alia, because its goal is not
redistributive, although redistribution may sometimes be a means to its achievement. See
Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1544-45 & n.374 (noting that Ronald
Dworkin, John Rawls, and others define the basic principle underlying the Equal
Protection Clause in this way).
70. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?, in Post-Analytic Philosophy 3,
5-6, 18 n.12 (John Rajchman & Cornel West eds., 1985).
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quired to practice only a weak sort of other-considering "virtue." 7 1 Consistent with the demands of (liberally economized) equality, the virtue
individuals must practice in their public lives is "equal concern" virtue.
Public actors must refrain from public acts characterized by 7 2 a belief that
the individuals or groups disadvantaged by the acts are less worthy of respect and concern either because the disadvantaged individuals or group
members are not worthy choosers or because the values or interests they
have chosen are unworthy. 73 Put differently, and drawing upon a protoequal protection provision that, courtesy of James Madison, did creep
into the first Constitution in its first amendment: Individuals acting in
the public sphere must refrain from "establishing" a particular7 4 type of
chooser, chosen value, or interest as the one the polity prefers.
In one important sense, this conception of fraternity, community,
and virtue is not economized. Its notion of public actors and public acts
is broader than the standard conceptions of "state action" and "politics."
Citizens, 75 as well as public officials-even, sometimes, citizens acting in a
71. For discussion of "virtue" in connection with communitarian legal theory, see,
e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471, 1494
(1986) (claiming that "the bywords of communitarian theory are solidarity, responsibility,
and civic virtue"); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 18 (1986) ("Republicanism's 'animating
principle' is said to be civic virtue."); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice
in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 543-50 (1986) ("A feminine
jurisprudence, instead of rejecting the communitarian and virtue-based framework of
Jeffersonian republicanism, might embrace and adapt it for modern society.").
72. "Characterized by" is meant in the sense of "intentionally acting on the basis of,"
as in the purpose requirement of equal protection law. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text; infra notes 521-522 and accompanying text. Alternatively, it is meant
in the sense of "projecting the view that," as in the Court's "message-conveyance" test for
violations of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
653 (2002) (adjudicating an Establishment Clause challenge based on whether a
"reasonable observer is likely to draw from the [state action] . . .an inference that the
State... is endorsing a religious practice or belief"or is otherwise not "neutral" as between
different religious beliefs (citation omitted)). For uses of a "message conveyance" test in
the equal protection context, see, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996)
(acknowledging "expressive harms" that race-based drawing of electoral districts can cause,
even apart from any concrete effect on voting); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993)
(similar); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility." (citation omitted)); see also Blasi, supra note 27, at 806 (linking
equal protection and Establishment Clause theory and doctrine); Liebman, Desegregating
Politics, supra note 66, at 1574-75 (same); infra Part II.B.2.b (same).
73. For an explanation of how the law aims to eliminate such public acts through
vehicles like the doctrine of suspect classifications, which facilitates analysis of actors'
motivations, see Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at 145-48.
74. On the link between establishment and equal protection, see supra notes 27, 72;
infra Part II.B.2.b; infra note 134 and accompanying text.
75. By citizens we mean individuals engaged in public actions, such as voting and even
speaking if doing so "incites" political action. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra
note 66, at 1552-53; infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
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civil or social, 76 but not the political, sphere-must practice equal con77
cern virtue.
That, in any event, is a theory of why liberty needs equality and fraternity to save liberty from itself. In practice, however, liberty abhors its cure.
Individuals invited to choose values and plans do not readily respect and
concern themselves with others whose values and plans conflict with their
own and about whose capacity to choose wisely they may have serious
doubts. When left to their own devices, liberated individuals are likely to
consider even economized equality only a theory and even economized
fraternity an inconvenient or obnoxious recipe for subordinating their
freedom to someone else's or to the collective. By all evidence, moreover, liberated individuals strongly resist equality and fraternity even when
they are not, strictly speaking, left to their own devices and instead are
legally admonished by the Equal Protection Clause to adhere to the economized notions of equality and fraternity that are described above. This
helps explain why judges are so often called upon-yet so often fail-to
condemn inequitable, nonfraternal exercises of political freedom and are
called upon and fail to adopt remedies that effectively replace the resulting misdistributions of public services and skewed institutional practices
78
with constitutional ones.
76. Civil or social activity includes buying, selling, working, employing, and publicly
associating.
77. The Constitution applies to political action, so "virtue" in that field of endeavor is
always required. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1581. Legislation
properly governs civil or social action and may (although it need not) impose an equal
concern requirement in that sphere via civil rights legislation. See infra note 447.
Although courts sometimes adjudicate "intent" issues (as we advocate) by scrutinizing not
only what public officials did and wanted but what their constituents did and wanted,
doing so is more controversial than other methods of adjudicating equal protection
violations. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1605. Given that mutual
"participation," other-considering "virtue," and "deliberation" are important procedural
indicia of community, see, e.g., Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 115 (1963); Michelman,
supra note 71, at 27-36, this conception's broad notion of who constitutes a participant
obliged to act virtuously, and (thus) to deliberate, achieves a fair amount of the
communitarian agenda. It does so, however, in service of liberalism and without the
communitarian tendency towards parochialism and oppression.
78. On the ineffectiveness ofjudicial relief for equal protection violations, see Gerald
N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (1991) (debunking the view that the Supreme Court and
federal courts were instrumental in securing civil rights, and questioning whether courts
are an effective means of securing change); Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The
Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 3 (1987) (arguing that "the salvation of racial equality has
eluded us again"); Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,
1376-81 (1988) (claiming that civil rights law has failed to remedy discrimination, permits
subordination of people of color, and has been rendered indeterminate by
neoconservative notions of colorblindness); Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century:
Equality Through Law?, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1515, 1517 (1990) (posing "a question presented
time and time again, before and after Dred Scott: whether meaningful equality can be
obtained for African-Americans through law"); Richard Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 Colum.
L. Rev. 976, 979-81 (2004) (discussing surprising paucity of federal decisions finding
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Elsewhere, we and others have been groping towards a solution to
this difficulty. 79 The solution builds on the idea that, although individufederal government liable for equal protection violations); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458,
475-78 (2001) (expressing doubts about ability of courts, lawyers, and rule-based
approaches generally to remedy employment discrimination). For the Madisonian
explanation of the failure of courts in this regard, see infra Part V.B.
79. See, e,g., Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards, in Can We Put an End to
Sweatshops? 3, 4-12 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001) (advocating a system of selfand third-party-monitoring of overseas working conditions by corporations operating
global supply chains); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 314-23 (1998) [hereinafter Dorf & Sabel,
Democratic Experimentalism] (describing potential role of democratic experimentalism
in resolving difficult questions of constitutional interpretation); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831,
832-38 (2000) (discussing recent innovations in use of court-monitored treatment plans
for drug addicted offenders); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 (1997) (advocating collaborative innovation in
the administrative context); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 48 (2001) (advocating a system in which police departments use
community partnership, monitored information collection, and problem solving as a
means of combating racial profiling); Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal
Protection, supra note 8 (manuscript at 54) (describing how a "Madisonian light on
experimentalism reveals how modern experimentalist regimes help solve the problem of
equal protection"); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation:
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 Geo. L.J. 257, 260
(2001) (championing systematic use of performance monitoring and benchmarking as
regulatory tools in the environment and other areas); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental Performance,
102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 908 (2002) (proposing that NEPA be retooled as a means of
progressively redefining government projects to moderate their environmental effects to
the extent currently possible);James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child
Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1703,
1704-07 (2003) (claiming that the No Child Left Behind Act is part of a national "New
Accountability" movement for school reform that potentially could supplant Brown v. Board
of Education as the model for institutional reform and achievement of effective education);
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 183, 184-85, 191-92, 303-04 (2003) [hereinafter Liebman & Sabel, Public
Laboratory] (describing how a combination of movements towards standards, changing
goals of desegregation and school finance litigation, and state and federal legislation, have
converged to create a promising experimentalist framework for school reform); Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 558-62 (1997) (exploring the
uses of community-based planning and monitoring as a method of managing police
discretion); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1019 (2004) (describing an evolution in
public law remedies from injunctive command-and-control regulation towards
experimentalist remedies that permit collaboration, flexibility, and ongoing learning);
Sturm, supra note 78, at 462-63 (advocating a multi-tiered and interactive "regulatory"
framework that makes use of employee participation, problem solving, and ongoing
monitoring to remedy often informal patterns of employment discrimination); William H.
Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal
Liberalism (2003), available at http://www.wisc.edu/wage/simon.html
(unpublished
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als and their representatives are unlikely to be admonished out of a disposition to exercise their liberty in inequitable, nonfraternal ways, they
sometimes abandon such behavior in situations in which the need to
solve common problems creates an interest in acting equitably and fraternally as those concepts are defined, economically, above.8 0 The question
then arises whether such salutary situations may be constitutionally constructed: Relying on what might be called Madisonian psychology and
governance mechanics (concepts we more fully describe below), can (1)
a cautious belief in humankind's capacity to practice virtue, coupled with
(2) a healthy skepticism about its innate disposition to do so, prompt and
guide (3) the construction of "ethical situations"8 1 that give ambitious
and self-seeking individuals (4) incentives to behave virtuously in their
public lives and eventually (5) a disposition or habitual tendency to do
so?
The next portions of this Article show thatJames Madison fully anticipated each important aspect of this asserted method of harmonizing liberty, equality, and fraternity, including: (1) the underlying political theory, which identifies equality and fraternity as two necessary, libertypreserving constraints on liberty; (2) the need, in bringing theory into
practice, for a vigorous equal protection constraint on state action; (3)
the insufficiency of our admonitory, judicially enforced Equal Protection
Clause to achieve the necessary equal protection; and (4) the need instead for structural mechanisms to accomplish that goal.
B. Madisonian Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity
By no means a strong democrat,8 2 and only a skeptical republi-

manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing a new school of pragmatist
thought that advocates carefully monitored problem solving, in lieu of the announcement
and enforcement of fixed entitlements, as the most effective means of reforming social
institutions and responding to the needs of disadvantaged communities).
80. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1614-15.
81. Id. at 1609-14; see Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, supra
note 8 (manuscript at 6-8) (describing Madison's constitutional objective as an "ethical
situation" where "through the exercise of competing, overlapping powers ...individuals
constrain others in adjacent institutions to behave in [an] 'impartial' manner"); see also
infra Part III.A. A well-known philosophical example of an ethical situation is Rawls's
Original Position. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118-22 (1971) ("[F]or each
traditional conception of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial situation in
which its principles are the preferred solution.").
82. Madison attacked pure democracy and rejected Jefferson's proposal for frequent
constitutional conventions because, in his view, the people could not be trusted with the
responsibility. At various points in The Federalist, he "points with some satisfaction to the
fact that this 'wholly popular' government is distinguished by its 'total exclusion of the people
in their collective capacity.'" Epstein, supra note 68, at 195 (quoting The Federalist No. 14,
supra note 10, at 100 (James Madison); id. No. 63, at 387 (James Madison)).
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can, 83 James Madison was an ardent liberal. Indeed, he seems to have
come by his republicanism-what he described as his "honorable" but
unproven "assumption" that "the people" are capable of effectively choosing their own governments, representatives, and laws 84-as a byproduct
of his liberal belief in the capacity to choose beliefs, values, and plans.
Madison's liberalism also defined his economized conception of equality
and prompted his recognition of the need for a governmental structure
aimed at achieving fraternity or at least at avoiding its opposite: violent
internecine conflict.
1. Liberty. - Madison the political theorist is perhaps most famous
for his identification of "faction" as the "mortal disease[ " of republican
government, unless it is carefully controlled.8 5 For Madison, however,
the problem of faction can only be controlled, and can never be cured,
because it is an inevitable byproduct of something that cannot and
should not be eradicated, namely, "liberty."8 6 Madison reasoned that the
two sources of faction-passionately but not universally held "opinions"
and differing "interests"87-are
the unavoidable result of "diver83. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text. Like Madison, we define
'republican" as any "government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior." The Federalist No. 39, supra note
10, at 241 (James Madison).
84. The Federalist Nos. 37, 39, supra note 10 (James Madison); see Epstein, supra
note 68, at 118-20. As Alexander Hamilton wrote:
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people
of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to
depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.
The Federalist No. 1, supra note 10, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
85. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison).
86. Cf. Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 632 (noting that, for Madison,
"[f]action is the fundamental social force that needs to be controlled, the very stuff of
which society is made").
87. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 78 (James Madison) ("By a faction, I
understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community."). Madison carefully distinguished opinions from interests as causes of
faction, noting subtle differences between the allegiances, organizing methods, and
actions of factions arranged according to each of those two motivations, and noting less
subtle differences in the propriety of governmental regulation that preferred and
subordinated along lines of opinion and interest. On passionate opinions, Madison says:
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it,
different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his
reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal
influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will
attach themselves.
Id. On interest, Madison says:
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate,
is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of
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sity."'' 8 They arise precisely because people are "at liberty to exercise" a
"diversity... [of] faculties," 8 9 including (1) the faculty of inherently "fallible" "reason" (the source of "different opinions"); (2) the "different and
unequal faculties of acquiring property" (the source of "the possession of
different degrees and kinds of property," which in turn is the source of "a
division of the society into different interests and parties"); 90 (3) the
faculty of political action (which leads individuals to coalesce and publicly
promote their respective opinions and interests);91 and most fundamen92
tally, (4) the faculty of "free choice in exercising [other] faculties."
Revealing Madison's liberal bent, he recoiled at the possibility of saving Republican government from "the mortal disease []" of faction by
"destroying the liberty which is essential to [faction's] existence. ' 93 Quite
to the contrary, he believed that "[t]he protection of these faculties [for
self-service, self-expression, and self-rule] is the first object of governthese faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees
and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society
into different interests and parties.
Id.; see infra notes 92, 134, 148-151, 158, 165-168 and accompanying text.
88. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 78 (James Madison).
89. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 72 & n.27 (noting that Madison included reason as
a faculty).
90. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 78 (James Madison); see Beer, supra note
7, at 272-73 (noting that for Madison "each person also enjoyed as 'a gift of nature' the
right so to employ his faculties as to acquire, use, and dispose of property"); James
Madison, Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 Papers of Madison, supra
note 2, at 266, 266-68 (developing Madison's views on property).
91. Madison defined faculties (1) and (2) as the exercise of "public ... liberty" and
faculty (3) as the exercise of "personal" liberty. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77
(James Madison).
92. Epstein, supra note 68, at 84. Madison's catholic views as to the wide array of
value-laden and interested choices that individuals are at liberty to make is revealed by his
description of the various factions into which individuals group themselves by their
choices:
All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests,
as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed[,] the
manufacturing[,] the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that
district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples
of this religious Sect or that religious Sect.
James Madison, Popular Election of the First Branch, Speech at the Constitutional
Convention (june 6, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 32, 33 [hereinafter
Madison, June 6 Convention Speech].
93. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77-78 (James Madison). Madison added:
It could never be more truly said than of th[is] ...remedy that it was worse than
the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is
essential to political life, because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the
annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its
destructive agency.
Id. at 78.
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ment,"94 the very reason humans seek the protections but also risk the
dangers (to liberty) of civil society and government. 95 Insofar as the faculties involved are the "personal liberties," i.e., the capacity to choose the
values and life plans that constitute private life, protecting these "faculties" is the object that animates all-even nonrepublican-"free" governments, meaning polities that allow citizens to choose their own livelihoods and beliefs, whether or not they allow citizens (as in a republic) to
choose their government. 96 This same object especially animates republican governments, however, precisely because it applies as well to "political
liberty," i.e., the right to choose governments, governors, and laws. 9 7 Because men characteristically "choose to live a 'political life,"' only in a
98
republic does government enable individuals to exercise faculties fully.
Madison's liberalism, his devotion to the human capacity for freedom, seems to have driven him inexorably-if perhaps ambivalantly-to
his republican commitment to popular sovereignty. His chief explanation in The Federalist for the Constitution's republican character was that
only republican government was "reconcilable . . . with the honorable

determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our po-

94. Id. at 78.
95. Id. No. 51, at 324 (James Madison); see Epstein, supra note 68, at 144, 163.
96. See James Madison, Republican Distribution of Citizens, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 3,
1792, reprinted in 14 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 244, 244-46 [hereinafter
Madison, Republican Distribution]. Free governments include England's, although it is
not a republic because only one branch is popular. The Federalist No. 8, supra note 10, at
70 (Alexander Hamilton). On religious freedom as an attribute of a "free" government,
see infra note 115.
97. See Madison, Republican Distribution, supra note 96, at 244-46; see also The
Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison).
98. Epstein, supra note 68, at 68. Under this conception, the attribute of individuals
to which the most fundamental governmental and legal protection attaches is not some
particular fruit of the exercise of the human faculties (such as Lockean property), and
instead is the possession of the various self-actualizing faculties themselves-most
fundamentally, the faculty of choice among the various faculties and their fruits. As
Professor Epstein writes:
Madison does not say that government is instituted to protect the rights of
property, but rather that the "first object of government" is the "protection" of
the "faculties of men." . . . As in Locke's account, men enter society for the
purpose of protecting something which they enjoy precariously prior to society.
But Madison's specification of that something is an apparently original
formulation. Men do not seek to protect any particular property but rather their
faculties of acquiring property altogether.
Id. at 74. As Epstein himself shows, Madison seems to have included among the "faculties"
that of reason leading to diverse opinions and values. Id. at 72 & n.27. The better reading,
therefore, is to expand Madison's insight beyond the protection of the property-acquiring
faculties to all faculties of choice. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. There is
something of this same notion in the Declaration of Independence's statement that "all
men are created equal" given their "unalienable Rights" to "Life, Liberty, and pursuit of
Happiness." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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litical experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government." 99
Given his contemporaneous concession that "instability, injustice, and
confusion introduced into the public councils have, in truth, been the
mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished,"100 Madison offered little besides hypothesis to justify either his
faith in humankind's capacity for self-government or the massive new republican "experiment" he, Hamilton, and Jay were advocating. 10 As he
said, however, he had no choice, as a "votary" of human liberty, but to
conclude that because individuals have "political" as well as "personal"
faculties, they must remain at liberty to exercise those faculties as a key
element of their underlying faculty of choice; they thus must remain at
liberty to govern themselves; and must be presumed to have a "capacity
0 2
for self government."1
...
2. Equality. - As we just noted, in The FederalistNo. 10, Madison defined "[t]he protection of these faculties" of choice in good liberal fashion as "the first object of government."' 0 3 When he later elaborated the
point, however, Madison changed it in an important way. In The Federalist
No. 51, Madison writes, "[U] ustice is the end of government. It is the end
of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." 10 4 By 'justice," moreover,
Madison did not-as Professor Kramer has recently argued-principally
mean the kinds of libertarian immunities we today use the word to describe. 10 5 He did not, that is, mean protection against the government's
99. The Federalist No. 39, supra note 10, at 240 (James Madison). Madison also
claimed that only republican government conformed to popular wishes and coincided with
the principle of popular choice embodied in the act of revolution. Id.
100. Id. No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
101. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 119-20 (concluding that, for Madison, "Men's
capacity for self-government is . . . not an undeniable truth but a hypothesis ... of...
votaries of freedom"); id. at 122 ("The Federalist . . . presents a paradox: popular
government 'has so long labored' under 'opprobrium'; yet 'republic' is an 'honorable
title."' (quoting The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 81 (James Madison); id. No. 39, at
241 (James Madison)).
102. The Federalist No. 39, supra note 10, at 240 (James Madison); see Epstein, supra
note 68, at 121 ("It would appear that the minimum requirement for a republic is that it
honor the great body of the people by respecting their capacity to choose."). Epstein
argues that it was a "point of honor" with Madison and Hamilton to assume that humans
could choose; otherwise, they would be like animals. See, e.g., id. at 15-16, 119-25.
Madison seems to be saying something more: that the only way to properly honor the
human capacity to choose in the private sphere-the purpose of government in the first
place-is to assume that the capacity extends to the political sphere. See The Federalist
No. 11, supra note 10, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 14, at 103-04 (James Madison);
id. No. 36, at 224 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 39, at 240 (James Madison). This
understanding explains Madison's otherwise curious extension of the word "liberty"which Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu reserved for exercises of freedom in the private
sphere-to exercises of political freedom. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 148 (discussing
Madison's deviation from prior uses of the word "liberty").
103. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 78 (James Madison).
104. Id. No. 51, at 324 (James Madison).
105. Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 642.
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or another individual's interference with one's exercise of faculties of
choice or with the fruits of that exercise, for example, by taking' 0 6 or
theft. 10 7 Madison described those protections as "rights" which he distin08
guished from 'justice."'
What Madison meant by "justice" was the protection of "minority"
groups against systematic "oppression"'10 9 or "tyrann[ization]""10 by more
powerful groups acting through the political process and the government.'
By justice, he meant the duty of "government... [to] protect
all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful," lest "the stronger
faction [could] readily unite and oppress the weaker." 112 The "injustice
with which a factious spirit... taint[s] our public administration"' 13 thus
occurs when one group destroys the liberty of the members of another
group-not, at base, by withdrawing the latter's individual rights (although that may also occur), but instead by systematically doubting or
disrupting the ability of minority group members, as group members, to
exercise their faculties of choice.
In other words, the "injustice" Madison attributed to "factions" and
famously diagnosed as "the mortal disease[ ] under which popular governments have everywhere perished"'1 4 is what we today call the problem
of equal protection. 115 This in turn explains how Madison could believe
both that protecting the libertarian faculties is the first object of govern106. See James Madison, Parties, Nat'l Gazette, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in 14 Papers
of Madison, supra note 2, at 197, 197 [hereinafter Madison, Parties] (arguing that
government should use the "silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of
property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme
indigence towards a state of comfort").
107. See The Federalist No. 62, supra note 10, at 381 (James Madison) (discussing
"unmerited" gain that one "harvest[s]" from "toils and cares" of another).
108. See, e.g., id. No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (distinguishing government actions
"concerning the rights of single persons" and "concerning the rights of large bodies of
citizens").
109. E.g., id. No. 51, at 323 Uames Madison).
110. Id. No. 47, at 301 (James Madison).
111. Madison's distinction bears emphasis. Generally speaking, violations of "rights"
run against an individual; they are episodic; and they are committed out of a desire to
benefit the perpetrator rather than out of some belief about the unworthiness of the
victim. By contrast, deviations from 'justice"-"injustices"-run against groups and their
members as members; they are ongoing (hence Madison's terms "oppression" and
"tyranny"); and they are committed, at least in part, based on a belief in the relative
unworthiness of the victims.
112. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 325 (James Madison).
113. Id. No. 10, at 78 (James Madison).
114. Id. at 77.
115. In Madison's earliest writings on religious liberty, he tended to use the language
of "equality" to refer to what he later would discuss under the heading of 'justice." See
infra notes 122, 126-137 and accompanying text. Madison's reliance on the language of
equality to express his views on religious freedom was in line with substantial eighteenth
century thought linking the two concepts. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of
the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346, 383-85 (2002). See generally Philip A.
Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The .Eighteenth-Century Debate About Equal
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ments generally and that 'justice," or equal protection-shielding minorities from factional oppression-is the first object of republican governments. For under republican governments, the worst threat to the free
exercise of one's faculties is faction-the tendency of powerful groups to
use majority rule as a vehicle for oppressing the members of weaker
groups.
In seeking to protect minorities, Madison was no utopian. He recognized that government action inevitably requires choices among competing interests that temporarily subordinate one to the other,1 16 and he
identified government choices as "unjust" only if they either (1) subordinated one group to another because of a belief that members of the subordinated group or their opinions were less worthy than those of the majority group, or (2) were made with the assumption that a particular
interest or occupation was unworthy of any consideration. 1 7 Once
again, it is Madison's liberalism that explains his tempered egalitarianism.
Although, like other Republican theorists," 8s Madison believed that
a modest amount of redistribution of wealth (short of takings) was appropriate, 119 he opposed a legislatively enforced "equal division of property."'1 20 Because government must "protect[ ] ... different and unequal
faculties of acquiring property," it also must protect "the possession of
12 1
different degrees and kinds of property [that] immediately results.'
For Madison, therefore, equality was not quantitative but qualitative; it
was not the extent of the fruits of individuals' labor that made them
equal, or even the extent of their faculties for acquiring particular kinds
or amounts of those fruits, but rather the possession of faculties in the
first place and the ability and the right to choose among them and their
fruits. 122

Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 366 (describing eighteenth
century movement towards conception of equality of religious rights).
116. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79 (James Madison) ("The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation . .

").

117. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
118. See, e.g., James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana 181, 197-98 (Henry
Morley ed., George Roudledge & Sons 1883) (1656) (advocating "a perpetual law
establishing and preserving the balance of dominion, by such distribution that no one man
or number of men within the compass of the Few or Aristocracy can overpower the whole
people by their possession of lands"); see also Beer, supra note 7, at 103 (discussing
Harrington's Oceana, where "the distribution of property was determined by law").
119. Madison, Parties, supra note 106, at 197 (arguing that government should use
the "silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, reduce
extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state
of comfort").
120. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79-80 (James Madison).
121. Id. at 78.
122. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 83 (suggesting that for Madison, "U]ustice means,
or at least includes, the protection of each man's right to exercise his faculties").

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:837

An examination of the examples of "injustice" that Madison identi23
fied confirms that, like mainstream equal protection thinkers of today,'
he was primarily concerned with a group's denial of the ability of the
members of another group to exercise their liberty when the denial was
likely to be ongoing, group-wide, and systematic, and when it was premised on disabilities associated with membership in that group. Indeed,
Madison's examples closely approximate the modern taxonomy of equal
protection violations-down to a distinction between unequal treatment
1 24
deserving scrutiny that is so "strict" in theory that it is "fatal" in fact
(the first two subcategories of injustice discussed below), and unequal
treatment that almost always survives scrutiny, save in the rare instance in
which its relation to the "public good" is entirely obscure (the last subcategory of injustice discussed below).
a. Distinctions Based on Beliefs or Opinions. - The first opinion
Madison expressed on a public matter was that Virginia's colonial government had no business providing preferential treatment to its Anglican
majority by enacting laws requiring preachers to be licensed and by arresting Baptist ministers who were not licensed. 125 His first act as a public
man-indeed his only significant act as a delegate to Virginia's constitutional convention of 1776-was to secure the replacement of a provision
in the proposed Virginia Declaration of Rights stating that "all men
shou'd enjoy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according
to the Dictates of Conscience" with a stronger provision declaring that
"all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion."1 26 By shifting the focus from toleration of the exercise of different religions to an
assurance of all religions' equal status, this second provision discouraged
laws giving members of one religion preferences not available to others.
That assurance in turn "laid the intellectual basis for disestablishment,"1 2 7 which Madison subsequently convinced Virginia to accomplish
by legislation in 1785.128
Madison consistently resisted opinion- or conscience-based governmental establishments, among which he included all preferential government treatment of any sort for groups of citizens identified by their opinions or beliefs. 129 In a pamphlet circulated anonymously in 1785 at the
123. See Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at 145-48.
124. See Gunther, supra note 56, at 8 (describing Warren Court's "two-tier"
approach: "Some situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny
that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential 'old' equal
protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact").
125. See Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 6.
126. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (noting that religious liberty and opposition to
religious establishment were the first issues that moved Madison in public affairs).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 35 (discussing Madison's shepherding of Jefferson's Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom through the Virginia legislature in late 1785).
129. Madison opposed the bill to subsidize "Christian" teachers not only because it
taxed members of nearly all sects to support the teachers of only some of them but also
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beginning of his successful campaign to disestablish religion in Virginia,
he argued that even mild governmental preferences for religion are intolerable because they "degrade[ ] from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority. ' 130 Government, he believed, should not create preferences of
any sort based upon or implying judgments about the relative worth of
the different opinions to which individuals' exercise of their reasoning
faculties has led them.
For Madison, therefore, freedom of conscience was simply an example-perhaps the classic example-of the 'justice," or immunity from factional oppression, or (in modern parlance) the equal protection that republican government is duty-bound to afford.1 3 1 In terms Madison
because its exemptions for Quakers and Mennonites were preferential on the basis of
conscience. SeeJames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (June 20, 1785), in 8 Papers
of Madison, supra note 2, at 295, 300 [hereinafter Madison, Memorial]. Quakers and
Mennonites were exempted from the general restriction that funds from the assessment be
used only for buildings and salaries for the clergy; the exception was quite logical in that
neither group built edifices or hired clergy. But Quakers and Mennonites were then
permitted to spend the funds on proselytizing, which other groups could not do. This
particularly offended Madison: "Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others
with extraordinary privileges by which proselytes may be enticed from all others?" Id.
Whether in its subsidy or in its exemptions, the fault of the Bill, he said, was that it
operated "by subjecting some to peculiar burdens" while "granting to others peculiar
exemptions." Id.
As is true of Madison's writing leading up to and immediately after the Convention,
which focused far more on equal protection ("justice") than individual "rights," see supra
notes 109-115 and accompanying text, his writings on religious freedom emphasized
governmental neutrality (opposing religious establishments and restrictions on or
preferences among organs of the press) more than government noninterference (e.g.,
with free speech and free religious exercise). Of course, he included both protections in
the First Amendment.
130. Madison, Memorial, supra note 129, at 302. In the pamphlet, Madison wrote:
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no
more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural fights.
Above all are they to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the free exercise
of Religion according to the dictates of Conscience."
Id. at 300. Madison was responding to A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the
Christian Religion (1784), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Madison clearly perceived this bill (proposed, interestingly, by
Madison's Anti-Federalist opponent at the Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry) as
an example of the kind of factional oppression to which representative legislatures were
susceptible-an instance in which "the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority."
Madison, Memorial, supra note 129, at 299; see Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 34
(describing Madison's successful efforts to defeat proposal to tax citizens to support
Christian teachers, including securing thousands of signatures on petitions, an amazing
organizational accomplishment); Hobson, supra note 1, at 223 ("[T]he [General
Assessment Bill] experience was a sobering reminder of the precariousness of so-called
unalienable rights in a society and government operating under the rule of a majority.").
131. Madison himself drew this connection in The Federalist: "In a free government
the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights." The Federalist
No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison).
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developed a few years later, all individuals are equally endowed with a
"faculty" to choose a religion to practice, a faculty that, once exercised,
associates the individual with other individuals defined by the same
choice. 132 Even more so than other exercises of liberty, this one automatically poses a serious threat to itself in a republic, given the tendency
decried by Madison of self-governing individuals to coalesce in factions as
a result of passionately held opinions and, when in the majority, to oppress those with whom they disagree. 133 It thus is the first object of government to guard the equality of conscience against the factional oppres13 4
sion it invites.
Uncompromising equal protection of differing "opinions" is not only
easier for republican governments to achieve than an analogous protection of competing interests, but also is more important to the survival of
the political community. By involving themselves in religious matters,
governments needlessly increase strife between religious groupspoliticizing them, drawing them into the public sphere, and inviting
them to rely on religious imprimatur as a basis for using government action to abuse others. 135 Religious belief is an inflaming passion that often
132. See Banning, supra note 9, at 76-107 (connecting Madison's views at the time he
mobilized opposition to a general assessment on behalf of Anglican teachers to views he
developed more fully at the Convention and in The Federalist).
133. According to Madison, writing in The Federalist No. 10.
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other than to co-operate for their common good.
The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79 (James Madison). Professor Epstein speculates
that by "persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions," Madison here meant to refer to slaves. Epstein, supra note 68, at 214 n.117. For
additional evidence that Madison contemplated race-based factions, considering them to
be especially virulent and productive of strife, see infra notes 139-144 and accompanying
text.
134. Madison evidently believed, as well, that republican governments should be
particularly forceful and uncompromising in equally protecting adherents of all religions
and in protecting the holders of all the "various and interfering" "opinions." The
Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 78-79 (James Madison). For governments can
accomplish all their other intended functions without "regulat[ing]" opinions. Id. at 79.
This is in contrast to the problem facing republican governments when their citizens have
"various and interfering" interests. Id. In that situation, governments cannot so forcefully
implement their duty of neutrality, because accomplishing their other objectives inevitably
requires them to choose among competing interests. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 806
("Today we tend to look upon 'equal protection' and 'free exercise' as wholly separate
notions, both fundamental to our constitutional structure but not conceptually integrated.
That is not how Madison viewed the matter.").
135. Madison feared that "[r]ulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have
found an established Clergy convenient auxiliaries." Madison, Memorial, supra note 129,
at 302.

2004]

MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION

leads to coercion and oppression, and led to "[t]orrents of blood ...
spilt" in Europe. 13 6 Madison feared that when authority becomes accustomed to favoring certain groups at the expense of others, the tendency
137
to aggrandize power and exclude others can continue unchecked.
Thus, not only liberty and equality but also fraternity-the polity's stability itself-is endangered by measures tending to establish religion:
"[T]he majority may trespass on the rights of the minority" and, once
38
accustomed, will do so with abandon and without any check.'
b. Distinctions Based on Personal Status. - Madison's writings in the
constitutional period contain three references to "injustices" or "oppression" based on the victims' personal status. The first two-crucially, given
the nation's subsequent history-are to factions defined by race. The
third is to government preferences among practitioners of different
occupations.
Madison's most startling reference to justice-impairing factions came
in a crucial speech at the Convention in which he summarized views that
later became the core of his famous Nos. 10 and 51 of The Federalist.
There, in discussing injustices to which republics tend to succumb, he
identified race as perhaps the most virulent source of faction and the
oppression it invites: "We have seen the mere distinction of colour made
in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive
139
dominion ever exercised by man over man."
Madison's reference to race as a motivator of faction in this speech at
the Convention helps us interpret an even more tantalizing passage in a
precursor to the speech and to Nos. 10 and 51. As we discuss in greater
detail below, Madison prepared a memorandum on the eve of the Convention listing the "vices" of republican governments-in general and in
the thirteen states and the Confederation-that he hoped a new constitution would cure. 140 In describing ways in which republics governed by
majority rule fail to live up to their promise of self-government, he commented, as he did again at the Convention, that "[w]here slavery exists
136. Id.
137. In his Memorial, Madison warns:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? [T]hat the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever?
Id. at 300.
138. Id. at 299.
139. Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 33; see supra note 133
and accompanying text; infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text (discussing other
evidence Madison recognized race as important source of faction).
140. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in
9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 345, 348-57 [hereinafter Madison, Vices].
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the republican Theory becomes still more fallacious."' 4 Madison suggests that there are two sources of this particular republican fallacy. The
first lies in the fact that slaveholders, even if they make up a majority,
cannot claim their exercises of authority are in the "Right." 142 The second source of the fallacy inheres in the danger of a slave revolt, in which
the previously enslaved group takes power and the prior enslavers can no
longer count on the protection of the law, even, again, if they are in the
majority.

14 3

Particularly, in light of Madison's specific reference to racial factions
in his speech summarizing this memorandum at the Convention-and
given also its group-versus-group, as opposed to individual-versus-individual, connotations-this passage is highly informative about the kinds of
factional injustice and strife Madison most feared. The first source of the
republican fallacy posed by slavery is the "injustice" and resulting illegitimacy that accompanies a racial or other factional use of laws to systematically oppress another group. The second source is the danger of violent
revolt by members of the oppressed faction, which, as we will see, was a
strong libertarian (and modestly fraternal) motivation for Madison's
identification of equal protection as the first task of republican
44
government.1
141. Id. at 351; James Madison, Reply to the New Jersey Plan (June 19, 1787), in 10
Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 55, 58 [hereinafter Madison, June 19 Convention
Speech] (summarizing discussion in Madison, Vices, supra note 140, and stating again that
"[w]here slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more fallacious").
142. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 350.
143. See id.
144. See infra Part II.B.3. For an even earlier reference to the dangerous power
republics give "the majority in every community to despoil & enslave the minority of
individuals," see Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 5, 1786), in 9 Papers
of Madison, supra note 2, at 140, 140 [hereinafter Madison, Letter to Monroe]. For what it
is worth in the case of a lifelong slaveholder who never emancipated any of his own slaves,
Madison was not oblivious to the depredations of African slavery. While a member of the
Virginia legislature, he expressed offense at motions during the 1786 legislative session to
"throw under the table" the Methodists' petitions for a bill gradually emancipating the
slaves and the concurrent motions to forbid manumission. Letter from James Madison to
George Washington (Nov. 11, 1785), in 8 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 403, 404.
Later, at the Convention, he opposed any sanctioning of the slave trade in the Constitution
because he "thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be
property in men." Speech of James Madison at the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 25,
1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 157, 157. Madison noted the discord that
slavery caused among the states, finding it so divisive that it overshadowed the differences
between large and small states and invited a "line of discrimination" between the North
and South. James Madison, Speech at the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 10
Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 102, 102 [hereinafter Madison, July 17 Convention
Speech]; see also infra note 378. In The Federalist, Madison pulled his punches. See The
Federalist No. 54, supra note 10, at 336-41 (James Madison) (discussing three-fifths
compromise and institution of slavery and, instead of taking sides, presenting the
argument for the Southern position in the voice of a Southerner, and the objections of a
Northerner, and concluding after much pragmatic, legalistic, and nuanced discourse that
the compromise reached was sound). Later in life, Madison called slavery "the dreadful
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Madison's third reference to injustices based on personal status
came in an essay he wrote a few years after the Convention. There he
expressed his view that certain occupations (e.g., farming) are more worthy and conducive to the public good than others (e.g., manufacturing of
"frivolous" goods) .145 But despite his own prejudices, he adhered to the
view that government should never take a position in favor of one and
against another occupation, because doing so would interfere with "the
46
free choice of occupations by the people.'
This passage is significant because it forced Madison to distinguish
normal legislation, which almost inevitably favors one interest or occupation over another, from legislation that is unjust because it is premised on
a deep-seated or systematic preference for one occupation over another.
Madison recognized, of course, that "necessary and ordinary" government "regulation" (the lowering of tariffs, for example) will very often
favor one occupation (e.g., farmers) over others (e.g., manufacturers).
Given this recognition, the distinction for Madison between the "necessar[il]y" disproportionate consequences of "ordinary" government "regulation," on the one hand, and the government's unjust interference in
"the free choice of occupations by the people," came down to a question
of whether the regulation was, on the one hand, designed to serve the
"public good" or, on the other hand, invidious in the sense that it was
motivated entirely by the belief that a particular occupation was unworthy. 14 7 Thus, the distinction Madison drew is very like the modern one
permitting economic classifications that, at the least, roughly serve a legitimate state interest, while barring those that serve no purpose other than
to disadvantage a particular occupation or interest.
The occupational preference that most troubled Madison, based on
his own experience as a legislator in Virginia and his broader observations in the years prior to the Convention, was populist legislation authorizing the printing of paper money, requiring its acceptance in commerce,
and providing other forms of debtor relief.14 8 Madison viewed such legislation as unjust (and as drawing distinctions among occupations) because
calamity which has so long afflicted our country and filled so many with despair," and
supported proposals to free slaves, provide for their settlement in Liberia (because they
would remain "dissatisfied with their condition" in the United States), and to compensate
their former owners from the sale of western land. Epstein, supra note 68, at 104-05;
Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 177.
145. See Madison, Republican Distribution, supra note 96, at 246.
146. Id. at 245; see Epstein, supra note 68, at 85 ("Madison's view of justice
subordinates a concern for the effect of various ways of life on the faculties of men to a
respect for men's faculty of free choice.").
147. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 82-85.
148. Madison described the problem in a more evenhanded, general way at the
Convention: "Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard
on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown a
disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species." Madison, June 6 Convention
Speech, supra note 92, at 33.
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he viewed it as a preference for a class of speculators. 1 49 Madison's archetypal example of factious oppression of this sort was Rhode Island, where
speculators and debtors took control of the state legislature and passed
legislation forbidding use of promissory notes or hard currency, devaluing the currency and relieving their debts while deflating the value of
real property.1 50 According to Madison, such measures fit the mold of
unjust preferences for a particular occupation by benefiting speculatorcapitalists at great and unjustified expense to real property holders such
151
as farmers.
Of course Madison's classification of debtor relief legislation as unjust, and not simply inconvenient or misguided, is hard to swallow for the
modern observer, who can hardly imagine life without paper money (unless perhaps the substitute is even softer electronic currency). 152 As we
149. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79 (James Madison); see id. at 84
"
(arguing that [a] rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of
property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole
body of the Union than a particular member of it"). During his time in the Virginia
Assembly, Madison decried land speculators who bought property on credit, then sought
legislative protection from creditors. Hobson, supra note 1, at 224; see infra note 151
(discussing views of Charles Beard, Forrest MacDonald, and Jennifer Nedelsky).
150. The "wickedness of the measures they are pursuing" in Rhode Island were
symptomatic of the "embarrassments and mortal diseases of the Confederacy." Letter from
James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Apr. 1, 1787), in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2,
at 358, 359 [hereinafter Madison, Apr. 1 Letter to Madison Sr.]. The Rhode Island-type
"majority faction" that Madison most feared grew out of the unrest leading to Shays'
Rebellion. Id. at 360 n.2 (editor's endnotes). In Rhode Island in April 1786, the "country"
party in support of issuing paper money took power of the legislature and governor's office
and immediately issued substantial paper money, devaluing the currency. The legislature
passed laws forbidding the use of promissory notes in business so that the devalued
currency would be used instead, and it redeemed state debt with the same bills. Conflict
with the federal government ensued when the federal postmaster insisted on receiving
hard currency, and not the paper bills. Rhode Island also barred out-of-state debtors from
discharging their debts using Rhode Island paper money. Finally, Rhode Island, rumored
to be sheltering rebels from Shays' Rebellion, refused to assist Massachusetts in arresting
the rebels. Id.
151. For the view that the legislation Madison decried in fact benefited all debtors at
the expense of the mercantile and wealthy landowning minority to which Madison
belonged, see Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum 199-207 (1965). The classic criticism
of the self-interested motives of the largely wealthy and property-owning Founders is
Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
(The Free Press 1986) (1913). More recently, Jennifer Nedelsky has argued that Madison
principally feared an aroused majority's confiscation of property or, via paper money,
devaluation of his assets as a major creditor. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the
Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy 22-25,
73-75 (1990).
152. Madison most fully laid out his objections to paper money in notes for a 1786
speech in the Virginia Legislature opposing a measure to issue paper money. James
Madison, Outline for Speech Opposing Paper Money (ca. Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 156, 156-57 (arguing that paper money is unjust to creditors and
debtors, would result in "scarcity of specie," "destroy confidence public & private," become
a "source of dissention between States," "enrich collectors, speculators" and "vitiate
morals," "reverse the end of Govt. by punishing good Citizens & rewarding bad,"
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next discuss, however, Madison's struggle to define the "public good" as a
basis for distinguishing unjust from appropriate legislation that favors
one set of interests over another is not so different from more recent
153
efforts to give "teeth" to "minimum rationality" analysis.
c. Distinctions Among Divergent Interests. - Madison identified and
carefully distinguished two important ends of government-'justice," or
equal protection, and pursuit of "the public good."1 5 4 Madison considered faction to be the bane of both crucial ends of government, because
faction begets governmental action "adverse" not only "to the rights of
other citizens" (i.e., injustice) but also "to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community. 1 55 Madison's overriding project of establishing a system of government that was sufficiently "well-constructed... to
break and control the violence of faction"1 5 6 thus was designed to prevent not only unjust actions but also actions adverse to the public interest.
Here, too, Madison's project tracks modern equal protection theorizing.
"discourage foreign commerce," and even "dishonor our Repub[lic] [in] the eyes of
mankind"); Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (ca. Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 158, 158-59 (adding historical examples of paper money leading
to depreciation and scarcity of specie). Paper money was responsible for the
disappearance of specie in the seven states that had adopted it. Letter from James Madison
to James Monroe (June 4, 1786), in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 73, 74 n.6
(editor's endnotes) (internal citation omitted). As Madison wrote to Monroe, "Our
situation is truly embarrassing. It can not perhaps be affirmed that there is gold & silver
eno' in the Country to pay the next tax." Id. at 74. Gordon Wood's explanation of
Madison's concern with paper money suggests that more may have been at stake in the
dispute than a run-of-the-mill clash of economic interests or an effort by Madison and his
colleagues to maintain the dominance of the rich over the poor:
Madison and many of the other Federalists still conceived of property in
premodern, almost classical terms-as rentier property, proprietary property,
property as a source of authority and independence ....
These kinds of fixed
property were very vulnerable to inflation, which is why Madison and other
Federalists were so frightened by the state assemblies' issuing of so much paper
money in the 1780s. Inflation threatened not simply their livelihood but their
authority and independence as citizens ....
Th[e] majorities [favoring paper
money], however, were neither the propertyless masses nor radicals opposed to
the private ownership of property. Such debtors believed in the sacredness of
property as much as Madison and the other Federalists. But it was a different
kind of property they were promoting-modern, risk-taking property; not static
proprietary wealth, but dynamic venture capital; not money out on loan, but
money borrowed. ...
Gordon S. Wood, "Motives at Philadelphia": A Comment on Slonim, 16 Law & Hist. Rev.
553, 560-61 (1998).
153. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 56, at 20-24.
154. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison) ('justice is the end
of government. It is the end of civil society."); id. No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) ("[T] he
public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be
pursued; and ... no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be
fitted for the attainment of this object.").
155. Id. No. 10, at 78 (James Madison).
156. Id. at 77.
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First, consider Madison's definition of the "public good." Implicit in
his criticism of faction as inviting action "adverse .

.

. to the permanent

and aggregate interests of the community" 15 7 is the view that, in ascertaining the public good, all the interests pursued by various self-serving facul8
ties either singly or in groups ought to count for something.15 Madison
in fact seemed to believe that all such interests should count equally. As is
noted above in discussing government distinctions based on the relative
worth of occupations, Madison believed that the job of government was
not so much to define the public good, in the sense of adjudicating among
society's various interests, as it was to achieve the good that the aggregate
of those interests themselves defined. Government's goal, that is, was to
maximize the interests' aggregate satisfaction-in effect weighting all interests equally.
Next, consider Madison's definition of "wise" or "fit" representatives-representatives who pursue the public good-as ones who are intellectually capable of considering and who are morally disposed to consider all interests and not just their own or their constituents'. 1 59 What
Madison called fitness parallels John Hart Ely's conception of public action undertaken according to the principle of "equal concern and respect" in the sense that all interests count. 160 For Ely, the central danger
161
in representative government is the danger of a "refusal to represent."
Such a breakdown occurs not where the losing group's interests are subordinated on one or another occasion to the general interest, but where
the legislature repeatedly and harmfully ignores a group's interests, and
does so not just for the selfish good of the majority, but "largely for the
sake of simply disadvantaging [the losing group's] members." 162 Victims
of such invidious discrimination hold interests that do not receive equal
do not count. "Such groups
concern and respect, because the interests
63
might just as well be disenfranchised."'
That Madison was troubled by this same sort of breakdown is clear
from his views on the national dispute that was most on the minds of the
delegates as they gathered for the Constitutional Convention: Jay's pro157. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
158. Epstein, supra note 68, at 66 ("The interests of the community are an 'aggregate'
because the community is a nonhierarchical whole; none of the parts has a higher dignity
than the others."); see also Beer, supra note 7, at 272 (noting that one of Madison's great

contributions was rejecting hierarchies based on "different types of property").
159. Although Madison believed that people might come by this wisdom or fitness
naturally, his conception of human psychology convinced him that other dispositions were

likely to be stronger in most people and, accordingly, that governmental structures had to
winnow out the more from the less fit and give those who were elected incentives to behave

wisely. See infra Part III.A.
160. Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at 82 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously 180 (1977)); see Beer, supra note 7, at 276 (discussing the interest-broadening or
-generalizing disposition that Madison associated with action in the public good).
161. Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at 82.
162. Id. at 152-53.
163. Id. at 84.
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posal to allow Spain (then in possession of New Orleans) to close off the
Mississippi River to commerce for five years in return for trade concessions.1 6 4 In Madison's view, the burden that this proposal placed on the
citizens of the "ultramontane" districts was so obviously great, and the
benefits to the eastern districts so obviously modest, that its supporters
could have reached their position only illegitimately or "unjustly"-by ut1 65
terly ignoring the interests of the western districts.
Next, consider Madison's term for action "adverse to the... aggregate interests of the community," the term he typically paired with "injustice": "partiality."' 66 Madison deplored the "partiality" of states toward
their own interests and rights because its effect was to "exaggerate the
inequality [among states] where it exists," and to lead others to "even
suspect it where it has no existence."1 67 Thus, partiality exaggerates inequality, breeding mistrust and instability.
164. For a detailed discussion of Madison's letters to Washington, Jefferson, and
Randolph on the eve of the Convention, see infra Part IV.A; infra note 226 and
accompanying text.
165. Madison, Letter to Monroe, supra note 144, at 140-41. Madison's October 1786
letter to Monroe is important. It evidently is the first time Madison discussed his fear of
majority tyranny and forcefully rejected the argument that the majority view is necessarily
consistent with the public good. Exemplifying the problem was the measure to close the
Mississippi, which Madison considered to be:
an alarming proof of the predominance of temporary and partial interests over
those just & extended maxims of policy which have been so much boasted of
among us and which alone can effectuate the durable prosperity of the Union.
Should the measure triumph under the patronage of 9 States or even of the
whole thirteen, I shall never be convinced that it is expedient [i.e., in public
interest], because I cannot conceive it to be just [meaning equally protective of all
interests]. There is no maxim in my opinion which is more liable to be
misapplied, and which therefore more needs elucidation than the current one
that the interest of the majority is the political standard of right and wrong.
Taking the word "interest" as synonymous with "Ultimate happiness," in which
sense it is qualified with every necessary moral ingredient, the proposition is no
doubt true. But taking it in the popular sense, as referring to immediate
augmentation of property and wealth, nothing can be more false. In the latter
sense it would be the interest of the majority in every community to despoil &
enslave the minority of individuals; and in a federal community to make a similar
sacrifice of the minority of the component States. In fact it is only reestablishing
under another name and a more spe [c] ious form, force as the measure of right;
and in this light the Western settlements will infallibly view it.
Id. (editor's footnote omitted). This letter anticipates the linkage in The Federalist No. 51
of, on the one hand, the might-makes-right quality of the state of nature and, on the other
hand, popular democracy unconstrained by the equal protection principle. Madison links
injustice to "partiality" and to a failure to consider the full range of views, i.e., to add "every
necessary moral ingredient." Id. at 141. The passage also shows Madison vehemently
concerned with minority rights other than those of the propertied opponents of paper
money and debtor relief.
166. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 78 (James Madison).
167. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 352; see also Madison, Letter to Monroe,
supra note 144, at 140-41.
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Madison thus did not consider Rhode Island-style debtor relief or
the Jay proposal "unjust" because he believed the government could or
should avoid actions beneficial to some interests and adverse to others. 168
As he repeatedly acknowledged, actions of that sort are the "principal
task of modem legislation" which inevitably "involves the spirit of party
' 169
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government."
What Madison believed "a well-constructed Union" should be capable of
avoiding is "partial" action: action undertaken by legislators who simply
ignored certain interests, or (what may signal the same thing) action that,
in the aggregate, accomplishes so much more harm to some than good to
others that the interests of the former group had assuredly been
1 70
ignored.
3. Fraternity. - Madison was more of a liberal than an egalitarian.
His liberalism drove him to his economized conception of 'justice," or
equality-which valued and sought to protect individuals' "unequal faculties of acquiring property" and, thus, their unequal "degrees ... of property.' 1 7 Not surprisingly, therefore, the first of the two rationales he expressed for giving government an obligation of equal protectionconstraining "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" and proceeding "according to the rules ofjustice and the rights of the
minor party"' 72-was the liberal's explanation: Absent this obligation,
the majority faction in any government organized along republican lines
could interfere with the minority party's "free choice of occupations,"
opinions, and other exercises of their faculties.
Madison's second rationale for equal protection from factional oppression was similarly functional, identifying equality as a means to another end. That end was fraternity, which Madison's liberalism again
drove him to conceptualize in a highly economized fashion. Unless regulated, Madison believed, factions would foment instability, violence, and
rebellion.' 73 His principal explanation for keeping government neutral
168. For criticism of Madison's view that legislation not in the public interest must be
overturned, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1339 (1994) (arguing that a "common ground
around which to rally" does not exist and that "[w]e are doomed by the logic of majority
voting to aggregate private preferences rather than to find a common public good").
169. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79 (James Madison).
170. Id. at 77-79.
171. Id. at 78.
172. Id. at 77.
173. In regard to the fear of an aroused citizenry, see id. No. 6, at 56, 59 (Alexander
Hamilton); id. No. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 22, at 151 (Alexander
Hamilton); id. No. 27, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 28, at 178 (Alexander
Hamilton). Among Madison's expressions of the same fear, often in regard to Shays'
Rebellion and its spillover from Massachusetts into the Rhode Island legislature, see
Madison, June 19 Convention Speech, supra note 141, at 58 (discussing necessity of
securing "the internal tranquility of the States"-"[t]he insurrections in Massts.
admonished all the States of the danger to which they were exposed"); Letter from James
Madison to Ambrose Madison (Aug. 7, 1786), in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 89,
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among different opinions, notwithstanding that such opinions are "fallible" and probably unequally so, was that allowing passionately opinionated factions to establish their views as those of the government would
"inflame[ ] . . . mutual animosity" and "excite the[ ] most violent
74

conflicts."1
Far from being a friend of all "minorities," therefore, Madison
mainly lived in fear of them. 175 Repeatedly noting the tendency of minority factions-slaves included176-to resort to violence when persistently tyrannized and oppressed by the majority, Madison feared that "a
177
minority may in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for the majority."
For that reason, the notion of fraternity these passages imply is entirely
negative: freedom from instability and conflict. Madison thus did not
focus on fraternity178 any more than he advocated thick notions of equal89 (describing "general distress and tumultuous meetings" in Rhode Island due to the
paper money measures); Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Nov. 1, 1786),
in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 153, 154 (fearing result should the "discontented"
behind Shays' rebellion "get [the] uppermost" at the Convention because they desired
abolishment of debts and a "new division of property"); Letter from John Madison to
George Muter (Jan. 7, 1787), in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 230, 231 (fearing
that "civil blood may be shed," that the government might not prevail, and that those
events "furnish new proofs of the necessity of such a vigour in the Genl. Govt. as will be
able to restore health to any diseased part of the federal body"); Madison, Apr. 1 Letter to
Madison Sr., supra note 150, at 360 n.2 (editor's endnotes) (providing historical
background on events in Rhode Island following Shays' Rebellion); Madison, Vices, supra
note 140, at 355.
174. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79 Uames Madison); see supra notes
125-138 and accompanying text (linking these same views to Madison's resistance to
government preferences among adherents of different religious opinions).
175. This point is perhaps the strongest answer to the claim that the only minority
Madison was interested in was the one to. which he belonged: the propertied class. See
supra notes 151-153. Madison was well aware that he was simultaneously a member of
majorities and minorities, and both statuses provided him with reasons for concern in the
absence of vibrant equal protection.
176. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
177. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 350-51. The three examples Madison gives in
the cited passage: (1) a rich and militaristic "one third" of the populace "may conquer the
remaining two thirds"; (2) "those whose poverty excludes them from a right of suffrage...
for obvious reasons [may] ...join the standard of sedition"; and (3) slave revolts, discussed
supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text-reveal not only the breadth of his
conception of the types of "minority" and "majority" factions but also the insecurity he felt
in the face of the possible violence of the former against the latter. Madison, Vices, supra
note 140, at 350-51. In a speech at the Convention criticizing the NewJersey plan because
of its insufficient check on factional oppression in the states, Madison again raised the
specter that a consistently ignored "minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for
the majority." Madison, June 19 Convention Speech, supra note 141, at 58-59. For other
references to the danger of minority factions, see The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at
80 (James Madison) (noting minority factions may "convulse the society"); supra note 173
(discussing Madison's fears regarding Shays' rebellion).
178. But cf. The Federalist No. 14, supra note 10, at 104 (James Madison) (discussing
common bonds created not only by blood, but also by common exercise of choice to
dissolve ties with England); id. No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (advocating popular
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ity. Rather, he thought a lot about and strove to find ways to avoid the
opposite of equality and fraternity-majority oppression of minorities
leading to violent insurrection.
4. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. - In two critical passages, one in The
FederalistNo. 51 and another in his germinal memorandum written on the
eve of the Constitutional Convention, 179 Madison wove together his committed liberalism, functional egalitarianism, and economized fraternity
into a coherent description of the development of a stable republican
government. In doing so, he identified the critical importance of an
equal protection principle in assuring the mutual security of a republic's
liberally enfranchised citizens:
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or
until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms
of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of
nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the
stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their
condition, to submit to a government which may protect the
weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more
powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the
weaker as well as the more powerful.1 8 0
The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of
the Sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral between the
different interests and factions, to controul one part of the Society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time
sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse
to that of the whole Society. In absolute Monarchies, the prince
is sufficiently[ ] neutral towards his subjects, but frequently sacrifices their happiness to his ambition or his avarice. In small
Republics, the sovereign will is sufficiently controuled from such

ratification of the Constitution because it serves to replicate the common exercise of
choice of government).
179. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 348. Rakove calls Vices "one of those rare
documents in the history of political theory in which one can literally observe an original
thinker forge his major discovery." Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 46. Arguably,
however, Madison's most important document is not the Vices monograph, but the
subsequent letter to Jefferson that actually contains versions of both critical passages quoted
in the text. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 Papers
of Madison, supra note 2, at 205, 214 [hereinafter Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson].
Moreover, Madison had already forged most of "his major discovery" in a letter to Monroe
written six months before the Vices memorandum. See Madison, Letter to Monroe, supra
note 144, at 140.
180. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324-25 (James Madison).
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a Sacrifice of the entire Society, but is not sufficiently neutral
towards the parts composing it.""'
In these two passages and the accompanying monographs, Madison
provided a path-breaking narrative account of the formation and evolution of a just regime.' 8 2 In keeping with the liberal tradition, he begins
with the state of nature, in which, left to their own devices, privately liberated people freely pursue their own ends. Doing so under conditions of
scarcity, however, especially given individuals' unequal faculties and abilities to secure goods for themselves, leads some to threaten others, with
the strong victimizing the weak. Eventually, this dangerous and unstable
situation leads even the stronger individuals, in their more far-thinking
moments (i.e., their more "virtuous" moments), to recognize that all individuals, the currently strong as well as the currently weak, are equally
threatened by this state of affairs. This situation inspires recognition of
the "liberal" respect in which the strong and the weak are fundamentally
equal (i.e., in their capacity and desire to exercise their faculties of choice
without oppressive interference). This recognition in turn leads people
18 3
to submit to a government for their equal protection.
Thus far, Madison follows the traditional liberal account. At this
point, however, he takes a sharp turn away from earlier accounts of the
advantages of republics. By itself, the establishment of a republic does
not, he pointed out, sufficiently ensure justice. Precisely because of the
self-government a republic permits, the diversity of opinion and unequal
capacity to acquire property that in a state of nature enables the powerful
to tyrannize the weak will lead in a republic to the tyranny of stronger
factions over weaker ones. Even the most virtuous may be tempted to
181. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 357.
182. As classical tradition had it, in the natural cycle of regimes, oligarchy would lead
to democracy or republican government, which would degenerate into tyranny. 1 The
Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli 218-30 (W. Stark ed., Yale Univ. Press 1950) (1532);
Plato, The Republic 554a-557 (Francis Macdonald Cornford trans. & ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1941). The liberal tradition did not have any picture of a cycle, but instead adopted a
linear view of progress from a state of nature, to despotism, to a "free" but non-republican
government (one that allowed individuals to pursue their own plans in their personal lives
but not to govern themselves in their public lives, see supra Part II.B.1), and finally to a
contract through which a sovereignty such as a republic is erected. Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan 228-39 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651); Locke, supra note
68, ch. 8, §§ 95-122, at 52-65. Madison's thinking had elements of both traditions, as is
clear from what follows.
183. Initially, people mainly submitted themselves to non-republican governments to
solve the equal protection problem, by giving power to a single person who was assumed to
be neutral among the rest. Doing so, however, dangerously empowered that single
sovereign to aggrandize himself vis-A-vis the rest or to side with one faction or another,
harming a minority or even the majority. This in turn threatened freedom or "selfgovernment," the protection of which drove people to form civil society in the first place.
For this reason, non-republican governments are unstable over the long run, and
republican governments are preferred. Frank Michelman identifies this same link between
liberal self-government in the private sphere and republican self-government in the public
sphere. Michelman, supra note 71, at 18-19.
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pursue their own interests and those of their group, be those interests
class-based, commercial, political, .or religious. So, although the republican solution nicely empowers people to govern themselves, it dangerously
replicates the state of nature by allowing strong factions to victimize weak
ones through the representative process. This, Madison believed, was the
chief vice of the Confederation that the thirteen American states had created after the Revolution.
This dangerous and unstable situation eventually leads even majority
factions, in a second "virtuous" moment of constitutional reflection, to
recognize that they, together with the minority, are equally threatened by
this state of affairs. This reminds individuals of the "liberal" respect in
which they-members of majority as well as minority factions-are fundamentally equal, i.e., in their capacity and desire to exercise their faculties
of choice. And that recognition in turn leads even the majority "to wish
for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the
more powerful," i.e., to wish for a republican government constrained by
an equal protection principle.
Providing equal protection based on a mutual recognition of the
ways in which all individuals and group members are equal to all others,
and of the equal protection the government owes to all, not only protects
the liberty of minorities against majority tyranny but also keeps the peace
between the two. Equal protection thus enables liberalism to save itself
from itself. For Madison, therefore, the purpose of the Constitutional
Convention was to provide this equal protection against chronic "injustice" in the states.
Providing that equal protection is not easy, however. Liberalism can
be saved from itself only as long as individuals in their public lives-no
less than in their imagined moments of constitutional reflection-actually practice this (economized) "equal concern virtue. 1 8 4 And republics
can survive only if citizens recognize, every day, their mutual interest in
protecting, and their common humanity in possessing, the faculties of
choice. How, then, is it possible to provide equal protection-to make
individuals practice this kind of virtue in their everyday public actions?
This is the question that Madison devised the extended republic and the
national negative to answer.
III.

THE FIRST CONSTITUTION'S STRUCTURAL

EQUAL

PROTECTION CONSTRAINT

A. Madisonian Psychology and Mechanics
In The Federalist, Madison claims that a "double security" protects
"the rights of the people" under the new Constitution.1 8 5 The first form
of security, the separation of powers between departments of government
184. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (introducing concept of "equal
concern virtue").
185. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 323 (James Madison).
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and between the states and the federal government, chiefly protects the
people against an overreaching federal government. The other significant source of security, the operation of the Constitution's structural
equal protection constraint through the extended republic, protects the
people against factional capture of state government. The Madisonian
psychology and governance mechanics that explain the need for this latter constraint and its workings are familiar and are only lightly sketched
here.
In Madison's view, individuals have a capacity to be "fit" self-governors; to forbear using the government and political power to entrench
their own opinions; to take "remote" and public-spirited as well as "partial" and selfish interests into consideration; in short, to exercise what
may be called "equal concern virtue. 18 6 But humans also have the opposite, often stronger, disposition to instill their own opinions (an ambitious
faculty) and to promote their own interests (a self-serving faculty) or
those of their constituents (another ambitious faculty).187 Madison emphasizes that neither "religious" nor "moral" controls can adequately prevent these dispositions from leading individuals to resort to "injustice"
and "violence."188 Something stronger is required.
In considering ways to control the disposition of republics and
republicans to injustice and violence, Madison rejected "exterior"'8 9 controls of the "thou shalt" variety, not only when enforced by religious and
moral values but also when enforced by law and the courts. Madison had
little faith in "legal imperatives requiring conformity,"' 90 which he repeatedly disparaged as "parchment barriers."' 9 ' Instead, as Beer writes, he
186. These all may be human "faculties," related to ambition. See id. at 322; id. No.
15, at 111 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 48, at 309 (James Madison); Madison, Vices,
supra note 140, at 354 (identifying as a cause of injustice that representatives seek power
due to "ambition"); see also Epstein, supra note 68, at 138-40.
187. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79 (James Madison); Epstein, supra note
68, at 78-88; Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 48.
188. Madison made this point most succinctly at the Convention:
In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the
rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A
prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by
experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for
character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the
blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to
be inadequate in individuals .... Besides, Religion itself may become a motive to
persecution & oppression.
Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 33; accord Madison, Vices, supra
note 140, at 355; Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 213-14; The
Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 81 (James Madison) ("If the impulse and the
opportunity [to create powerful factions] be suffered to coincide, we well know that
neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control.").
189. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 320 (James Madison).
190. Beer, supra note 7, at 284-85.
191. Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 295, 297 [hereinafter Madison, Oct. 17 Letter to Jefferson]
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preferred to "use law to create situations which would incite office-holders incidentally, but voluntarily, to conform to the norms of their office." 192 It is true that Madison and especially Hamilton were willing to
rely on enforcement via 'judicial review" as a back stop.19 3 But as we
discuss later, Madison was loath to rely upon judicial review, which he
19 4
considered ineffectual.
The controls Madison preferred were "interior"-not to individuals,
but to the structure of government. In other words, the controls he preferred were "structural"-they were intended to constrain the actual everyday practice of just government, rather than to inculcate virtue before
the fact or to punish injustice after the fact. Through the design and
empowerment of the various branches and levels of government,
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
195
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."'
The idea was not so much separation as interdependence, and thus
Madison expected the states and national government to "control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."' 96

("Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing
majorities in every State."). The original letter can be viewed online at http://
www.loc.gov/exhibits/madison/objects.html.
192. Beer, supra note 7, at 284-85; The Federalist No. 48, supra note 10, at 313
(James Madison) (stating that, to be effective, the separation of powers must be
guaranteed by more than "a mere demarcation" of responsibilities on "parchment"); see
also The Federalist Nos. 25, 50 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 45 (James Madison); Epstein,
supra note 68, at 43-46, 50; Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 73, 77; Liebman,
Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1604-14.
193. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696,
762-73 (1998). And Madison himself dutifully followed the instructions of the state
ratifying conventions to write exactly such limitations on the federal government into the
Bill of Rights. See infra Part V.A.1-3 (noting Madison's assiduous work to secure adoption
of the various "parchment barriers" in first ten Amendments to the Constitution, his earlier
contributions to the drafting of Virginia's Declaration of Rights, and his reliance on the
Declaration as a barrier to religious establishment in his Memorial and Remonstrance and in a
contemporaneous letter to Monroe).
194. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing Madison's argument in favor of a national veto
based on inadequacy of judicial review).
195. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 322 (James Madison). Madison's
distinction between weak "exterior" or admonitory constraints and potentially stronger
"interior" or structural constraints foreshadowed Robert Dahl's famous combination of
both legal and moral-religious restrictions into a single category of relatively less effective
controls on misbehavior by citizens and officials, which Dahl juxtaposed with relatively
more effective, structural controls. Only Madison's and Dahl's terminology is differentmaddeningly so, given Dahl's use of the word "internal" to describe the controls operating
through laws and "motives" that Madison referred to as mere "exterior" controls. Robert
A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 6, 18, 36, 82-83 (1956).
196. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 323 (James Madison).
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B. The Extended Republic as StructuralEqual Protection Constraint'9 7
Madison's first step in developing his concept of interior or structural controls was to reject classic "small republic" theory. This theory
held that democracy could be maintained only in a small, cohesive, homogenous society like Geneva or a Greek city-state.' 98 Madison argued
that no matter how small a republic is, there will still be factions. Diversity is inevitable, based on a republic's (or any "free" polity's) protection
of the human faculties and thus of the resulting differences of class, occupation, and opinion. t 9 9 In fact, the greater danger lies in a smaller republic. 200 The smaller the republic the greater the "impulse" to coalesce
into a faction, because of a faction's higher probability of achieving a
20 1
majority in a small republic.
Madison's extended republic addressed the danger of faction in
three ways. In a larger nation (1) there is a lower probability that any
faction will amount to a majority and less "impulse" to coalesce into what
197. In our discussion here of the link between the extended republic and equal
protection, we are indebted to Dean Sandalow. See Sandalow, supra note 27, at 1190.
198. See, e.g., Montesquieu, supra note 68, bk. VII, chs. 16-17, at 124-25 (contrasting
distinctive properties of republic and monarchy); Beer, supra note 7, at 91, 277
("[G]reater homogeneity in turn is thought to enhance the chances for agreement and so
for orderly government in the republic."); Epstein, supra note 68, at 101 (locating
Madison's rejection of small republic theory in David Hume's writings).
199. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
200. As Madison wrote:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression.
The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 83 (James Madison). Madison continued:
[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost
every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is
that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of
property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent
in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of
government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect
equality in their political rights, they would at the same time be perfectly
equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
Id. at 81. For Madison, the worst tendencies of small republics were illustrated by
America's own Rhode Island. See supra notes 150, 173 and accompanying text; infra notes
206, 281 and accompanying text.
201. Given close proximity and ties of blood in a small society, a few individuals may
dominate, "and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression." The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10,
at 83 (James Madison).
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will be only minority factions; (2) there is less "opportunity" to coalesce,
given the large distances separating allied individuals; and (3) elected
officials' wider constituencies make it more likely that they will take a
broader, more general and impartial view of their responsibilities and
that this enlarged view will eventually become habitual.
Hamilton's notes at the Convention, in which he (presciently20 2 ) dissented from Madison's faith in extended republics, highlight the reliance
Madison placed on the development of broadening dispositions based on
the extended republicans' breadth of activity and interaction. In Hamilton's view, local factions would have no trouble finding common cause at
the national level or in forming larger, regional alliances that could be
20 3
just as oppressive.
Madison, on the other hand, hoped that a broad-minded disposition
would arise from the constant, repeated need to find commonalities in
great collections of interests, even if (as Hamilton predicted) those interests find sufficient impulse and opportunity to coalesce into larger alliances of factions. The only way "a coalition of a majority" can form across
such a wide variety of interests, would be based on "principles . . . of
justice and the general good." 20 4 Because the extended republic will
"take in a greater variety of parties and interests[,] . . . [this structure]
makes it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens." 20 5 Diversity thus brings security by requiring consensus and cooperation.
Two auxiliary benefits arise because of an extended republic's tendency toward large electoral districts. First, large districts distance representatives from many petty, local factions. In order to get elected from
large districts, representatives must engage in something like the same
disposition- and habit-forming practice of finding commonalities among
different factions as are discussed above. 20 6 Second, there is a larger
202. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 1334-47 (arguing that private interest
legislation abounds, even in Congress, because of public choice failings of Madison's
extended republic, and also because of social and technological changes making
communication easier and making interested national legislation more accessible and
attractive); infra notes 663-668, 679-681 and accompanying text.
203. Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 34 n.2 (Hamilton's
notes). Hamilton confided in his notes that Madison's arguments for an expanded
republic "do not conclude so strongly as he supposes" because the legislators "will meet in
one room if they are drawn from half the globe-& will be liable to all the passions of
popular assemblies." Id.; see also Proceedings of Committee of the Whole House,
Wednesday, June 6, 1787 (Alexander Hamilton), in 1 Farrand, supra note 9, at 145, 146.
204. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 325 (James Madison); see also Beer,
supra note 7, at 276 ("The judgments of the extended republic will be more just because
they are more general, and they will be more general because, perforce, they must include
a greater variety of interests.").
205. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 83 (James Madison).
206. See id. No. 58, at 360 (James Madison). Madison gave a particularly detailed
account of how the structuring of government activity can over time form virtuous habits in
The Federalist No. 57, which discusses the selection of members of the House:
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number of "fit" or "wise" (i.e., relatively virtuous, commonality-seeking)
"characters" in larger districts. Consequently, there is a greater likeli'20 7
hood that each faction will coalesce around such a "character.
Additionally, in an extended republic, the separation and interdependence of power that provides the first structural "security" against injustice 20 8 includes not only the separation of the executive, legislative,
and judicial functions but also a division of power between the national
and state governments. The function of the states within this federal organization creates two additional potential sources of equal protection.
First, vis-a-vis each other, states are separated horizontally, so that "[t]he
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
20 9
other States."
Second, given the national government's practically and constitutionally limited set of functions, Madison expected the states to siphon off
many localized issues of the sort that are especially interesting to factions. 210 As Professor Beer points out, Madison also expected that connecting large numbers of small, localized governmental units to a
[T] he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an
habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments
impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the
exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their
power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must
descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a
faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
Id. No. 57, at 352 (James Madison). Madison juxtaposed the House of Representatives to
state assemblies with large numbers of members representing small constituencies-as few
as ten voters per representative in Georgia, and typically only several hundred electors per
representative. See id. No. 55, at 341-42 (James Madison). With particular reference to
the "iniquitous" measures passed in Rhode Island, Madison argued that a "sense of
national character ... can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable
body," and that big assemblies with representatives of small constituencies are especially
susceptible to passion and unqualified members. Id. No. 63, at 383 (James Madison); see
also id. No. 58 (James Madison).
207. Thus, whichever candidate is elected will have a greater innate disposition to
virtue than is likely to be true of representatives elected from smaller districts. See id. No.
10, at 82 (James Madison); id. No. 58, at 360 (James Madison); id. No. 68, at 414
(Alexander Hamilton).
208. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
209. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 84 (James Madison).
210. See id. at 83 ("The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this
respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and
particular to the State legislatures."); id. No. 46, at 294-95 (James Madison) ("[A]ll the
more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for [by
the states]."). As a result, an even higher proportion of especially "fit" (i.e., virtuous)
"characters" would be enticed to seek election to national office because of the more
challenging issues confronted there, and because they could leave behind them at the state
level the many petty issues of government that might otherwise repel them from public
service. A national government made up of "fit" "characters" thus could devote itself to
generalizing the interests implicated by the smaller category of more momentous issues.
See id. No. 10, at 83 (James Madison).
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broader, national legislature would encourage the development and wide
diffusion of innovative responses to public needs. States that rose above
self-interest could become "well-springs for reform. '2 11 Especially in the
House (where Madison served in the first constitutional Congress), given
its members' closer connection to their smaller districts and familiarity
with local laws and institutions, Madison "foresaw legislators from across
the country pooling their knowledge of their home state laws when drafting federal laws." 21 2 Just as states nourished the revolutionary spirit and
participated in ratifying the Constitution while making suggestions for its
immediate modification, they might set examples for each other and for
the national government.
Madison hoped this same interaction would work to dissuade public
officials from "partial" and "unjust" legislation, while encouraging them
to innovate and learn from each other. Congress would not only be restrained by the people who elected members of the House of Representatives; it also would "be... watched and controlled by the several collateral
legislatures"2 1 3 through their power to appoint senators and to agitate
among their representatives in the House.2 1 4 Madison hoped that this
power would operate "symmetrically," matching state controls on the national government with a reciprocal power of Congress to veto unjust
2 15
state legislation.
In sum, Madison believed that in an extended republic opinionated
factions would be unlikely to comprise a majority on their own and too
passionately opinionated to coalesce effectively with other opinionated
groups. The only likely coalition, therefore, would be a coalition of
"sects" sharing a desire that government give no sect a leg up. The result
would be a disposition toward "equal concern virtue" of the 'justice" variety. Second, no single self-interested faction would be a majority. Even if
many lesser factions coalesced into a greater one (e.g., various types of
landowners into an owners' coalition, which then forms an alliance with a
commercial coalition), the organizing principle would likely be closer
than before to the principle of the public good. The result, in short,
would be a tendency-albeit perhaps weaker in this instance-toward
2 16
equal concern virtue of the "impartiality" variety.
211. Beer, supra note 7, at 388 (citation omitted).
212. Id. at 306.
213. The Federalist No. 52, supra note 10, at 330 (James Madison).
214. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543, 559 (1954) [hereinafter Wechsler, Political Safeguards]; authorities cited infra notes
255-256, 289.
215. Beer, supra note 7, at 302; see infra Part IV.C.4.
216. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 325 (James Madison) ("In the
extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties,
and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom
take place on any other principles than those ofjustice and the general good .... "). Like
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IV. MADISON VERSUS THE FIRST CONSTITUTION'S FLAWED FEDERALISM

There was one big problem with the Constitution's equal protection
constraint, and Madison knew it. The problem was that the Constitution
would do almost nothing to "cure" the "mortal diseases" of faction-driven
"injustice" and "partiality" that, to Madison's mind, justified the effort to
frame a new charter in the first place. 2 17 Indeed, one of the steps the
Constitution took to enhance the cure-its retention of a strongly federalist organization-actually preserved and exacerbated the disease. To
see why this is true, it is first necessary to consider the "vice[s]" in the
Confederation that drove Madison's ardent efforts to frame a new, more
"well-constructed Union. '2 18 After doing so, this Part demonstrates how
the new Constitution institutionalized factional injustice and partiality in
vast geographically defined and issue-defined reaches of the new republic, how Madison knew it and despaired of it, and how his far more radical (because less federalist) equal protection constraint (the "national
veto") would have avoided it.
Scholars have puzzled over the question of how Madison came to the
idea of the extended republic, especially given its violation of the Machiavellian and Montesquieuian orthodoxy that republics can survive only if
they encompass small territories and populations. 2 19 Although traces of
extended republican theory have been found in the writings of two Scottish thinkers, James Harrington 220 and David Hume, 221 the question remains why Madison chose to build upon Harrington and Hume rather
Hamilton, Madison had doubts about the capacity of the extended republic's legislature to
resist factional influences. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
217. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison). For further
discussion of the point that the extended republic fails to bind state legislators, see infra
Part IV.B.
218. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison).
219. See sources cited supra note 198.
220. See Beer, supra note 7, at 91-122.
221. See id. at 266-70; Epstein, supra note 68, at 101-02; Rakove, James Madison,
supra note 1, at 50. One of David Hume's essays advances a version of extended
republican theory. Hume proposed a government with a hundred counties, each
administered by eleven elected magistrates and each with a hundred parishes. David
Hume, Idea of Perfect Commonwealth, in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary 512, 516
(Eugene F. Miller ed., 1987). Each parish would elect a representative to a county
legislature, and the county's legislature would elect a senator to a national senate. Id.
There thus would be 100 senators, 1,100 county magistrates, and 10,000 county
representatives. Id. Hume believed this "separation of places and interest" would permit
stable representative government and "have all the advantages": "If the people debate, all
is confusion: If they do not debate, they can only resolve; and then the senate carves for
them. Divide the people into many separate bodies; and then they may debate with safety,
and every inconvenience seems to be prevented." Id. at 523, 525. Hume's scheme had
checks and balances not unlike those Madison later advocated, including the national veto.
The Senate would have " [l]arger powers, though of the safest kind." Id. at 526. Although
each county would be "a kind of republic within itself," minority rights within each county
would be protected by the national senate, which could annul the bylaws of another
county-as could any of the other ninety-nine counties! Id. at 520. Counties would try
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than following Machiavelli and Montesquieu.2 22 Madison's papers actually leave little doubt about the answer to this question. The reason the
answer remains obscure is that Madison largely left it out of The Federalist.
He did so not only because it would have lent support to some of the
criticisms of the Constitution that The Federalist was designed to answer
but also, as we shall see, because a critical omission from the Constitution's equal protection constraint left Madison with no occasion to discuss the problems that the omitted provisi'on would have addressed. 223
A. The "Vices" of the ExistingArrangement That Required a New Constitution
The standard (indeed, the official) explanation for convening the
meeting in Philadelphia that eventuated in the Constitution was that the
weak central government under the Articles of Confederation had
failed. 22 4 In letters to George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph, however, as well as in a private memorandum and in a
speech at the Convention, Madison gave a very different explanation. In
Madison's view it was the stronger governments of the thirteen small republics in the Confederation that had failed. Their "vices" were manifest,
moreover, not only in actions that, at every turn, had thwarted the central
government's erstwhile efforts atjust and impartial legislation and administration. More importantly, the thirteen republics had succumbed to
even more abject failings in managing their own affairs. The critical defect in the constitution of the Confederation was not in the Articles themselves, therefore, but in the constitutions of the thirteen member republics. It was those constitutions, Madison believed, that most needed to be
criminal defendants, "[b]ut the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves."

Id. at 521. In regard to Hume's influence on Madison, see Beer, supra note 7, at 269-70.
222. Although classical "small republics" theory generally derives from Aristotle, even
he recognized that a relatively large state-large by the standards of the day, though very
small by modem standards-may be more stable than the small, divided regime because of
its greater immunity to "faction":
The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other is free from faction; and

where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and
dissensions. For a similar reason large states are less liable to faction than small
ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to
divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave
nothing in the middle.
Aristotle, Politics, reprinted in The Basic Works of Aristotle 1113, 1221 (Richard McKeon
ed., 1941).
223. See EditorialNote to Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 205

(remarking that "JM's essays in The Federalist are an incomplete statement of his political
thought" given Madison's omission from The Federalistof his most cherished proposal after
the conveners omitted it from the Constitution).

224. See The Federalist No. 40, supra note 10, at 247-48 James Madison) ("[T]he
object of the convention was to establish in these States afirm nationalgovernment; 2nd, that
this government was to be such as would be adequate to the exigencies of government and the
preservation of the Union. . . ."). Madison largely derived this definition of the Convention's
object from the Act of Congress of February 21, 1787, which authorized the Convention.
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changed, and he saw the development
of a new national constitution as
2 25
the way to accomplish that goal.
In his writings, Madison attributed four "vices" or "mortal diseases"
to "the Legislative sovereignties of the States"-the "multiplicity," "mutability," "injustice," and "impotence" of their laws. 22 6 In successive iterations, the discussion of the third vice ("injustice") grew while discussions
of the other vices shrank. The third vice then became the one that
Madison-after almost totally stripping it of any explicit linkage to the
governments of the thirteen states-placed at the core of his most famous
Nos. 10 and 51 in The Federalist, namely, the mortal diseases bred of
faction.227
225. See Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 44 (explaining that Madison "came
to believe that only the creation of an effective national government would rescue the
states from their own failings").
226. See Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 353-57; Letter from James Madison to
Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 368, 370
[hereinafter Madison, Letter to Randolph]; Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16,
at 384; Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41; James Madison,
Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, Address Before Constitutional
Convention (June 21, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 67, 68-69
[hereinafter Madison, June 21 Convention Speech]; Madison, July 17 Convention Speech,
supra note 144, at 102-03; Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
The "mortal diseases" language appears for the first time in a letter Madison wrote to
Jefferson just before the Convention, which linked the "mortal diseases of the existing
constitution" to "the Legislative sovereignties of the States," and described the maladies as
the states' "invasion" of "national rights and interests," "thwarting and molesting each
other," and their "oppressing the minority within themselves" by "unrighteous measures
which favor the interest of the majority." Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note
32, at 318.
227. See Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 51 (stating that it was Madison's
"overriding conviction that factious majorities within the states posed the greatest danger to
liberty" under the Articles). Illustrating Madison's effort to obscure his concerns about the
states in his contributions to The Federalist, the "mortal disease" phrase reappears in The
Federalist No. 10 but is used to describe the diseases of constitutions of past republics-on
which, Madison claims, the constitutions of the states have "admir[ably]" and "valu[ably]"
"improve[d]." The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison); cf. Madison,
Oct. 24 Letter toJefferson, supra note 179, at 205, 213-14 (presenting similar analysis but
omitting any of encomia to state constitutions). And although Madison smuggled some of
his honest views about the states into his classic, he did so in the midst of inaccurately
saying he believed the Constitution cured the problem. Starting out in a critical, if
uncharacteristically wishy-washy, mode, Madison stated:
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control
the violence of faction ....
The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced
into the public councils have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which
popular governments have everywhere perished .... The valuable improvements
made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and
modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an
unwarrantable partiality to contend that they have as effectually obviated the
danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere
heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of
public and private faith and of public and personal liberty, that our governments
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"In developing the evils which viciate the political system of the U.S.,
it is proper," Madison wrote, "to include those which are found within the
States individually, as well as those which directly affect the States collectively, since the former class have an indirect influence on the general
228
malady and must not be overlooked in forming a compleat remedy."
Among those "evils," the most "alarming" was the "[i]njustice of the laws
of the States." 22 9 Madison considered this "defect" to be "alarming not
merely because it is a greater evil in itself, but because it brings more into
question the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the
majority who rule in such Governments are the safest Guardians both of
public Good and of private rights." 23 0 In assaying the "causes" to which
"this evil [is] to be ascribed," Madison concluded that the "more fatal...
cause lies among the people themselves," given their natural tendency to
"divide[ ] into different interests and factions." 23 1 Madison warned that
individuals will always "naturally" pursue self-interest at the expense of a
minority, when given the opportunity:
In republican Government the majority however composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever therefore an apparent interest of
common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from
unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of
individuals? . . .Place three individuals in a situation wherein
the interest of each depends on the voice of the others, and give
are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these
complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to
deny that they are in some degree true.
The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison). Madison then offered his
extended republic solution and misrepresented his belief that, by extending the republic
and its national government according to that theory, the proposed Constitution thereby
cured the republican "dangers" that "our governments-referring to the state
governments-previously had "not ... effectually obviated." Id. at 77, 84 ("In the extent
and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government."). Later, however, in Nos. 47 and 48,
Madison again criticized the state constitutions, noting that many were hastily drafted and
lacked proper mixing and separation of powers, and that uncorrected violations of state
constitutions by state legislators had occurred in all of the states. See id. No. 47, at 307
(James Madison); id. No. 48, at 310, 312 (James Madison).
228. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 353.
229. Id. at 354.
230. Id. In a letter to James Monroe eight months before the Convention, Madison
harshly criticized the "maxim... that the interest of the majority is the political standard of
right and wrong." Madison, Letter to Monroe, supra note 144, at 141. "[N]othing can be
more false," he argued, noting "the interest of the majority in every community to despoil
& enslave the minority of individuals; and in a federal community to make a similar
sacrifice of the minority of the component States." Id. Without some kind of equal
protection constraint, majority rule "only reestablish [es] under another name and a more
spe[c]ious form, force as the measure of right." Id. (second alteration in original).
231. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 355.
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to two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third?
Will the latter be secure? The prudence of every man would
shun the danger.... Will two thousand in a like situation be less
likely to encroach on the rights of one thousand? The contrary
is witnessed by notorious factions & oppressions which take
place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities are, and in
little republics when uncontrouled by apprehensions of external
23 2
danger.
In "lobbying" letters before the Convention to Governor Randolph
and General Washington (the two acknowledged leaders of the Virginia
delegation), 233 in speeches at the Convention, and in a lengthy letter to
Jefferson (then the ambassador to France) immediately after the Convention's embargo on descriptions of its proceedings was lifted, Madison
pressed the same theme. It was "absolutely necessary," 234 he said, that the
new "system" of government curb the "constant tendency in the States to
encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe
the rights & interests of each other"; and, most especially, "to oppress the
weaker party within their respective jurisdictions." 235 Cataloging the
states' "[i]nterferences" with "the security of private rights, and [with] the
232. Id. at 355-56; see also James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice
Scalia's "Split Personality," 16J.L. & Pol. 231, 251 n.83 (2000) (describing this passage as
"[a]n illustration of Madison's rather dark view of human nature," "influenced at least in
part by his Calvinistic training, a primary tenet of which is the doctrine of original sin").
233. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 382; Madison, Letter to
Randolph, supra note 226, at 368. Madison's lobbying letters did not fully develop-or
report-his views. In several, he justified the veto more in terms of coercing the states or
creating a "defensive power" against state encroachment on federal prerogatives than in
terms of protecting state minorities, although he always mentioned the latter point. See,
e.g., Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 32, at 318. Professor Kramer notes
this change in Madison's defense of the veto-from giving the veto's "supervisory function"
a "plainly subordinate role" in his early Convention-eve lobbying letters, to emphasizing
that function in his later private Vices memorandum and in his April 16, 1787, letter to
Washington. Kramer, Madison's Audience, supra note 25, at 635. Kramer chalks up the
change to evolution in Madison's thinking. See id. at 636. In fact, Madison's letter to
James Monroe six months earlier had already fully and emphatically stated Madison's
belief in the need to curb state injustices. See supra note 230. It thus appears that the
inconsistencies between Madison's lobbying letters and his more private views were a result
of his tailoring his attacks on the states and defense of the veto to make them most
convincing to the letter's particular recipient. As we discuss below, some of the Virginia
delegates who received lobbying letters from Madison, such as Edmund Randolph, were
far more sympathetic at the Convention to the veto's power to strengthen the national
government's hand vis-A-vis the states than to its uses to curb state oppression of minority
groups. See infra Part IV.C.5. Madison's tactics may have come back to haunt him when
early veto supporters like Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania withdrew their support from
the veto in favor of a judicially enforced Supremacy Clause that, although a reasonable
method of curbing state encroachments on federal prerogatives, had no power (especially
given the Constitution's lack of anything resembling an equal protection clause) to curb
states' injustices against their own minority factions. See infra notes 382, 389 and
accompanying text.
234. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
235. Id.
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steady dispensation ofJustice," Madison asked the Convention whether it
"[w] as ... to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under
the abuses of it practiced in some of the States." 2 36 He put the point
most directly in his post-Convention letter to Jefferson:
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious
evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant
as to alarm the most stedfast friends of Republicanism. I am
persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from these
sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced
the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general
reform, than those which accrued to our national character and
interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform therefore which does not 23
make
provi7
sion for private rights must be materially defective.
B. The Vice of the Constitution as Revealed by The Federalist No. 51
Through The Federalist and his head-to-head debates with Patrick
Henry at Virginia's ratifying convention, Madison (along with Hamilton
and to lesser extents Jay and Wilson) was the great and successful champion of the Constitution. But what were Madison's candid thoughts
about the prospects for the new Constitution-what many consider to be
his constitution? 23 8 He expressed those thoughts in a letter to Jefferson
toward the end of the Convention, when the embargo on discussions of
its deliberations still prevented him from giving his reasons: "I hazard an
opinion," he wrote, "that the plan should it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which
239
every where excite disgusts agst the state governments."
The reasons for Madison's doubts about the Constitution are apparent in his single greatest essay in political science, The FederalistNo. 51.240
The doubts are apparent, however, not from what Madison said, but from
what he left unsaid. To mangle the cliche, No. 51 is like a grand old clock
that reaches high noon and tolls eleven times.
No. 51 begins by restating a familiar constitutional problem and
some unavailing solutions to it that were addressed in the immediately
preceding papers, and then proposes classically Madisonian mechanics as
the solution. The familiar problem was to identify some "expedient...
236. Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 32.
237. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
238. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
239. Madison, Sept. 6 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 13, at 163-64 (emphasis
omitted).
240. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 320 (James Madison). Unlike the more
theoretical No. 10, No. 51 is an exercise in real constitutional architecture. No. 51 is also
more complete than No. 10, because it juxtaposes Madison's extended republican theory
to previously established (especially Montesquieuian) separation of powers theory and
describes many of the structural aspects of the Constitution beyond the extended
republican aspects.
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for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the
several departments as laid down in the Constitution." 24' The key phrase
here is "in practice," which was prompted by Madison's immediately preceding conclusion that "exterior provisions"-i.e., legal "thou shalts" and
"shalt nots" that purport to define the powers and limitations of "the several departments"-are "inadequate" to assure conformity with the principles they state. 24 2 "The only answer," Madison concluded, introducing
his famous mechanics, is to "so contriv[e] the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual rela'243
tions, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Thus far, Madison's essay sounds in Montesquieu's "separation of
powers" theory. 244 And, indeed, the first part of Madison's essay is devoted to the political science underlying that theory-i.e., "to lay[ing] a
due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different
powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands
to be essential to the preservation of liberty .... ,,245 Reprising Montesquieu's core principle (absolute separation of each branch from the
others in their functions and appointment 246 ) and the principle's implication for a republic (that, because the departments cannot appoint each
other, the people acting independently of each other should appoint all
of them), Madison proceeds to note and explain the Constitution's sub24 7
stantial "deviations" from the orthodox position.
In fact, the glory of the separated powers under the Constitution is
that they are not very separated. Judges are appointed by the President,
confirmed by the Senate, and compensated by both Houses. The President's veto and the Vice President's vote in the Senate enables the executive to share legislative power with Congress; the Senate's power of approving appointments and treaties lets the legislative branch share
executive power with the President; and neither the Senate nor the
House can act without the concurrence of the other. 248 In essence, each
241. Id.
242. Id.; see supra Part III.A.
243. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 320 (James Madison).
244. Montesquieu, supra note 68, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 156-66; id. bk. XX, ch. 12, at 345;
see Beer, supra note 7, at 225-31; see also Locke, supra note 68, ch. 9, § 131, at 68.
245. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 321 (James Madison).
246. Id. ("[E]ach department should have a will of its own; and consequently should
be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the
appointment of the members of the others.").
247. Id. ("[R]igorously adhered to, [the separation of powers] would require that all
the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should
be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no
communication whatever with one another.").
248. According to Madison, the Constitution separates the legislative branch into two
parts precisely in order to subject the otherwise over-powerful legislative power to
additional separation of powers constraints:
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into two different
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branch (particularly the political branches) shares a significant portion of
the power of the others but exercises its power separately-the President
only after Congress has acted, the Vice President only after the Senate has
deliberated to a standstill, and the like.
Madisonian mechanics provide the explanation for thus qualifying
the classical separation of the three branches' powers by requiring some
of the separated powers to be shared, but then separating the branches'
acts of shared authority into successive steps. Just as "exterior provisions"
forbidding rulers to usurp each other's powers and those of the ruled are
unavailing, so too is innate human virtue, given "the defect [i.e., insufficiency] of better motives" that characterizes "human nature. '249 Based
on the "experience . .. [of] mankind," Madison thought that the purest
form of republican mechanics-periodic elections-was also inadequate
to the task of enforcing the needed division of powers, thus creating a
"necessity of auxiliary precautions." 250 Under these circumstances, the
so-called separation of powers could succeed in limiting government oppression only by giving each department enough of the power of another 25 1 (1) to interest the "ambitions" of the first department in the
business and product of the second department, and then (2) to allow
the first department, when ambition dictates, to thwart the plans of the
second department-or to refrain from doing so if but only if the second
department refrains from encroaching on the prerogatives of the first
252
department.
branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different
principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their
common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.
Id. at 322.
249. Id. In Madison's famous words:
It may be a reflection on human nature that such [mechanistic or structural]
devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary....
This policy of supplying . . . the defect of better motives, might be traced
through[out] the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.
Id.; see supra notes 262-265 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's use of the word
.motives" to refer to what classic republican theory describes as "virtue" and rejecting
virtue as an adequate protection against the dangers of faction).
250. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 322 Uames Madison).
251. The system avoids giving any one branch too much of the other branch's power.
See, e.g., id. at 323 (giving Madison's explanation for withholding from the President an
'absolute negative on the legislature" and allowing the legislature to override the
President's veto).
252. See id. at 321-22. Madison writes:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others .... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
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Madison then noted that under the new Constitution "usurpations"
of power "are guarded against" by a second "division of the government
into distinct and separate" parts, namely, through the retention of a
25 3
partly federal structure:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself.254

In Nos. 44 and 46, Madison had described how this checking function
would work through the states' mobilization of the people: States "will be
ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and
to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives."' 2 5 5 Indeed, Madison was concerned about the ability of the national government to protect its power from the states as successfully as
the states could protect their power from the federal government
25 6
through a mobilized electorate.
253. See infra Part IV.C.4 (explaining why constitutional structure Madison
envisioned, both with and without national veto, gave the states less sovereignty and
independence than in a classically federalist polity).
254. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 323 (James Madison).
255. Id. No. 44, at 268 (James Madison); see also id. No. 46 (James Madison).
Madison used this very technique in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 to
mobilize public opposition to the federal Alien and Sedition Acts-indicating more
continuity between his views at the time of the founding and later than is sometimes
assumed. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; infra notes 353, 494-495 and
accompanying text.
256. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to cooperate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of
the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be
added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be
despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the
sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present
obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.
The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 297-98 (James Madison). We do not conclude
that Madison's fears were answered in part by the national political party system, though it
provided mutual dependence of states and federal government, and a conduit connecting
local and national politics. See Beer, supra note 7, at 306; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 269-71
(2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Putting the Politics]. Professor Kramer argues that the two
national political parties have admirably served the role Madison assumed Congress would
play in the extended republic. Id. On this view, the parties mimic the role of the
legislature in the Madisonian extended republic by bringing enough small factions under a
single "tent" to amass or approach a national majority, in the process denying decisive
influence to any single faction, no matter how powerful it may be locally. Cf. Nicholas
Lemann, The Controller: Karl Rove Is Working to Get George Bush Reelected, but He
Has Bigger Plans, The New Yorker, May 12, 2003, at 68, 82-83 (attributing this
understanding of role of political parties to Bush Administration political strategist Karl
Rove-a fan of James Madison, after whom he named his only child). But from the
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At this point, it helps to recall The FederalistNo. 51's underlying objective: to show how to constrain government, particularly republican government, so it never becomes powerful enough to threaten the capacity
of individuals to exercise their faculties. 2 57 In terms Madison used elsewhere, 2 58 separation of powers and federalism pit the "few" against the
"few" (executive officers against legislators; state officials against national
ones) so that the few (government as a whole) never become powerful
enough to threaten the many (the people).
In this way, separation of powers and federalism protect the "rights"
or individual liberties of the people vis-A-vis the government. But at least
as discussed up to this point in Madison's essay, these political mechanics
do not assure 'justice" among the people: They do not address the problem of faction by keeping groups of people from oppressing each
other. 259 On the contrary, federalism may have the opposite effect. First,
it leaves the states subject to control by small enough groups of voters
that a single faction could hold sway over a state and use its power "unjustly," not only locally but in mobilizing the state's power against the
national government. 260 Second, by leaving entire spheres of activity
outside the interest or control of the national government, 261 federalism
permits this oppression to operate without interference or constraint
from the national level. So, although federalism may be "a double security" for liberty, it provides a double invitation for state-level factional
abuse of minorities.
Having dealt with the problem of protecting the many from the few,
Madison turned to the problem of protecting the few (members of minority factions) from the many. In his statement of the problem, he
again rejected virtue as a constraint on the abuse of power and again
identified the need to embed alternative protections in the constitutional
framework:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
standpoint of the equal protection concerns motivating Madison at the Convention, any
"generalizing" effect the two political parties have achieved at the national level has been
more than offset by their fortification and perpetuation of factional control at the state
level. Cf. id. at 75-77 (describing Rove's and others' success in replacing Democratic
Party's century-long stranglehold on Texas politics with similarly monolithic control by
Republican Party). In other words, the two-party system only underscores our conclusion
that the extended republic is not enough by itself to achieve the local-level equal
protection that Madison believed was essential to successful republican government. We
discuss this point further in infra Part VII.
257. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 320-21 (James Madison).
258. See, e.g., id. No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (discussing measures the
Constitution takes to avoid "an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of
the few").
259. See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text (distinguishing "individual
rights" from 'justice" in Madisonian political theory).
260. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text; infra note 495.
261. See infra note 276.
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the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on government; but experience
has
262
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
As Madison well knew, this passage is fraught with paradoxes. In a republic, "the people" are not only "the governed" but also, when in the majority, "the government." Yet, although the people, like other governors, are
no "angels, '263 and are the locus and source for faction, a "dependence
on the people is . . . the primary [republican] control." 26 4 Madison described the same problem on the eve of the Convention, again rejecting
virtue, or "character," as its solution:
In republican Government the majority however composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever therefore an apparent interest or
common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from
unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of
individuals? Three motives only 1. a prudent regard to their
own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the
Community . . . 2dly. respect for character . . . [and]
3dly. . . . Religion . . . , [none of which is a sufficient
restraint] 265
Madison devoted the remainder of The FederalistNo. 51 to a search for the
"auxiliary precautions" that could compensate for the people's "defect
of ... motives" and "oblige [the government]"-ultimately, a majority of
26 6
the people-"to control itself."
"It is of great importance in a republic," Madison began, "not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of society against the injustice of the other part. ' 267 Encapsulating
The FederalistNo. 10, he explained how such "injustice" might arise: "If a
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will
be insecure." 268 Madison identified "but two methods of providing
against this evil"-in our terms, of providing a workable equal protection
constraint. The constitution either (1) must "creat[e] a will in the community independent of the majority-that is, of the society itself'; or (2)
must "comprehend [ ] in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very
improbable, if not impracticable." 269 Madison damned the first method
262. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 322 (James Madison).
263. See Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 213 ("However
erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of dissention and faction, may appear to the
enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher, the bulk of mankind who are
neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will continue to view them in a different light.").
264. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 322 (James Madison).
265. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 355-56. For further discussion of the three
motives, see supra note 188.
266. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 322 (James Madison).
267. Id. at 323.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 323-24.
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both by association and by analysis. That method "prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority" and is "but a
precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as
well espouse the unjust views of the major as the rightful interests of the
'270
minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.
As a result, Madison wrote:
The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic
of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the
rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be
in little danger
27 1
from interested combinations of the majority.
Reiterating The Federalist No. 10's theory of the extended republic,
Madison noted that "the security for civil rights must.. . consist[ ] ... in
the multiplicity of interests" which "may be presumed to depend on the
extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same
government. '2 72 He continued, "In the extended republic of the United
States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it
embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take
place on any other principles than those of justice and the general
good .... -"273 And it is on this note that No. 51 concludes: " [T] he larger
the society, provided it lie within a practicable sphere, the more duly ca270. Id. at 324.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 325. As Madison said at the Convention, in a speech in favor of the
national negative as a necessary adjunct to the extended republic:
The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so
great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be
likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the
whole or of the minority; and in the 2d place, that in case they shd have such an
interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.
Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 33. It is just here in The Federalist
No. 51 that Madison inserts the passage on which so much emphasis is laid above-that
"U]ustice is the end of government" because it enables the weak to preserve their liberties
against incursions occurring when the strong exercise their liberties; that a version of equal
concern virtue convinces the stronger individuals in the state of nature to agree to submit
to government along with the weak to protect what even the strong (eventually, virtuously)
recognize as their shared equal liberties; that a belief in liberty and its implication, selfgovernment, eventually compels a switch to republican governments that respect
"political" as well as "personal" liberty; that, however, the creation of a republic and the
empowering of the people replicates (and worsens) the state of nature by placing weak
minorities at the mercy of strong majorities (indeed, this is worse than the state of nature,
because the strong now can wield the entire power of the state, not just their own power);
that a new type ofjustice (the equal protection requirement) thus becomes a necessity of
republican government, to protect weak factions from strong ones; that strong factions
accept this constraint out of a version of equal concern virtue (Madison's "like motive")
that arises once they recognize their own insecurity absent "protection" for what they
recognize are their own and minority group members' equal liberties. See supra Part
II.B.4.
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pable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause,
the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent by ajudicious
274
modification and mixture of the federal principle."
Earlier in No. 51 and in the immediately preceding papers of The
Federalist, Madison had explained how the federal principle enabled a
wide enough extension of the republic to bring the new constitution's
equal protection mechanics into play with regard to the central government. First, the breadth of the central government could be widened in
the interest of protecting minorities from majorities (protecting "the few"
from "the many") without unduly empowering the governors to oppress
the governed (without enabling "the many" to oppress "the few") because
the expanded central government's "usurpations are guarded against" or
checked by the states. 275 Moreover, by limiting the tasks assigned to the
central government to an enumerated few, 2 7 6 with the rest being reserved
to the states, the federal principle not only (1) made the range of tasks
assigned to the central government manageable, but also enabled the
central government (2) to operate with a manageably small number of
representatives (because the principle reserved for the states the localized
issues that require localized knowledge and, thus, numerous locally
knowledgeable representatives), and (3) to attract "fit" "characters" (who
would have been repelled by the tedium and minutiae of those localized
issues) .277

Dividing power not only among the three branches but also between
the federal and state governments would enable each of the three
branches of the federal government and also the states, together with
periodic elections, to protect the people as a whole against the national
government's exercise of its enumerated powers. Such a division of
power, together with periodic local elections, would also permit the national government and the state governments to protect the people as a
whole against state governments in exercise of their reserved powers.
And to cure "the evils" that most "contributed .. .to that uneasiness
which produced the Convention" 278-"the internal vicisitudes of State
policy" in the course of the states' exercise of their reserved functions and
274. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 325 (James Madison). Madison
developed this idea further in an "immoderate digression" in his post-Convention letter to
Jefferson. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter tojefferson, supra note 179, at 214.
275. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 323 (James Madison); see supra notes
253-256 and accompanying text.
276. In one sense, the so-called enumerated "powers" are not really powers, but
substantive areas of concern-problems to be solved, or as Madison called them, "objects."
The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296 (James Madison); id. No. 10, at 83 (James
Madison) (distinguishing "great and national objects" of the national government from
"local circumstances and lesser interests" that prevail in state legislatures); see Beer, supra
note 7, at 292-93.
277. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
278. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212; see also Madison,
June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 33.
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"the aggressions of interested majorities" in the states against "the rights
of minorities and . .. individuals"2 7 9- The FederalistNo. 51 and the new
Constitution offered ... well, nothing.
And Madison knew it. Indeed, he said so in No. 51 itself, albeit covertly. In the guise of responding to critics of the extended republic who
parroted the Machiavellian/Montesquieuian orthodoxy that only small
republics or confederacies of them could survive, 28 0 Madison wrote:
[I]n exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be
formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated; the best
security, under the republican forms, [namely, the extended republic] for the rights of every class of citizen, will be diminished;
and consequently the stability and independence of some member of government,
the only other security, must be proportion28 1
ally increased.
But, as The FederalistNo. 51 admits, in order to take advantage of "the
federal principle" to permit the "practicable" extension of the republic,
the Constitution itself had formed "the territory of the Union . . . into
more circumscribed ... States," facilitating "oppressive combinations of a
majority" and diminishing "the rights of every class of citizen" in those
282
states.
The quoted passage does, to be sure, offer an alternative form of
"security" for those rights, namely, "proportionally increas[ing]" "the stability and independence of some member of the government."28 3 But
this is an alternative characterized only a few sentences earlier as "a precarious security," because it "introduc[ed] into the government . . . a will
independent of the society itself."28 4 And most important of all, it is an
alternative solution that the Constitution nowhere provided for. On the contrary, as Madison noted in The Federalist No. 44, "[t]here being no . . .
intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in
279. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 384.
280. See supra notes 198, 222 and accompanying text.
281. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison). As usual, Rhode
Island was Madison's archetype of the danger of factional tyranny in a small state:
It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the
Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of
government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated
oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the
people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule
had proved the necessity of it.
Id. at 325; accord Madison,July 17 Convention Speech, supra note 144, at 103 (noting, as a
reason why a negative on state laws was needed, the "wicked & arbitrary plans" of Rhode
Island legislature); see also supra notes 150, 173 (describing events in Rhode Island that
triggered Madison's concerns).
282. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324-25 (James Madison).
283. Id. at 324.
284. Id. at 324-25.
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watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State constitutions
are .

.

. likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed."

28 5

The first Constitution, in sum, was fundamentally flawed because it
lacked an equal protection constraint on oppressive action by majorities
in the states. And it was precisely this defect-the Constitution's omission
of either the first or the second method of controlling "many versus few"
oppression in the states-that prompted Madison to tell Jefferson that
"the plan should it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national
object nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts
agst the state governments.

' 28 6

C. Madison's (and Hamilton's and Wilson's) More Perfect Constitution
Madison had a solution to this problem that he passionately pressed
on the Convention: the national legislative veto, or national negative.
But the Convention rejected it, and as we later note, perhaps for good
reason. Before discussing Madison's solution, we first consider his reasons for rejecting two alternative proposals.
1. Alexander Hamilton's Solution. - Hamilton's solution in theory,
and in practice as Secretary of Treasury, was to have the national government absorb as many functions as possible, leaving few of any moment at
the mercy of "many versus few" oppression at the state level. Madison
had some sympathy for this approach, hence his proposal at the Convention for an open-ended, not enumerated, description of the national government's powers. But he lost. Partly because he lost, significantjurisdiction would always remain with the states, in spheres offering many
28 7
opportunities for majority oppression of minorities.
Moreover, as recent events reveal, even a national government that
has gradually accreted broad powers over issues may choose not to exercise them. 28 8 Aggregating too many powers at the national level may lead
to inefficiency and failed policies, popular resistance, and an effective demand by the states ofjust the sort that The FederalistNo. 44 had predicted,
that power be returned to them. There is thus no reason to expect that
the national government will choose to absorb the kinds of issues that are
most susceptible to majority tyranny in the states and many reasons to
285. Id. No. 44, at 286 Uames Madison) (emphasis added).
286. Madison, Sept. 6 Letter to Jefferson, supra

note 13, at 163-64

(emphasis

omitted). Madison further explained his doubts about the new constitution in Madison,
Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 209-14.
287. See The Federalist No. 17, supra note 10, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) ("There
is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State governments . .. I
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the
most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and
attachment."). For additional discussion of the significant powers and advantages
remaining with the states, see The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296-98 (James
Madison); supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.
288. See infra Part V.C.
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think it will instead choose to concern itself with less factious issues that
more obviously affect the public good, such as national security.
Madison made exactly this prediction in No. 44 in the process, as we
have noted, of stating explicitly what the lacuna in No. 51 had implied,
that the Constitution as written would not sufficiently protect minorities
from state-level tyranny:
The truth is that this ultimate redress [i.e., federalism] may be
more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal
than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason that as every
such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the
latter, these [states] will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to
sound the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence
in effecting a change of federal representatives. There being no
such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the
people interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unno289
ticed and unredressed.
Regardless of the precise allocation of responsibility between the states
and the national government, therefore, the retention of a federal system
in which the states had substantial sovereignty and political clout (which
was itself a prerequisite for the extended republic's protection against
national tyranny) left ample room for state-level factional oppression to
operate and yet "remain unnoticed and unredressed."
Ultimately, even Hamilton himself recognized this problem. In the
only reference in The Federalist to the national negative, Hamilton in No.
80 described the veto, or some substitute for it that goes beyond the extended republic itself, as crucial if the states were to be prevented from
committing injustices against their people:
No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions [on state
injustices] would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on
the State laws or an authority in the federal courts to overrule
such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of
290
Union.
As we develop later in this Part, the Convention did very explicitly understand and adopt the 'Judicial review" solution to which Hamilton refers as
a substitute for the veto. 291 But as we develop in Part V below, Madison
rightly rejected this solution, not only because the first Constitution had
no equal protection provision for the federal courts to enforce against
289. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 10, at 286 (James Madison); see also id. No.
80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) ("What... would avail restrictions on the authority of the
State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of
them?").
290. Id. No. 80, at 475-76 (Alexander Hamilton).
291. See infra Part IV.C.5.
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in
the states but also because judicial review was not an "effectual power
292
the [central] government to restrain or correct" state injustices.
2. James Wilson's Solution. - Hamilton's nationalist fellow traveler
James Wilson-who along with Hamilton was the rare delegate who actually seems to have understood Madison's concerns about faction 29 3-disagreed with Madison's assessment of the seriousness of the problem. For
Wilson, faction was simply an excess of political enthusiasm-an "esprit
du corps" that was "frequently nothing else than a warm but inconsiderate ebullition of our social propensities." 29 4 Wilson was loath to dampen
such social passions, believing they would draw the people to the newly
empowered national government. 295 He also thought the maladministration of state governments would diminish as the national government's
better administration (a product of its consideration of a wider, more
we have seen,
optimal range of interests) led states to emulate it.29 6 As
297
however, Madison found no solace in such predictions.
Worse, Wilson's prediction depended in part on a psychological assumption: that the "social virtue" citizens possess would lead them, in
exercising their power of self-government, to develop affection for a national government that better embodied those virtues than local governments. 298 Although similar to the virtue-inculcating process that Madison
hoped would accompany his national veto-under which the extended
republic would create generalizing habits of political practice that would
feed back to the state governmental leve1299 -the psychological process
Wilson imagined worked directly on citizens, not just on state legislators.30 0 And it worked purely by emulable example, without the structural incentives at the heart of Madison's proposal.
From a Madisonian perspective, the psychology Wilson imagined was
both unlikely, given the highly economized version of citizen participa292. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 10, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton).
293. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; infra notes 338, 388 and
accompanying text.
294. Beer, supra note 7, at 375-76 (quoting James Wilson, Of Man, As a Member of a
Confederation, in 1 The Works of James Wilson 247, 266 (Robert Green McCloskey ed.,
1967)).
295. See id. at 367-73.
296. See id.; James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, in Wilson, supra note 294, at 148,
162-64; James Wilson, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania-Of
the Legislative Department, in Wilson, supra note 294, at 399, 402-03.
297. This was due to his respect for the states' capacities to maintain the allegiance of
the people in any fight with the national government, and his worry that oppressive state
majorities would think they had more to lose by giving up their state-level monopolies on
power than they had to gain by adopting more far-seeing administrations. See The
Federalist No. 44, supra note 10, at 286 (James Madison).
298. Beer, supra note 7, at 367-73.
299. See infra Part IV.C.4.
300. See Beer, supra note 7, at 370-71 (discussing Wilson's belief in the inculcating
power of discussing and explaining that for Wilson "[t]he perfecting of the Union went
along with the perfecting of its citizens").
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tion that the Constitution adopted, and unwelcome, given Madison's reservations about strong participatory democracy. 30' Madison harbored
those reservations precisely because he expected "partial," not "generalizing," considerations to dominate local elections, where the kind of national-to-state-level feedback Wilson imagined would have to take
place. 30 2 Madison's belief in individuals' "defect of better motives" under
most circumstances, 30 3 and his respect for the ability of states and their
governing factions to command popular support, 30 4 also left him with
little faith in the virtue-inculcating power of the national government's
example by itself. For Madison, as we will soon see, virtue can be inculcated only after long, habitual, incentive-driven practice. It will not arise
merely as a result of the public's occasional attention to salutary
examples.
3. Madison's National Negative. - Madison's own solution was to add
a separate structural or "interior" equal protection constraint that operated not on the government of the extended republic but on those of the
"more circumscribed . . . States." 30 5 As radical then as now, Madison's
proposal was a national legislative veto. Congress would be empowered
to veto state legislative measures in "all cases whatsoever."30 6 The national
negative was the centerpiece of Madison's proposed constitutional structure, and by his lights the most important contemplated reform of the
Articles. He tirelessly advocated it at the Convention. Indeed, for the
other delegates his advocacy of the negative must have been tiresome,
given how often he tried to resurrect the proposal after it was first
defeated.
Although in the sections that follow we highlight Madison's enthusiasm for his proposal, we do not, in the end, share his fervent belief in the
particular structural equal protection mechanism he proposed. On the
contrary, in Part VII below and in a companion article, 30 7 we argue that
that the national veto would not have served its intended purpose, especially under modern conditions. What we instead take from Madison is
his reasoning and his structural approach to the problem he so
presciently diagnosed. Before we can explain what we do and do not take
from Madison, however, we must first describe his proposal and recall in
detail his reasoning and approach to structural equal protection.
301. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 195-97; supra note 200 (noting Madison's
reservations about strong democracy).
302. See The Federalist No. 57, supra note 10, at 352 (James Madison); see also id.
No. 55, at 341-42 (James Madison) (noting that state elections were rife with possibilities
for factional control, given that as few as ten electors sometimes were responsible for
electing a single state representative).
303. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.
305. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison).
306. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 383.
307. Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, supra note 8 (manuscript
at 82-83).
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a. The Need for the Negative. - In understanding the importance of
the negative to Madison, it helps to begin with Madison's strong metaphor-the "mortal diseases of the existing constitution. 3 0°8 "These diseases," he said in a letter to Jefferson:
are at present marked by symptoms which are truly alarming,
which have tainted the faith of the most orthodox republicans,
and which challenge from the votaries of liberty every concession in favor of stable Government not infringing fundamental
principles, as the only security against an opposite extreme of
3 09
our present situation.
Having thus tried to prepare Jefferson for a radical "concession in favor
of stable Government," 3 10 Madison offered his solution, privileging it
"over" what we call Hamilton's solution above:
Over & above the positive power of regulating trade and sundry
other matters in which uniformity is proper .... [the new constitution should] arm the federal head with a negative in all cases
whatsoever on the local Legislatures.... The effects of this provision would be not only to guard the national rights and interests against invasion, but also to restrain the States from thwarting and molesting each other, and even from oppressing the
minority within themselves by paper money and other unright3 11
eous measures which favor the interest of the majority.
In this letter and letters to Washington and Randolph, Madison argued that the severity of the states' injustices compelled the breadth and
radical nature of his proposal. Acknowledging that the language, "in all
cases whatsoever," came from the British Crown's despised royal prerogative over the legislation of the former colonies,3 12 he argued that extending the veto to entirely "local questions of policy" was "absolutely
308. Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 32, at 318.
309. Id.; see also Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 33 (noting
tendency of "all civilized Societies" to divide "into different Sects, Factions, & interests"
who pursue their goals in the political process).
310. Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 32, at 318. In fact, Madison's
veto idea offended Jefferson's federalist sensibilities. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (June 20, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 63, 64
[hereinafter Jefferson, June 20 Letter to Madison] ("Primfa facie I do not like it."); infra
Part VII.B (discussing Jefferson's objections).
311. Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 32, at 318.
312. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 383 (stating that "a negative in
all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly
prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible
encroachment on the State jurisdictions"). At risk to his ability to win over the other
delegates, Madison more than once stated that the veto was inspired by the prerogative of
the King of England over the laws of parts of the empire. As he said in a speech to the
Convention, he admired the "harmony & subordination of the various parts of the
empire," which he attributed to the Crown's ability to "stifle[ ] in the birth every Act of
every part tending to discord or encroachment." Madison, July 17 Convention Speech,
supra note 144, at 102-03. Madison's negative proposal also evidently was influenced by
David Hume's writings about the ideal republic-although Hume, too, may have been
influenced by the royal prerogative. See supra note 221.
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necessary" and, given the need, "the least possible encroachment on the
State jurisdictions. '3 13 Rejecting the Hamiltonian solution by itself,
Madison argued that " [w] ithout this defensive power" of the national government to veto unjust legislation by the states, "experience and reflection have satisfied me that however ample the federal powers may be
made, or however Clearly their boundaries may be delineated, on paper,
they will be easily and continually baffled by the Legislative sovereignties
3 14
of the States."
Madison turned up the heat even higher at the Convention, arguing
he "could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts
of the States"-one "extend [ing] to all cases"-"as absolutely necessary to
a perfect system. '3 15 In ominous tones, he forecast the Civil War, warning that the inevitable alternative to this "least possible" structural encroachment was the national government's resort to coercive force
against the states:
Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to
infringe the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the
weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative was
the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these
mischeifs [sic]. The existence of such a check would prevent
attempts to commit them. Should no such precaution be3 16engrafted, the only remedy wd. lie in an appeal to coercion.
b. The Ameliorative Operation of the Veto. - In pre-Convention letters
to Randolph and Washington, Madison provided the first of three descriptions of the ameliorative or arbitral operation of the negative against
the depredations of majority oppression of minorities:
The great desideratum which has not yet been found for Republican Governments, seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions & interests in the State. The majority who alone have the right of
decision, have frequently an interest real or supposed in abusing
it. In Monarchies the sovereign is more neutral to the interests
and views of different parties; but unfortunately he too often
forms interests of his own repugnant to those of the whole.
Might not the national prerogative here suggested be found suf313. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 383-84.
314. Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 32, at 318. For similar
statements in contemporaneous letters and at the Convention, see Madison, Letter to
Washington, supra note 16, at 382; Madison, Letter to Randolph, supra note 226, at 368;
Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41; Madison, July 17 Convention
Speech, supra note 144, at 102-03.
315. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41. For similar
statements, see Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 213-14; sources
cited supra note 314; see also infra note 378 (discussing speech by Madison at the
Convention predicting increasing conflict between Northern and Southern states over
slavery, particularly as new Western states joined the Union).
316. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
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ficiently disinterested for the decision of local questions of policy, whilst it would itself be sufficiently restrained from31the
pur7
suit of interests adverse to those of the whole Society?
When the King served as arbiter, he was not sufficiently neutral. Congress would do better, however, given the workings of the extended republic, because it would have a wide mix of diverse interests, with no
single faction being large enough to hold sway over the rest.3 18 In the
aggregate, Congress would be entirely disengaged from any particular local question of policy, and perfectly situated to focus on the national
good. It would be the umpire, the neutral arbiter.
Madison's speech at the Convention on behalf of a combined presidential and judicial veto of federal legislation, delivered a few days before
he championed a national legislative veto of state legislation, provides
additional support for his "neutral arbiter" point:
We must introduce the Checks, which will destroy the measures
of an interested majority[.] [I]n this view a negative in the
Ex[ecutive] is not only necessary for its own safety, but for the
safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and
interested majority-The independent condition of the
Ex[ecutive] who has the Eyes of all Nations on him will render
him a just Judge-add
the Judiciary and you increase the
3 19
respectability.
In defending the legislative veto itself at the Convention, Madison
shifted ground somewhat. A reason for the shift may lie in concerns
about the correctness of Madison's claim that the veto would "not infring[e] fundamental [i.e., republican] principles." 32 0 That assurance may
be compared with Madison's subsequent, more generalized description
in The FederalistNo. 51 of the neutral-arbiter "method" of avoiding majority tyranny. That method, he said, "prevails in all governments possessing
an hereditary or self-appointed authority" and proceeds by "introducing into
the government ... a will independent of the society itself"''3 2 1 In The Federalist
No. 51, Madison equivocates on whether this method is consistent with
"republican forms," and in his parallel speech at the Convention, he
strongly suggested that it was not consistent with such forms of government.322 Perhaps to distance the proposal from the anti-republican odor
317. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 384; see also Madison, Letter to
Randolph, supra note 226, at 370. In his June 8 speech to the Convention, Madison
floated the possibility of limiting the power to veto to the most neutral legislative branch,
the Senate. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 42.
318. See supra Part III.B.
319. James Madison, Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, Speech at
the Constitutional Convention (June 4, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 25,
25 [hereinafter Madison, June 4 Convention Speech].
320. Madison, Mar. 19 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 32, at 318.
321. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324, 325 (James Madison) (emphasis
added).
322. In Madison's speech at the Convention that foreshadowed The FederalistNo. 51,
he claimed that the extended republic was "the only defense agst. the inconveniences of
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of the "neutral arbiter" method of assuring equal protection, which
Madison at the very least considered a "precarious security, '3 23 he
switched at the Convention to a "separation of powers" explanation:
"The States cd. of themselves then pass no operative act, any more than
one branch of a Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed
without the other."3 24 Thus, as in a bicameral legislature, "[t]he existence of such a check" created by the requirement of the second body's
concurrence "would prevent attempts to commit" such "mischiefs" in the
first body, as it would legislate with an eye towards what would be acceptable to the second.3 2 5 Although this explanation addressed the states'
legislative tendencies to usurp national prerogatives, it did not as neatly
explain the national negative's value in avoiding internally oppressive
legislation.
Madison's most coherent explanation of the negative's republican
bona fides is in his post-Convention letter tojefferson. "It may be asked,"
Madison wrote, "how private rights will be more secure under the Guardianship of the General Government than under the State Governments ....,"326 Both governments, he noted, are "founded on the republican principle which refers the ultimate decision to the will of the
majority, and [the two] are distinguished rather by the extent within
which they will operate, than by any material difference in their structure." 32 7 The answer, wrote Madison, is exactly that distinguishing traitthe "extent within which [the national and state governments] will operate." 328 "In a large Society, the people are broken into so many interests
and parties, that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the
requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a majority"; consequently,
"no common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the
whole ...."329 By contrast, in a "small . . . sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed agst. the weaker party .... -330
In Madison's view, therefore, the national legislature-itself a republican body formed in part by the votes of the citizens of each state-was
the appropriate body to exercise a negative, not because it reflected no
interest or only one, but because it reflected a "pretty even balance" of all
democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt." Madison, June 6 Convention
Speech, supra note 92, at 33 (emphasis added). This statement made clear what the
discussion in The FederalistNo. 51 leaves ambiguous-that the "stability and independence
of some member of the government, the only other security [against majority tyranny]," is
not consistent with "republican forms" or able to constrain majority tyranny. The
Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison).
323. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison).
324. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
325. Id.; see also The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton).
326. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 214.
330. Id.
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interests. 3 ' A national legislature empowered to veto state legislation
could thus provide "[t]he great desideratum in Government." It could
"modify the sovereignty [so] that it may be sufficiently neutral between
different parts of the Society to controul one part from invading the
rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from
33
setting up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society."

2

Thus understood, the national negative was not anathema to republicanism but a prerequisite to it. The negative would have simultaneously
afforded minorities equal protection against unjust and partial state
laws- giving them access to an impartial political process through which
to exercise their self-governing faculties-while being sufficiently constrained (unlike England's king and hereditary lords) "by its dependence
3 33
on the community" via elections and on the states via federalism.
Moreover, by operating both through the national legislature's afterthe-fact nullification of unjust legislation, 334 and by "preventing" attempts
to commit "mischiefs" before the fact 3 35-as state legislators contemplated the reaction their proposals would engender in the national legislature-the process of inculcating state legislators with the national legislators' interest-generalizing dispositions, habits,, and virtues would
proceed far more successfully than if the inculcating process occurred (a
la James Wilson) entirely by distant example.
The habit-forming process by which the negative would have served
over time to inculcate habits of just and generalizing lawmaking may be
inferred from The Federalist'sdiscussion of second-best substitutes for the
veto, such as judicial review and the extended republic. A crucial psycho331. Id.; see also The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 79-80 (James Madison)
(analogizing operation of the legislature in extended republic to deliberations of a judge
free of "bias" and "corrupt[ion]").
332. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 214.
333. Id. As Madison wrote, "The General Government would hold a pretty even
balance between the parties of particular States, and be at the same time sufficiently
restrained by its dependence on the community, from betraying its general interests." Id.
334. What Madison said about the ameliorative effect of the small number and
indirect election of United States Senators on injustices momentarily contemplated by
members of the public precisely describes the beneficial effect he also expected Congress's
veto to have on injustices actually committed by state legislatures under the influence of
oppressive majority factions:
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and
actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers;
so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by
some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful
misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they
themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these
critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and
respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career and to
suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason,
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?
The Federalist No. 63, supra note 10, at 384 (James Madison).
335. See Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
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logical effect of Congress's oversight would be to cause each state legislator to stop and think, before adopting unjust legislation, about how Congress would react. Just as Hamilton said about judicial review by federal
judges, this oversight process could have been "of vast importance" in
deterring unjust laws by "operat[ing] as a check upon the legislative body
in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be expected" upon subsequent review by national
officials "are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice
336
they meditate, to qualify their attempts."
Although, as we will see, Madison lacked Hamilton's faith in courts,
his reasons distinguish the congressional veto. Unlike occasional judicial
review subject to the vagaries of litigant interests, resources, and access to
distant courts, veto consideration would be automatic in each case. 337 As
James Wilson contended at the Convention, the proposed negative would
serve as "the key-stone wanted to compleat the wide arch of Government
we are raising.... The firmness ofJudges is not of itself sufficient. Something further is requisite-It will be better to prevent the passage of an
improper law, than to declare it void when passed. '3 38 Nor did the negative face the difficult task of getting state legislators to think habitually
like judges governed by "parchment provisions." 33 9 Instead, the negative
sought to make state legislators think habitually like representatives and
senators governed by the inherently legislative need to build "coalition [s]
of [the] majority," 3 40 albeit at the scale of the extended republic, where
coalitions are "more just because ... more general, and.., more general
'34 1
because . . . they must include a greater variety of interests."
Madison valued frequent elections of members of the House of Representatives because elections would infuse members with "an habitual
recollection of their dependence on the people." 342 He likewise expected the national negative to provide state legislators with a constant
reminder of their "habitual" dependence on the national legislaturesome of whose members, in turn, were likely to be habitually dependent
on individuals very much like those constituents state legislators might
otherwise be disposed to neglect or oppress because of their minority
status locally. This explains why the extended republic was not sufficient
by itself. 343 Although the large republic did create a governing body with
the kinds of generalizing dispositions that Madison valued, it was only
336. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton).
337. See supra notes 316, 324-325 and accompanying text.
338. Proceedings of the Convention, Draft Constitution Required by the Committee
of Detail, Aug. 23, 1787 (James Madison), in 2 Farrand, supra note 9, at 391 (remarks of
James Wilson).
339. The Federalist No. 25, supra note 10, at 167 (Alexander Hamilton); see infra
Part V.B.3.
340. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 325 (James Madison).
341. Beer, supra note 7, at 276; see supra Part III.B.
342. The Federalist No. 57, supra note 10, at 352 (James Madison).
343. See supra Part III.B.
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through the national negative that state legislators could be made habitually dependent on the support of national legislators with that broader
perspective.
4. Cooperative Federalism. - Even apart from the national negative,
but especially when it is considered, Madison can be seen to have envi344
sioned a unique brand of federalism. Contrary to one prominent view,
Madison did not wish to see the states wither away. He valued the states
as a "double security" for the individual "rights of the people" and against
inter-factional injustice. 345 Along with the even more nationalistic Hamilton, he described the states as essential administrative "auxiliaries" of the
national government, 346 and as crucial mechanisms for siphoning off
tasks the national government could not administer itself without under347
mining its efficiency and discouraging "fit characters" from joining it.
344. See, e.g., Hobson, supra note 1, at 219 ("In effect, Madison proposed nothing
less than an organic union of the general and state governments."). But see supra notes
30-31 (criticizing Hobson); Part L.A (same).
345. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 323 (James Madison); supra notes
254-256 and accompanying text; infra note 495.
346. The Federalist No. 27, supra note 10, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Thus the
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members will be incorporated into
the operations of the national government asfar as itsjust and constitutionalauthority extends;
and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws."); see also id. No. 33, at
201-02 (Alexander Hamilton). Illustrating the imagined relationship of state and national
governments is Hamilton's description of state courts as "natural auxiliaries" of an
integrated national judiciary operating pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and required by
oath to uphold the national Constitution:
[T]he national and State [judiciall systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE.
The courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of
the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that
tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice
and the rules of national decisions.
Id. No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton explicitly expected even lower federal
courts to hear appeals from state courts, further integrating the state and federal judicial
hierarchies. See id. at 494-95; see also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 193, at 722. Hamilton
later emphasized that not just judges, but officers of all branches of state government are
rendered "auxiliaries" to the federal government:
It merits particular attention . . . that the laws of the Confederacy as to the
enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction will become the SUPREME
LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and
judicial in each State will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective [states] will be incorporated
into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional
authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.
The Federalist No. 27, supra note 10, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton).
347. Madison expected that "the eventual collection [of taxes] under the immediate
authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules,
appointed by the several States" and that "it is extremely probable that in other
instances ... the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of
the Union," including but not limited to state judges. The Federalist No. 45, supra note
10, at 292 (James Madison); accord id. No. 44, at 287 (James Madison) (stating that
although "[t]he members of the federal government will have no agency in carrying the
State constitutions into effect," "[tihe members and officers of the State governments, on
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As these latter descriptions make clear, Madison did not hold the
current Supreme Court's view of the states as sovereign entities free of all
control by the national government save that to which they expressly consented.3 48 States could, of course, check and influence the national government by urging their senators to vote and by mobilizing popular sentiment against national legislation or through the ameliorative exercise of
their power-emphasized by Madison-to oversee their officials' imple3 49
mentation of national administrative tasks, such as collecting taxes.
But notwithstanding the states' checking and implementing roles, "the
3 50
national and State systems [were] to be regarded as ONE WHOLE."
Precisely because much of the state (as well as national) administrative
apparatus would be comprised of state officials "clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union,"'35 1 state actors would be strongly disposed to make the interests of the Union "the objects of their affections
the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution"). As
Madison asked in The Federalist No. 45:
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy
formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance
of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty,
and safety, but that the governments of the individual States, that particular
municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed
with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?
The Federalist No. 45, supra note 10, at 289; cf. Prakash, supra note 6, at 2004, 2033-36
(agreeing that Madison and other Federalists anticipated federal commandeering of
executive and judicial officials but contending that a larger number of the Framers would
have withheld their support from national legislation directing state legislatures to comply
with federal programs).
348. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)
("Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint."); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution protects us from our
own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of
government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457 (1991) ("As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government."). For criticism of the
Court's reasoning and invocation of Madison, see infra Part VI.
349. See The Federalist No. 45, supra note 10, at 292 (James Madison); see also id.
No. 36, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The national legislature can make use of the [tax
collection] system of each State within that State. The method of laying and collecting this
species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal
government."). Against the complaint that direct taxation would inflict on the citizenry
"double sets of revenue officers," Hamilton offers the simple expedient of "employ[ing]
the State [revenue] officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an
accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence
into the channels of the national government . . . ." Id. at 221-22.

350. Id. No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton).
351. Id., No. 45, at 292 (James Madison); see also Beer, supra note 7, at 306. As Beer
points out, Madison here follows the description of Scottish republican theorist James
Harrington, whose ideal republic, Oceana, would have almost no bureaucracy at the level
of the central government and instead would use local units to execute the laws. Id. at
252-53.
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and consultations. 3 52 Like the state
judges, these state officials would be
"co-opted" to the national cause. 35 3
Madison imagined similar influences running in the opposite direction-from the states to the national government. Given senators' and
representatives' access to "local knowledge of their respective districts,"
"considerable knowledge of [state] laws," and experience as members of
state legislatures in the past or "even at the very time" they were serving in
Congress, Madison expected Congress to rely upon "local information"
and the "assistance of the State codes" in designing its own laws. 354 As
Samuel Beer has shown, Madison "foresaw legislators from across the
country pooling their knowledge of their home state laws when drafting
federal laws" 3 55 and was the progenitor of the Brandeisian idea of states
3 56
as "laboratories for experimentation."
Neither national hierarchy nor dual sovereignty describes Madison's
conception of the federal structure. Consistent with his recasting of the
"separation" of powers as the powers' creative interdependence, and with
his treatment of federalism as merely an example of those interdependent powers, Madison envisioned a mixture of dependence and independence for the national and state governments. In his words, he envisioned a system "neither wholly national nor wholly federal'3 5 7-one that
352. Cf. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296 (James Madison) (discussing
conflicting loyalties of state between goals of state and federal government); id. No. 36, at
222 (Alexander Hamilton) (recommending, in regard to tax collection, "employ[ing] the
State [revenue] officers as much as possible," thus "attach[ing] them to the Union by an
accumulation of their emoluments" and helping "to turn the tide of State influence into
the channels of the national government").
353. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 193, at 764. Even the so-called "states rights"James
Madison, who argued in the Virginia Resolutions a decade after the framing period that
states could interpose their views in opposition to unjust federal laws (in that case, the
Alien and Sedition Acts), insisted while debating the amendments to the Constitution that
sovereignty was held by the people, not "detached bodies" of them. 1 Annals of Cong. 767
(Joseph Gales,Jr. & William W. Seaton eds., 1789); seeJames Madison, The Report of 1800
(Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 303, 309 [hereinafter Madison,
Report of 1800] (defining "States" as used in the Virginia Resolutions, drafted by Madison,
as "the people composing those political societies," and emphasizing that it is only "in that
sense [that] the Constitution was submitted to the 'States:' In that sense [that] the 'States'
ratified it; and in that sense of the term 'States,' [that] they are consequently parties to the
compact from which the powers of the Federal Government result").
354. The Federalist No. 56, supra note 10, at 347-48 (James Madison); see supra text
accompanying notes 211-212.
355. Beer, supra note 7, at 306.
356. Id.; cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
357. The Federalist No. 39, supra note 10, at 246 (James Madison) ("The proposed
Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in
strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both."); id.
No. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (remarking that only a "portion of sovereignty remain [s]
in the individual States," "a residuary sovereignty").
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might best be characterized as "cooperative decentralization," or in Cover
'35 8
and Aleinikoff's phrase, "Dialectical Federalism.
Thus far, this description of Madisonian federalism is based on the
original Constitution as explained in The Federalist. From this description,
it is clear, however, that the national negative would have fit comfortably
within the Madisonian conception, while highlighting its novelty and the
ways it deviates from both a national hierarchy and dual sovereignty. In
service of Madison's objective of protecting minorities against oppression
and dissuading them from violence against local majorities, the national
negative would have strengthened three attributes of cooperative decentralization. First, the central government would have had the power to
constrain the states by vetoing unjust legislation, but it could not dictate
state action, because each state would retain the power to initiate legislation and because the laws of the states as a whole would largely define the
universe of the possible. Second, ongoing national monitoring would habituate local officials to the more enlarged and general perspective of the
extended republic's legislators. Third, the monitoring process would also
transfer local knowledge and the fruits of local experimentation to the
national level, while diffusing each state's knowledge and experimental
successes to the other states.
The last mentioned attribute of cooperative decentralization-the
productive interaction of the states with each other and the national government-was a matter of particular interest to Madison, given problems
encountered under the Articles of Confederation. In opposing the New
Jersey Plan at the Convention because of its tendency toward multiple
sovereignties, Madison recited the cautionary history of ancient federated
governments, where associated states had tended to usurp the center's
authority, encroach on each other's power and territory, and "bring confusion & ruin on the whole." 35 9 He attributed the same propensities to
the thirteen states under the Articles, noting that some had entered into
compacts with subsets of others, made separate treaties and wars with "the
Indians," raised troops without the center's consent, and manipulated
public lands to obtain claims on other states' territory. 360 Madison promoted the negative in part because it would have empowered Congress to
veto separate wars, peace treaties, and deals made by the states reciprocally with their power under the Constitution to constrain the national
government from obliging them and the people to take similar steps conjointly.3 61 Even better, the negative would have served this purpose with358. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1035 (1977). The Supreme Court has approvingly
used the phrase "cooperative federalism" to mean approximately the same thing. See infra
note 703 and accompanying text. We also sometimes use the phrase "interactive
federalism" to refer to the same process.
359. Madison, June 19 Convention Speech, supra note 141, at 57.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 58.
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out either dissolving the states and their capacity for local experimentation into a national whole or unproductively walling them off from each
other, impeding the diffusion of their successes. Instead, it would have
enhanced the spread of information from each state to the others
through the center. Consistently with other aspects of the new government and with Madison's conception of interdependent, not separated,
powers, the negative would have enhanced the role and stake of the national government and each of the thirteen states in the attainment of
the objectives of all of the others.
5. Madison'sNear Miss: The NationalNegative at the Convention. - It is
perhaps doubtful whether Madison, even aided by fellow propagandists
Hamilton and Jay, could have achieved the ratification of a Constitution
containing the national negative. 36 2 But in fact he almost convinced the
Convention to try. Switching the mode of analysis to a review of what
transpired at the Convention, this Part shows just how important the national negative was to Madison, how hard he fought for it, what his explanations for his "internal" approach and doubts about the proposed "external" alternatives were, and the nature of the arguments that ultimately
defeated it despite Madison's dogged efforts.
Early in the Convention, the national negative was included as part
of the germinal Virginia Plan, although not to cover all state laws, as
Madison had adamantly desired, and only "to negative all laws passed by
the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of [the] Union. '36 3 Two days later, it was expanded without objection by the committee of the whole to permit vetoes of state laws
contravening "any treaties," as well as "articles," "of the Union." 3 64 These
rapid early victories evidently made Madison optimistic that the negative's structural protections would render unnecessary other protections.
The same day the negative was expanded, Madison successfully moved to
362. Jefferson's opposition is discussed infra Part VII.B. The strongest opposition to
the Constitution came from those claiming it went too far in limiting the power of the
states. The national negative would no doubt have increased that opposition. For this
reason, Madison's Virginia colleague George Mason, who supported the veto in principle,
argued against it at the Convention because it would have engendered controversy,
threatening the effort to replace the Articles. See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
363. The Virginia Plan, Section 6 (May 29, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note
2,at 12, 16. The Editor's note indicates that Madison preferred the language "in all cases
whatsoever" as evidenced by his use of that phrase in letters and by his support for
Pinckney's June 8 motion for an unlimited veto. "The vote on this unsuccessful motion
indicates that Randolph and Mason were responsible for the milder version of the veto
provided." Id. at 17 n.1 (editor's endnotes). The Virginia Plan was referred to the
committee of the whole that day. Proceedings of the Convention, The Virginia Plan, May
29, 1787 (James Madison), in 1 Farrand, supra note 9, at 23-24 [hereinafter Madison, May
29, 1787].
364. Proceedings of the Committee of the White House, May 31, 1787 (James
Madison), in I Farrand, supra note 9, at 47, 54 (noting that Benjamin Franklin moved to
expand the negative, and without discussion or dissent the negative was agreed to in this
expanded form).
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table the Virginia Plan's provision permitting the national government's
"use of force" against the states, given his "hope[ ] that such a system
would be framed as might render this recourse unnecessary. "365
A week later, Madison seconded Charles Pinckney's motion to expand the negative to apply to "all laws which [the national legislature]
shd. judge to be improper. '36 6 During a contentious day-long debate on
June 8, 1787, the crucial day for the negative, Madison gave two
speeches. 36 7 Madison argued that without a plenary negative, states
368
would "oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions.
Ignoring, or failing to understand, his equal protection reasoning, 369 the
delegates barraged the proposal with criticism. Many objected to the
veto's impracticality. Would state laws have to be held in abeyance until
Congress could decide whether to veto or not? How would Congress find
time to evaluate the full range of state legislation? 370 How would it know
whether a state law was "improper"?37 1 Of even greater concern, however, was the power the veto would give Congress to dominate, or as Eldredge Gerry put it to "enslave," the states. 37 2 Aggravating these worries
was Pinckney's own defense of the negative as the best way to keep the
states "in due subordination to the nation."3 73
365. Id. at 54.
366. Id. June 8, 1787 (James Madison), at 164 [hereinafter Madison, June 8, 1787].
Pinckney's own plan had proposed a similar negative, stating that "no Bill of the
Legislature of any State shall become a law till it shall have been laid before" and received
the approval of both Houses of Congress. See Proceedings of the Committee of Detail,
July 24-26, in 2 Farrand, supra note 9, at 129, 134-35; Pinckney Plan, in 3 Farrand, supra
note 9, at 595, 607.
367. Madison, June 8, 1787, supra note 366, at 164-65, 168.
368. Id. at 164.
369. See supra Parts II-III.
370. See Madison, June 8, 1787, supra note 366, at 167-68. Bedford asked:
Besides, [h]ow can it be thought that the proposed negative can be exercised?
[A]re the laws of the States to be suspended in the most urgent cases until they
can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the deliberations of a
body who may be incapable of Judging of them? Is the National Legislature too
to sit continually in order to revise the laws of the States?
Id. Madison suggested that that questions regarding the administrability of the negative
might be answered in part by having only the Senate review state laws, and by enabling
Congress or the Senate to give temporary assent to laws pending review. Id. at 168.
371. Gerry stated that he would not oppose a negative dealing only with, for example,
paper money, but did oppose one reaching such issues as use of the state militia. Id. at
165. Sherman and Dickinson added that it would be impossible to draw lines between
proper and improper state lawmaking, and between proper and improper uses of the
negative. Id. at 166-67.
372. Gerry feared that the negative "may enslave the states" and "will be abused." Id.
at 165-66. Bedford added, "Will not these large States crush the small ones wherever they
stand in the way of their ambitions or interested views." Id. at 167.
373. According to Madison's notes, Pinckney argued in support of the resolution that
the "States must be kept in due subordination to the nation," that the negative was needed
to "defend the national prerogatives," and that the "negative of the Crown" provided a
worthy precedent for the proposal. Id. at 164.
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The motion to expand the negative was defeated, with only the large
states supporting it.3 74 The negative remained, but applied only to state
laws that violated the constitution or treaties. In this form, the focus was
not, as Madison desired, on equal protection against factional oppression, but instead on curbing state defiance of national prerogatives.
In the following weeks, the delegates took up and defeated the New
Jersey Plan, which favored state over national prerogatives and included
no negative. Madison's most vigorous criticism of the plan was its failure
to protect the rights of minorities in the states, most particularly because
it lacked a national negative. 3 75 Although the nationalists won this battle,
their narrow margin of victory convinced them they had to "conciliate"
the small states by further weakening the constitution's constraints on all
states.
At this point support for the negative began to founder, even among
the Virginia delegation. Its leader, Edmund Randolph, suggested to
Madison that the veto be circumscribed with an essentially inadministrable line between state legislation of national as opposed to only local
interest.3

76

To deal with Madison's concerns about "unjust" laws tyran-

nizing local minorities, the compromise included a proto-equal protection clause permitting federal judicial review of "partial" or "unjust" state
laws. Randolph then would have counter-balanced this increase in federal power with a provision permitting states to demand judicial review of
congressional vetoes they claimed exceeded Congress's narrow veto
power.3 77 For reasons that are not clear, Randolph's proposal was never
brought to the Convention.
374. The motion was defeated seven to three, with only larger states, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, voting to expand the negative to include "all laws which to [the
national legislature] shall appear improper." Id. at 162-63, 168, 172-73.
375. Madison, June 19, 1787, supra note 9, at 315-16.
376. Because the line the compromise drew would have been unclear in nearly every
instance, every time a state legislature passed a law, it either would have to submit it for
congressional review or make a "federal case" out of its failure to submit.
377. Edmund Randolph, Suggestion for Conciliating the Small States (July 10, 1787),
in 3 Farrand, supra note 9, at 55-56. Randolph's proposal permitted states to petition "the
national Judiciary" to "void" vetoes that were "contrary to the power granted by the articles
of the Union," and permitted "any individual conceiving himself injured or oppressed by
the partiality or injustice of a law of any particular State [to] resort to the National
Judiciary, who may adjudge such law to be void, if found contrary to the principles of
equity and justice." Id.
Madison himself had contemplated the need for a check on Congress's power to
exercise the veto. One justification he gave for the Council of Revision in the Virginia
Plan-a panel composed of the chief executive and a number ofjudges and empowered to
overturn unwise congressional enactments unless Congress overturned the veto by a twothirds vote-was that it would moderate Congress's use of the negative and render it "more
respectable." Madison, June 4 Convention Speech, supra note 319, at 25; see infra notes
424, 677 (discussing the Council of Revision). The Council of Revision provides further
evidence of the extent to which Madison feared the effect of factional strife and control,
even in the national legislature. As proposed by Madison, the Council would have had
authority to veto "every [affirmative] act of the National Legislature before it shall
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The tide turned entirely against the negative when the Convention
narrowly voted (with Madison in the opposition3 78 ) to grant each state an
equal vote in the Senate. The small states had previously feared that the
negative would enable large states to band together and exert control
over them-a worry Madison's repeated complaints about Rhode Island
may have magnified.3 79 With equal votes in the Senate, it was now the
large states that worried that even the partial negative would allow small
states to meddle in the large states' affairs. Serious practical objections
continued to be voiced as well about how Congress could fulfill the timeconsuming task of deciding in each case whether a state law contravened
the Constitution 38 0 and what would happen to state laws between their
adoption and review by Congress.3 8 1 Reflecting all these concerns,
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, an early supporter of the negative,

operate," as well as to overturn Congress's exercise of its power to "negative" state
legislation-subject in both cases to legislative override by supermajority vote. Madison,
May 29, 1787, supra note 363, at 21; see Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at
385; Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 10, 1787), in 9 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 368, 370. Madison hoped the Council would mitigate the danger
of factional abuse in the national legislature through the moderating influence of the
other two, more "general" and "impartial" branches of the federal government. See
Madison, June 4 Convention Speech, supra note 319, at 25 (describing the need for
protection against the effect of faction in Congress, and suggesting as a solution to "add
the Judiciary and . . . increase the respectability" of the legislative process); see also
Madison, June 6 Convention Speech, supra note 92, at 35-36; Liebman & Ryan, supra note
193, at 710-12. The inclusion of federal judges in the proposed Council was defeated at
the Convention, Proceedings of the Committee of the White House, June 4, 1787 (James
Madison), in 1 Farrand, supra note 9, at 97-98, as was Madison and Wilson's attempt to
revive it, Hamilton,June 6, 1787, supra note 203, at 131,138, 140. All that remained in the
Constitution as adopted, therefore, was the executive veto.
378. See, e.g., Madison, June 19 Convention Speech, supra note 141, at 60-61 ("Let
them [the small states] have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever
might give law to the whole."); James Madison, Speech at the Constitutional Convention
(July 14, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 100, 100-02 (raising the fear,
prescient given the Missouri Compromise and events leading to the Civil War, that with
equal votes in the Senate, the "evil" of such representation would "increase with every new
State that should be admitted" where "the real difference of interests" between the states
"lay, not between the large & small but between the N. & Southn. States. The institution of
slavery & its consequences formed the line of discrimination.").
379. See, e.g., Madison, June 8, 1787, supra note 366, at 167 (remarks of Gunning
Bedford); supra notes 150, 173, 206, 281 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's
complaints about Rhode Island).
380. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Convention, July 17, 1787 (James Madison), in 2
Farrand, supra note 9, at 27 (remarks of Luther Martin) [hereinafter Madison, July 17,
1787].
381. See id. ("Shall all the laws of the States be sent up to the Genl. Legislature before
they shall be permitted to operate?"). Madison again proposed to solve this difficulty by
allowing laws requiring immediate action to be reviewed by a local intermediate body-an
"emanation of the [veto] power into the States, so far at least, as to give a temporary effect
to laws of immediate necessity." Id. at 28 (remarks of James Madison).
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turned against it, arguing that a judicially enforced supremacy clause
38 2
would sufficiently discourage unconstitutional state laws.
Madison made an impassioned final plea for the partial negative on
July 17, 1787. "Nothing short of a negative on their laws," he argued,
could "controul" the "propensity of the States to pursue their particular
interests in opposition to the general interest." 38 3 Such a negative, he
claimed, was "at once the most mild & certain means of preserving the
384
harmony of the System."
Later that day, the Convention voted down the negative and immediately thereafter, as an acknowledged substitute more palatable to state
interests, unanimously approved the Supremacy Clause. 38 5 That Clause
deviated from Madisonian orthodoxy in three ways: It was directed to
state judges not legislators; it switched from an "interior" mechanism for
channeling official behavior in the desired direction to an "exterior" admonition to obey federal law; and it applied only to state actions that
violated the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not
those that treated minority factions unjustly.
Dissatisfied, Madison repeatedly tried to revive the national negative. 386 On August 23, 1787, the nationalists moved a fourth time for a
negative, in this case requiring "two thirds of the Members of each house
assent" 38 7 and reaching any state law "interfering . . .with the General
interests and harmony of the Union."3 88 Gouverneur Morris from Penn382. Id. Madison notes that Morris was "more & more opposed to the negative." Id.
Morris stated that the veto would "disgust all the States." Id. Instead, he argued, a "law
that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security
should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law." Id.; see also Rakove, Origins, supra note
28, at 1047 (" [T] he negative was the first casualty... [of the] decision ofJuly 16 giving the
states an equal vote in the Senate."). Although Jefferson was serving as ambassador to
France at the time, his June 20, 1787 letter to Madison predicted each of these objections
and offered the same judicial review alternative that Morris and others proposed at the
Convention. See infra notes 654-656 and accompanying text.
383. Madison, July 17 Convention Speech, supra note 144, at 102.
384. Id. at 103.
385. Madison, July 17, 1787, supra note 380, at 21-22, 28-29. Only Massachusetts,
Virginia, and North Carolina voted for the negative; seven states voted against the
proposal. Id. at 24. Immediately after the vote, Luther Martin moved for the adoption of a
supremacy clause taken from the New Jersey Plan. That proposal was unanimously
adopted. Id. at 28-29.
386. Madison raised the issue again on August 28 and on September 12. See
Proceedings of Convention, Draft of Constitution Reported by Committee of Detail, Aug.
28, 1787 (James Madison), in 2 Farrand, supra note 9, at 437, 440; Proceedings of
Convention, Sept. 12, 1787 (James Madison), in Farrand, supra note 9, at 581, 589.
387. Proceedings of Convention, Draft of Constitution Reported by Committee of
Detail, Aug. 23, 1787 (James Madison), in 2 Farrand, supra note 9, at 380, 382.
388. Id. at 390 (motion of Charles Pinckney); see also id. (remarks ofJames Madison)
(noting Madison had long been a "friend to the principle" but supported the modification
proposed). James Wilson defended the proposal in Madisonian language, calling the veto
"the key-stone wanted to compleat the wide arch of Government we are raising.... The
firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient. Something further is requisite-It will be
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sylvania, in league with the usual coalition of smaller states, opposed the
proposals, stating that the Supremacy Clause, which had been strengthened to make clearer that all federal law would be supreme over state law,
rendered the negative unnecessary. 38 9 Again, the negative was defeated,
this time for good. Instead the Convention strengthened the Supremacy
Clause and the powers of the federal judiciary, which together with state
officials' oath of loyalty to federal law, were expected to serve the purpose
39 0
of Madison's negative.
His dogged efforts notwithstanding, Madison did not get his national
negative. Nor, therefore, did he get the constitution he wanted or one he
considered passably "effectual" in curing the most serious constitutional
ailment of confederation and of republics generally, namely, majority oppression of minorities through the adoption and enforcement of "unjust"
laws. For that purpose, neither the extended republic by itself, nor the
Constitution's specific restrictions on the states, nor Supreme Court enforcement of the Supremacy Clause's admonition to obey federal law
(which did not even include a requirement to behave justly toward minorities), would suffice. As the editors of The Papersof Madison noted, the
Constitution lacked "the one ingredient that in his view was essential for
establishing the supremacy of the central government and for protecting
the private rights of individuals": a national negative or some other effective equal protection constraint on the states. 39 1 Even in The Federalist,
Madison the political theorist could not restrain himself from chiding his
colleagues on this point. Particularly as to matters dealing with distribution of powers between federal government and states, he complained
that the finished product was the result of a series of unprincipled combetter to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed." Id.
at 391 (remarks of James Wilson).
389. Id. at 390 (remarks of Roger Sherman) (arguing-that the veto was "unnecessary;
the laws of the General Government being Supreme & paramount to the State laws
according to the plan, as it now stands"); id. at 391 (remarks of Hugh Williamson) ("[A]
revival of the question was a waste of time."). Others again raised the concern of how laws
would take effect in the states prior to Congress passing judgment on them, id. at 390
(remarks of George Mason); id. at 391 (remarks of Oliver Elseworth), and the fear that the
measure would endanger the states and be a "shackle" on them, id. (remarks of John
Rutlidge) ("Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this manner."). Again
overplaying his hand, nationalist Pinckney suggested as an alternative that Congress might
directly appoint the state governors, then give them the power to veto state laws, which
resulted in the prompt defeat of the motion. Id. (remarks of Charles Pinckney); cf.
Hobson, supra note 1, at 227 (noting that Pinckney's solution, although more direct and
practical, "smacked too much of the old hated royal government").
390. Upon the defeat of the negative-and also the Council of Revision, see supra
note 377-"the Convention's deliberations came to focus increasingly ...on the question
of what version of judicial review, bolstered by what duty of loyalty on the part of state
officials, would effectively restrain state law." Liebman & Ryan, supra note 193, at 760.
391. EditorialNote to Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson (Oct. 24, 1787),
in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 205.
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promises: "[T]he convention ...ha[d] been compelled to sacrifice theo392
retical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations."
Madison could only hope-as he described his Virginia colleague,
George Mason, doing-that even though "the public mind would not
now bear" an equal protection constraint on the states, "experience
would hereafter produce these amendments. ' 9 3
V.

THE SECOND CONSTITUTION'S FLAWED EQUAL
PROTECTION CONSTRAINT

Out of the Civil War that Madison had predicted would someday result from a constitution lacking an effective way to keep states from "oppress [ing] the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions"3 9 4 came
a number of amendments, including one aimed at Madison's equal protection objective. Short of a national negative, 395 the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 396 together perhaps with the Due Process Clause,3 97 appears rather close to the outcome Madisonian theory
dictates. Although Madison felt that the promised judicial enforcement
of the Supremacy Clause would not sufficiently deter factional injustice
and other abuses by the states, one reason was that the Constitution included no provision expressly barring such abuses. The Fourteenth
Amendment added such a provision-as Randolph's abortive compromise at the Convention had contemplated, and as Madison himself would
try to do in the "fourteenth" amendment he proposed while the Bill of
Rights was under consideration.
As we develop in this Part, however, neither Madison's fourteenth
amendment nor the postbellum Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment
is consistent with Madisonian theory. On the contrary, Madison's objections to relying on the federal judiciary to constrain injustices by the
states provide a poignantly accurate catalogue of the reasons the Fourteenth Amendment has failed to achieve the equal protection that
Madison considered essential to a successful republic.
A. Our (Madisonian?)Fourteenth Amendment
1. Madison's Fourteenth Amendment. - Even after failing at the Convention, Madison continued to seek constitutional protection for individ392. The Federalist No. 37, supra note 10, at 230 (James Madison).
393. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 216.
394. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
395. Interestingly, the Reconstruction Congress temporarily exercised a sort of
national veto, not only via its administration through the military of the rebellious states
but also by premising reentry into the Union on the quality of the laws of the
reconstructed states.
396. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
397. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Kramer's
linkage of the national veto to the protection of individual rights).
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uals against abuse of power by the states. As a second- (or third-) best
alternative to the structural protections he fought for at the Convention,
Madison chose another route as a member of the first Congress. He attempted to use the Federalists' commitment at the ratifying conventions
to amend the Constitution to admonish the national government to respect individual rights as an occasion for adopting similar rights against
the states. 39 8 Hoping to add to the small set of constraints on the states
that had already been built into the Constitution-forbidding states to
enact bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, coin money or issue bills of
credit, deny the privileges and immunities of persons out of state, or impair the obligation of contracts 3 9 9-amendment "fourteen" in Madison's
first draft of a bill of rights provided that "No State shall infringe the right
of trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the
freedom of speech, or of the press." 40 0 Madison's proposal was prophetic
of course, not simply in its numbering and anticipation of the postbellum
amendments by eighty years, but also in predicting the "incorporation"
40 1
process that began sixty years after that.
Using language reminiscent of his emotional defenses of the national negative at the Convention, Congressman Madison called his fourteenth proposal "the most valuable amendment in the whole list. If there
398. Madison preferred structural ("interior") to admonitory ("exterior") protections,
and considered the central constitutional problem to be the use of state power by local
majorities to oppress minority groups-with violations of individual rights being an
unfortunate symptom of that "mortal disease," not the malady itself. See supra Part III.B.;
infra note 403 and accompanying text (noting that Madison's defense of his fourteenth
amendment sounded in equal protection, not individual rights). Accordingly, exterior (as
opposed to structural) protections for individual (as opposed to minority) rights were
arguably a third-best solution-albeit the best available option at the time, given the
Federalists' commitment to amend exterior protections of individual rights into the
Constitution.
399. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall ... coin money; emit bills of credit;
make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. ... "); U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states."). These constraints targeted several of the
abuses with which Madison charged state legislatures in his writings before the
Convention. See Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 349 (discussing states' trespasses
against each other and the rights of their own citizens by, for example, issuing paper
money and impairing contracts between debtors and creditors). The dormant Commerce
Clause also protects out-of-state economic interests against discriminatory or abusive
regulation by local majority factions. See Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb.
13, 1829), in 3 Farrand, supra note 9, at 478, 478 (explaining that this protection afforded
by the incipient constitution "grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in
taxing the non-importing [states], and was intended as a negative and preventive provision
against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the
positive purposes of the General Government").
400. 1 Annals of Cong. 435 (Joseph Gales, Jr. & William W. Seaton eds., 1789).
401. The First Amendment was initially incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied against the states in 1925. See Gidlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
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was any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they
should be secured against the State Governments.

' 40 2

Similarly, notwith-

standing the individual rights tenor of the provision itself, Madison based
his defense of it on the floor of the House on the equal protection reasoning he had previously used in promoting his veto provision, which
aimed first and foremost at protecting minorities, not just from the states,
but also from the people:
But I confess that I do conceive, that in a Government modified
like this of the United States, the great danger lies rather in the
abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that
quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power. But this is not found in
either the executive or the legislative departments of Government, but in the body 3of the people, operating by the majority
40
against the minority.
Madison's proposed amendment passed the House of Representatives
but was defeated in the Senate. 40 4 Even in defeat, its equal protection
goals were at the fore. While the debates are not recorded, it is possible
that having secured the formal establishment of their churches in a number of states, majority factions there used their power to appoint members of the United States Senate to protect those gains against Madison's
contrary national proposal to protect the rights of conscience of members of minority sects. 40

5

Regardless, the defeat of Madison's fourteenth

amendment thus perfectly illustrated what he said in The FederalistNo. 51
about the Constitution's powerful structural protections of state majorities against exercises of national power, and what the same essay made
plain, without saying, about the inability of minorities to protect them40 6
selves against overbearing state majorities.
Madison's career as Founder and Framer began in 1776 when he
succeeded-explicitly on equal protection grounds-in amending Virginia's proposed Declaration of Rights to provide that "all men are
402. 1 Annals of Cong. 755.
403. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 22 (1998) (quoting 2 Bernard Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1029 (1971)); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 155 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing Madison's concern about the
injustice of many state laws (quoting 5 Writings of James Madison 27 (G. Hunt ed.,
1904))).
404. Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 215-19 (1957);
Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 83 ("In effect, Madison belatedly attempted to
revive his original intention of creating a national government capable of protecting
private rights within the individual states.").
405. See 1 Journal of the Senate 72 (Sept. 7, 1789), available at http://
memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsjlink.html#anchorl (indicating the Senate's rejection
of Madison's fourteenth amendment).
406. See supra Part IV.B.
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equally entitled to the free exercise of religion. '40 7 Madison's founding
and framing career ended in 1789 with the defeat of a similarly intended,
though more broadly focused, effort to amend an equal protection requirement into the United States Constitution. More central than these
bookend events, however, was the defeat at the Convention two years earlier of Madison's more general, and more cherished, national mechanism
for structurally ensuring local minorities of the equal protection of state
laws.
2. Our Fourteenth Amendment. - On one view, American constitutional history succeeded where Madison failed, albeit only after 200 years,
encompassing a civil war, a second constitution, and the civil rights upheavals of the 1950s and 1960s. In his James Madison Lecture in 1985,
Justice William Brennan argued that "[t]he passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment fulfilled James Madison's vision of the structure of American
federalism. ' 40 8 More precisely, in Brennan's view, it was the Fourteenth
Amendment's empowerment of the national judiciary to enforce the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, together with the Warren
Court's broad interpretation of the Clauses' admonitions against abusive
exercises of power by the states, that achieved Madison's "noble
40 9
purpose."
There are, indeed, deep connections between the Equal Protection
Clause and the structural equal protection that Madison unsuccessfully
pursued at the Convention. At least in its enforcement heyday in the
1950s-1970s, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was
intelligible in Madisonian terms as (1) an "exterior provision[ ]" 4 1 0 -a
legal "thou shalt" or "shalt not"-that begins to (2) locate an "intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in
watching the conduct of the former." 41 1 The Clause accomplishes this by
(3) empowering the life-tenured federal judiciary-the branch of the national government with the most "stability and independence" 41 2 -to
strike down legislation and other official actions of the states. Such re4 13
view, in turn, is based on (4) a determination that the "motive"
407. See Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 13.
408. Brennan, supra note 27, at 536-37 ("The enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment .. . signaled the adoption of Madison's view and banished the spectre of
arbitrary state power, his lone fear for our constitutional system.").
409. See id. at 552.
410. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 320 (James Madison); see supra Part
IILA; supra notes 241-243 and accompanying text,
411. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 10, at 286 (James Madison); see supra notes
281-286, 381, and accompanying text; infra notes 423, 495.
412. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison) (discussing "the
stability and independence of some member of the government").
413. Id. at 325; Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 351, 355 (describing "the ordinary
motives by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals: a confidence which does
honor to the enthusiastic virtue of the compilers"; giving as examples of these "motives"
individuals' and officials' regard for the common good, respect for character, and
religion); see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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(Madison's word for "virtue" or its absence) with which the actions were
taken by legislators or promoted by constituents were "unjust"4 14 or "partial" 41 5 because they lacked "a prudent regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good." 4 16 Although our principal
goal in this Part is to show how far short of the Madisonian ideal the
Equal Protection Clause falls, it first is important to acknowledge similarities between the two approaches.
a. Interposing a Will Independent of the Majority. - Consider, to begin
with, the second and third of the Equal Protection Clause's four attributes from a Madisonian perspective. Above we describe The FederalistNo.
51 as Madison's greatest contribution to political science. 4 17 In it,
Madison attempted nothing less than to "constitute" the world's first stable and effective republican form of government by using representation,
separation of powers, federalism, and the extended republic as mechanisms to structure the behavior of individuals so they could govern themselves effectively. As Madison well knew, however, the clockwork mechanisms in the first Constitution were incapable of striking more than
eleven. 418 While using representation, separation of powers, and federalism to preserve self-government and protect the people as a whole from
both the national and state governments, and using the extended republic as a self-governing method of protecting minorities from interested
majorities acting through the national government's "extended . . .
sphere," the Constitution contained no technique for protecting minorities from interested majorities acting through the "more circum41 9
scribed ... States."
In fact, No. 51 twice suggests how the states might themselves make
the clock strike twelve, notwithstanding that the national Constitution
had failed to do so. "[I] n exact proportion as the territory of the Union
may be formed into more circumscribed . . . States," Madison wrote:
oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated; the best
security, under the republican forms [i.e., under the extended
republic], for the rights of every class of citizen, will be diminished; and consequently the stability and independence of some
414. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison); Madison,
June 4 Convention Speech, supra note 319, at 25; supra notes 109-117, 165 and
accompanying text.
415. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison); Madison,
Vices, supra note 140, at 352; Madison, Letter to Monroe, supra note 144, at 140; supra
note 170 and accompanying text.
416. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 355; see supra Part II.B.2.c. Even "rational
basis" equal protection scrutiny may be understood as a proxy for "motives" scrutiny, i.e., as
searching for situations in which the only purpose or interpretation of the legislation is to
promote (or harm) some private interest, rather than promoting the public good.
417. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
418. See supra Part III.B.
419. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324-25 (James Madison).
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member of the government,
the only other security, must be
420
proportionally increased.
In the last clause, Madison referred to what he earlier has described as a
"method" that "prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or
self-appointed authority" of placing the protection of minority rights in
hands "independent of the majority ... [and] the society itself."42 1 As
long as the concurrence of this independent authority is needed for legislation to be adopted or carried out, that authority's neutrality as between
the majority and the minorities can provide some of the structural protection that is needed.
Although Madison's analogy to England's hereditary lords and selfappointed king calls4 2 into
question the consistency of this method with
"republican forms," 2 his allusion was serious, if a tad wishful. In contemporaneous writings, Madison expressed the hope that states-as "a
useful bitt in the mouth" of the legislature and as a "security against fluctuating & indegested laws"-would amend their constitutions according
to the New York model and require legislation to be submitted to a
"Council of Revision" composed of the governor and judges who could
require reconsideration and prevent readoption except on a two-thirds
vote of the legislature. 42 3 Madison made a similar proposal at the Convention, hoping a national council of judges with the power to revise national legislation would constrain Congress, not only for separation of

420. Id. at 324. A page later, Madison underscored the second-best quality of this
"will independent of the society," compared to a structural protection that routinely
requires the concurrence in state action of "a coalition of a majority of the [extended
republic's] whole society":
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of
interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the
whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from
the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the
security of the former, by introducing into the government a will... independent
of the society itself.
Id. at 325.
421. Id. at 323-24.
422. See supra notes 312-313 and accompanying text. Madison similarly called into
question his first-best proposal for a national veto by analogizing it to the Crown's
prerogative to strike down legislation adopted throughout the British colonies. See id.
423. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 350, 351 [hereinafter Madison, Letter to Wallace] (containing
Madison's advice on the proposed Kentucky constitution); id. at 357 n.4 (editor's
endnotes). Providing an example of how such an intermediate institution would work,
Madison's The Federalist No. 48 describes Pennsylvania's appointment of a Council of
Censors in 1783-1784 to "inquire whether the Constitution had been preserved inviolate
in every part," and whether the three branches had aggrandized power improperly. The
Council found rampant constitutional violations. The Federalist No. 48, supra note 10, at
311-12 (James Madison) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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powers (few versus many) purposes, 42but
more importantly for equal pro4
tection (many versus few) purposes.
Madison thus hoped that the states themselves would adopt what he
acknowledged in The Federalistwas a missing check on state legislative action in contravention of the interests and rights of members of minority
factions, namely, an "intermediate body between the State legislatures
and the people [that is] interested in watching the conduct of the former
[lest] violations... remain unnoticed and unredressed." 425 In describing
the hoped-for qualities of this intermediate body, Madison said it should
be like a 'Judge," characterized by "stability," "independence," and "respectability," 4 26 and also like "the Prince" in "absolute monarchies" who
is "tolerably neutral towards different classes of his subjects," but unlike a
Prince because disinclined to "sacrifice the happiness of all to [its] per4 27
sonal ambition."
To be sure, the judicial review of state action that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause permits is not the fully structural
or "interior" control that Madison preferred. Unlike Madison's national
veto and Council of Revision,judicial review does not occur automatically
in the case of every legislative enactment nor, therefore, remain constantly in the minds of state actors. 4 28 But when judicial review does occur, it has the desired Madisonian quality of relying on an intermediate
body between the state and the people, whose members' life tenure, and
resulting stability, independence, and respectability, tend to insulate
them from popular pressures, making them more neutral between majority and minority factions than frequently elected officials. 4 2 9 Judges are
424. Madison,June 4 Convention Speech, supra note 319, at 25. Madison argued that
a Council of Revision at the national level-that is, a power in a governor and the Supreme
Court acting together to veto unwise congressional legislation-was necessary to:
introduce the Checks, which will destroy the measures of an interested majorityin this view a negative in the Ex[ecutive]: is not only necessary for its own safety,
but for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and
interested majority-The independent condition of the Ex[ecutive] who has the
Eyes of all Nations on him will render him a just Judge-add the Judiciary and
you increase the respectability.
Id.; see also supra note 377 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's Council of
Revision proposal).
425. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 10, at 286 (James Madison) (discussing
"violations of the State constitutions," a subset of "unjust" state legislative action).
426. Id. No. 51, at 324 (James Madison); Madison, June 4 Convention Speech, supra
note 319, at 25; supra note 319 and accompanying text; see also The Federalist No. 63,
supra note 10, at 384 (James Madison) (discussing the Senate: "[H]ow salutary will be the
interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the
misguided career and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves,
until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?").
427. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 214.
428. See supra notes 324-325, 377 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.1.
429. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 10, at 316 (James Madison) (stating thatjudges
"by the mode of their appointment, as well as the nature and permanency of it, are too far
removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions"); see id. No. 78, at 469
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likewise the best authorities to entrust with the role of enforcing external
protections of the few (minorities) from the many (majorities), because
they are the least likely to try to aggrandize the kind of power in the few
(the government) that most threatens the many (the people).43o
b. EncouragingVirtue. - It helps, as well, that the message sent when
judges overturn state action under the Equal Protection Clause is at least
potentially one that state actors can incorporate into their "motives." In
The FederalistNo. 51, Madison reports his unhappy "reflection on human
nature" that, even when citizens of a republic govern themselves, some
sort of "devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government."43 1 "If angels were to govern men," Madison said, "neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." 432 As between the two kinds of controls Madison mentions, he of course
preferred structural or "internal" controls-separated powers, the extended republic, the necessary agreement of a body with a will independent of the people-over "exterior" ones-legal thou shalts and shalt
nots. 433 He formed this strong preference because of "how unequal
'434
parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
This preference notwithstanding, Madison recognized that "neither
moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control" 4 35
on temptations to oppress. He also believed that "a prudent regard to
their own good as involved in the general and permanent good" 4 36 can
sometimes lead even ruling individuals and factions, at least in their more
far-thinking moments, to recognize their equality with others based on
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that "nothing will contribute so much as this [life tenure]
to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty"); id. at 465-66, 470 (describing life tenure as "the best
expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and
impartial administration of the laws" and describing the "firmness and independence" of
the judiciary as "the citadel of the public justice and the public security").
430. See id. No. 48, at 310 (James Madison); id. No. 49, at 316 (James Madison); id.
No. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[I]n a government in which [the branches] are
separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a
capacity to annoy or injure them.").
431. Id. No. 51, at 322 (James Madison).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 320.
434. Id. No. 25, at 167 (Alexander Hamilton); see id. No. 41, at 257 (James Madison)
("It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.");
Madison, Oct. 17 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 191, at 297 (noting "[r]epeated violations
of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every
State").
435. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 81 (James Madison); cf. id. No. 51, at
320 (James Madison) ("[A]s all these exterior [controls] are found to be inadequate the
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that
its several constitutional parts may... be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.").
436. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 355.
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their equal ability to choose and, proceeding "by [that] motive, to wish
for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the
more powerful." 437 And as the author of important portions of the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the federal Bill of Rights, he believed that
it sometimes is "very practicable . . .to enumerate the essential exceptions" to the power of legislators that "may expressly restrain them from
meddling with religion-from abolishing Juries from taking away the
Habeus corpus-from forcing a citizen to give evidence against himself,
4 38
from controuling the press" and the like.
One reason Madison was sometimes willing to fall back on the last
mentioned, somewhat formal and admonitory constraint was its potential
for educating public actors and mobilizing public opinion. He believed
the formal statement of a principle in legislation, especially constitutional
legislation, had some capacity to improve the "motives" and "virtue" of
the people and to trigger their far-thinking moments. 43 9 To the extent
that this view perhaps anticipates the modem Equal Protection Clause's
single-minded focus on the "motives" of government actors, 4 4 0 it also ex437. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 325 (James Madison); see supra Part
II.B.4.
438. Madison, Letter to Wallace, supra note 423, at 351 (making recommendations
for the drafting of the Kentucky constitution). For other examples, consider Madison's
appeal to the Virginia legislature to defeat a tax for teaching Christianity on the basis that
it violated the Declaration of Rights, see Madison, Memorial, supra note 129, at 300; supra
notes 125-130 and accompanying text, his assiduous work to secure passage of Jefferson's
Bill for Religious Freedom, see supra note 128 and accompanying text, and his insistence
on a "Guaranty Clause" in the Constitution to preserve republican governments in the
states along with his consideration of the absence of the same type of protection in the
state constitutions to be one of the "Vices," see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.. . ."); The
Federalist No. 39, supra note 10, at 242 (James Madison); id. No. 43, at 274-75 (James
Madison); Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 350-51.
439. See Letter fromJames Madison tojames Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 Papers of
Madison, supra note 2, at 306, 306 (explaining "language of the people" in the Memorial
and Remonstrance as having been invited and justified-thus mobilized-by Virginia's
Declaration of Rights).
440. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that "the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose"); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 32, 34, 36-38
(1956) (anticipating the Court's strong association of violations of the equal protection
principle with oppressive motives); supra note 57 and accompanying text. This aspect of
modern Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence would be rendered still more Madisonian
if, as one of us has advocated elsewhere, the law also clearly focused on the "motives" of the
constituents of the state actors in question in the lawsuit. Liebman, Desegregating Politics,
supra note 66, at 1551 & n.392 (arguing that the equal concern and respect principle
underlying the Equal Protection Clause should, and providing examples of courts
recognizing that it does, apply to individuals insofar as they endeavor to influence public
action). As Madison said in his Vices memorandum, factional oppression is an abuse not
only by representatives but, more dangerously, by "the people," making it crucial to
scrutinize, and to attempt to inculcate virtue directly into, the "motives" of the people.
Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 355 ("A still more fatal if not more frequent cause [of
unjust laws] lies among the people themselves .... Whenever therefore an apparent
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plains decisions permitting motive to be inferred from actions, outcomes,
and the "message" they convey. 44 1 Because Madison's objective was always to use the structure of government or, failing that, the content of law
to inculcate virtuous actions and habits, he presumably would value doctrines that require public actors to evaluate constantly the virtuousness
not only of their perceived motives but also of their actions, outcomes of
44 2
those actions, and of the message the actions and outcomes convey.
Strict scrutiny of government distinctions based, for example, on
race also has a Madisonian explanation. Not only does it "smoke out"
impermissible motives after the fact, but it also encourages public actors
before the fact to consider whether they can rule out invidious motives
for racial classifications they are considering, given the close "fit" between
the proposed action and an important state objective and the absence of
alternative, nonracial means to the same goal. 443 If applied with a modicum of "bite,''44 4 even rational basis scrutiny can have some of this virtueinculcating quality. It thus can require public actors in every case to articulate the common good, as opposed to parochial interest, i.e., something
beyond ambition, personal benefit, or factional advantage that the proposed action serves.
Madison even had preferences among types of constraints against
unjust state action. He believed that banning the most predictable injustices-for example, by requiring the government to respect a laundry list
of individual rights to free speech, free exercise, and the like-would not
by itself suffice. Instead, the law had to do what the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause for the first time accomplished: forbid
"[i]njustice . . . effected by . . . [the full] infinitude of legislative
expedients."

445

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause thus was a
big improvement on the fourteenth amendment that Madison had tried
to get through the first Congress on the coat tails of the Bill of Rights.
Like the rights enumerated in the ten constraints on the federal government that the first Congress endorsed, Madison's proposed fourteenth
interest or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust
violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals?").
441. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 509 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68
(1977); see also Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1573-76 nn.474-483
(collecting sources).
442. See sources cited supra note 72 (listing Supreme Court authorities).
443. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that
"the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool"); Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at 148 (arguing that an impermissible motive is
likely when "the goal is so trivial in context that you have to believe it's a rationalization for
a racially motivated choice").
444. See Gunther, supra note 56, at 12-21.
445. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
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would only have constrained the states against violating a small set of
specified individual rights. In this respect, the Equal Protection Clause is
a vast improvement on the national negative. Whereas the negative
would have regulated only state legislation, the Equal Protection Clause
and legislation adopted pursuant to it also constrain many other kinds of
447
44 6
and even, potentially, private action.
state and municipal action,
c. Mobilizing Courts Against All Unjust Expedients. - Madison's and
the other Federalists' sympathy for an independent judiciary interposed
between minorities and majorities contributed heavily to the negative's
undoing. The negative's opponents argued thatjudicial review was a fully
adequate protection against unconstitutional state legislation that
avoided the impracticalities and risks of placing state laws at the mercy of
congressional approval. 448 And hard on the heels of the national negative's defeat-and as an explicit substitute for it-the Convention

446. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 n.45 (1978) ("Who dare say,
now that the Constitution has been amended, that the nation cannot by law provide
against all such abuses and denials of right as these in the States and by States, or
combinations of persons?" (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. appx. 85 (1871)
(statement of Representative Bingham, the author of the Fourteenth Amendment))); see
also id. at 685 (quoting Senator Edmunds, Senate manager of the legislation that is now
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, describing the provision as "really reenact[ing] the
Constitution" (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1871))); id. at 700-01
(concluding that § 1983 "was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed,
against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights").
447. Although the Supreme Court held early on that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not reach private actors, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating a
federal statute prohibiting race discrimination by public accommodations), it repeatedly
ruled during the 1960s and 1970s that Congress can reach private discriminators through
broadly remedial civil rights legislation adopted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179
(1976) (upholding Congress's Thirteenth Amendment authority to create a cause of
action for refusal to contract on the basis of race, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966) (Brennan,J., concurring, joined in result by six justices)
(stating, in the broadest articulation of Congress's authority under Section 5 ever to have
commanded a majority of the Court, that "Congress is . . . fully empowered to determine
that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the exercise of [the right to equal
protection] is necessary to its full protection"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305
(1964) (noting that Congress's power under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting commerce is broad and
sweeping within constitutional limitations); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (upholding Congress's power under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
enjoining motel from refusing accommodations for racial reasons); see also Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (barring private discrimination in
the workplace); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(barring private discrimination in schools). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth
Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2319 (2002) ("The broad substance of modern
antidiscrimination law was made possible by the Warren Court precedents of 1965-69, and
the Burger Court's acquiescence in them.").
448. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
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adopted the Supremacy Clause, 449 believing it to be a crucial adjunct to
450
the federal courts' Article III power of judicial review of state action.
Expressing the prevailing view, Hamilton argued in The Federalistthat
judicial control was the equivalent of the national negative, not a second
best. Using Madison's precise language from Nos. 44 and 51, Hamilton's
No. 78 identifies the federal courts as having been "designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority." 45 1 Hamilton mainly valued the life-tenuredjudiciary's capacity to protect the prerogatives of the national government against the
states, and to protect individual rights. 4 5 2 But he also noted the courts'
ability to protect minorities and national legal norms against majorities
and parochial norms, 4 53 and tracking precisely Madison's rationale for
locating the negative in Congress, he emphasized the courts' generalizing
as opposed to localizing tendencies and thus their independence not
45 4
only of other government officials but of majorities within the public.
As we have just noted, the one thing the first Constitution lacked
from this perspective was an explicit ban on factional oppression of the
sort the Fourteenth Amendment later added. But even here, Hamilton
449. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
450. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 193, at 729-31.
451. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id.
No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing "constitutional method[s] of giving
efficacy to constitutional ... restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures"). It was
here that Hamilton referred to Madison's national veto, arguing that there must be "some
effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the [states'] infractions" and that
"[t]
his power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in thefederal courts to
overrule such as might be in manifest contraventionof the articlesof Union." Id. at 476 (emphasis
added); see also Jefferson, June 20 Letter to Madison, supra note 310, at 64 (proposing a
somewhat similar alternative to the national veto under which state legislation would be
subject to state judicial consideration followed by a right of appeal to a federal court); infra
Part VII.B (discussing same); supra text accompanying note 319 (discussing the analogy
Madison drew between the national veto and judicial review).
452. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton).
453. In Hamilton's view:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves, and which.., have a tendency ....to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of
the minor party in the community.
Id. at 469. Hamilton continued:
[T]he effects of occasional ill humors in the society .. . sometimes extend no
farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by
unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast
importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such
laws. . . . This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the
character of our governments than but few may be aware of.
Id. at 470.
454. Id. No. 22, at 150-51 (Alexander Hamilton).
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found a rather Madisonian answer-in the federal judiciary. Recall
Madison's claim in No. 51 that even self-interested individuals, in their
more prudent moments, are prepared to submit to government and,
when those governments take the form of republics, to submit to an economized equal protection constraint, based on their recognition of all individuals' equal need to preserve their capacity for self-government and
equal vulnerability (over the long haul) to "injustice" at the hands of a
majority that excludes them. 4 55 In No. 78, Hamilton's famous paean to
life-tenured federal courts with the power of judicial review of state action, he used precisely the same argument to explain why the public is
prepared to give that power to the least republican branch:
Considerate men of every description ought to prize whatever
will tend to beget or fortify that temper ["integrity and moderation"] in the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be
tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a
gainer today. And every man must now feel that the inevitable
tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public and
private confidence and to introduce in its stead universal dis456
trust and distress.
For Hamilton, that is, life-tenured federal judges themselves "embody"
the equal protection principle.
Given Madison's fervent belief in the need for protection against the
"infinitude" of methods by which majorities oppress minorities, and his
willingness to fall back on constitutional admonitions against violation of
specific individual rights, it is puzzling that he never, even as a fallback,
proposed a broader-gauged admonition against factional injustice of the
sort the Equal Protection Clause later embodied. As we will see, however,
Madison had his reasons. Recall that the goal of external admonitory
constraints is not only to punish and redress violations of the admonition
457
after the fact, but also to educate and inculcate virtue before the fact.
From this perspective, a dilemma (analogous to the modern rules-standards dilemma) arises, as Madison clearly perceived: Whatever a broader
admonition gains in coverage, it loses in specificity and clarity and thus in
its capacity to divert behavior into habit-forming channels. 458
B. Our Incomplete Constitution
There is much about the Equal Protection Clause in its enforcement
heyday that can be assimilated into Madisonian thought and the design
of the Constitution as Madison himself described it in The Federalist. The
fact remains, however, as we discuss in the remainder of this Part, that
Madison viewed the constitution the conveners adopted as a bitter defeat
of all that was required to restrain the worst, discriminatory "vices" of
455.
456.
457.
458.

See supra Part II.B.4.
The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton).
See supra Part ILA; supra notes 334-336 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 505-509 and accompanying text.
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republican government. 45 9 Nor, as his writings at the time reveal, would
his fears have been mollified by a judicially enforceable "parchment" admonition to foreswear oppressing minorities that necessarily would have
been as thin and weak as it was broad and encompassing. 460 The fact also
remains, as we discuss in this and the next Part, that Madison was largely
correct. Judicial review under the first Constitution was no match for the
injustices that led to the Civil War. And the Equal Protection Clause has
subsequently failed to forestall even the most blatant factional oppression
46 1
save perhaps in a few decades of its 135-year history.
1. The Weakness of the Judiciary. - Madison recognized, of course,
that with the defeat of the national negative and the substitution of the
Supremacy Clause, the federal judiciary would be the primary safeguard
of minority rights. As he described at length in his October 24, 1787,
letter to Jefferson, however, Madison derived no solace from this safeguard, believing as he did that the judiciary was at best a weak and inadequate bulwark. Madison foresaw that "experience would hereafter produce... amendments" to the Constitution to impose some kind of equal
protection constraint on the states. 46 2 But in criticizing a suggestion by
Jefferson, 4 63 Madison identified in advance the defects of the postbellum
Fourteenth Amendment:
It may be said [as Jefferson had] that the Judicial authority
under our new system will keep the States within their proper
limits, and supply the place of a negative on their laws. The
answer is, that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a
law, than to declare it void after it is passed; that this will be
particularly the case, where the law aggrieves individuals, who
may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme
Judiciary; that a State which would violate the Legislative rights
of the Union, would not be very ready to obey a Judicial decree
in support of them, and that a recurrence to force, which in the
event of disobedience would be necessary, is an evil which the
464
new Constitution meant to exclude as far as possible.
Madison here predicted nearly all of the foibles of ourjudicially enforceable Equal Protection Clause-apart from the admonitory weakness of glittering generalities, which he later took as his subject in The FederalistNo.
37.465 Most importantly, waiting to enforce an exterior constraint against
unjust state action until such action takes place, rather than internally
structuring state action so injustice never occurs, is inefficient and awk459. See supra notes 238-239, 286 and accompanying text.
460. See infra Part V.B.3.
461. See infra Part V.C.
462. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 216.
463. Jefferson,June 20 Letter to Madison, supra note 310, at 64 (discussed supra note
451 and infra Part VII.B); see also The Federalist No. 80, supra note 10, at 476 (Alexander
Hamilton) (making a similar suggestion); supra note 451 (discussing No. 80).
464. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 211.
465. See infra notes 505-509 and accompanying text.
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ward. It tends to run all the standard presumptions of judicial reviewfor example, the presumption of the regularity of the laws and against
interference with operative rules and ongoing government processes in
which reliance interests may have formed-in favor of validating state action whose injustice cannot be clearly demonstrated until it unfolds over
the course of time.
Diffidence in the face of a fait accompli is particularly likely because
of "how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with [the perceived] public necessity" 466 that triggered the state action and accounts
for its injustice. In cases ranging from the infamous to the mundane, the
Supreme Court has permitted the sacrifice of the rights of minorities to
perceived public necessity. Illustrating the former is Korematsu v. United
States, where the Court justified the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II on an unsubstantiated claim of military need. 46 7 To
take a more mundane set of examples, the recent persistence of high
crime rates has prompted the Court to find a host of ways to avoid interfering with law enforcement methods that rather evidently have been applied unequally against members of minority communities. 4 68 The Court
instead has preferred to "operate[ ] near the margins," sometimes
"nudg[ing] and gently tugg[ing]" state actors, but rarely throwing itself in
the way of potentially abusive legislation or action that government officials strongly desire. 469 Even when the judiciary accepts responsibility for
policing state action, its apparatus for doing so moves slowly: at best "with
4 70
all deliberate speed.
The inability of the least powerful branch of government to stop
state factional abuse of minorities arises as well because of the imbalance
of power and resources between the chronically weak minority party and

466. The Federalist No. 25, supra note 10, at 167 (Alexander Hamilton).
467. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944).
468. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (placing sharp racial
disparities in the use of the death penalty, which were unexplainable on grounds other
than prosecutors' and jurors' assignment of disparate values to the lives of whites and
African American criminals and victims, beyond the reach of the Constitution); City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (urging federal courts to exercise "restraint in
the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the
States' criminal laws"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (relying in part on
principles of federalism to deny injunctive relief against state and local law enforcement
agencies); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-94, 499-501 (1974) (denying relief for
failing to "allege an actual case or controversy" and stating in dicta that monitoring state
courts would violate principles of federalism and comity); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44, 54 (1971) (forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court prosecutions,
based on concerns of federalism, comity, and equitable restraint).
469. Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 229 (1960).
470. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see also Rosenberg, supra note
78, at 17. District judges in particular have considerable discretion to delay or postpone
relief; parties may also delay and impose significant costs through repeated motions,
discovery abuse, appeals and the like. Id. at 17-18.
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the stronger party that permitted the injustice in the first place. 4 71 As
Madison pointed out, if an unjust act by state officials
be generally popular in that State . ..it is executed immediately .... The opposition of the. federal government, or the
interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all
parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means
always be resorted to with reluctance and
which must
2
difficulty.

47

Prefiguring the numbing institutional intransigence and inertia of hundreds of prisons, social services administrations, and police departments,
not to mention Jim Crow and Massive Resistance themselves, 4 73 Madison
predicted that after-the-fact orders to desist from unjust behavior and fix
the results would face "[t]he disquietude of the people; their repugnance
and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the
frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions ....-474 This would trigger "difficulties" in "any State," and "in a
large State" would invite "very serious impediments." 475 "[W]here the
sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison," majority resistance "would present obstructions which the federal government
4 76
would hardly be willing to encounter."
Whether because of judicial weakness or because coercion is unseemly and inconsistent with federal comity, federal courts indeed "underenforce" many constitutional norms. 4 77 As Hamilton wrote, because
the judiciary lacks any "influence over either the sword or the purse," it
"may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments." 4 78 Courts are particularly ham471. Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 102-03 (noting that federal courts during the civil
rights era sometimes provided political "cover" for officials making desired but
controversial changes in abusive practices by allowing them to claim that the courts had
forced them to act, but that even these improvements occurred only when officials were
independently willing to improve the lot of minorities).
472. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 297 (James Madison).
473. See Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 42-71.
474. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 297-98 (James Madison).
475. Id. at 298.
476. Id.
477. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978) (cataloging situations in which
"the Court, because of institutional concerns, has failed to enforce a provision of the
Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries"); see also The Federalist No. 15, supra note
10, at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (suggesting that government coercion through the
courts is typically aimed at individuals; when aimed at "bodies politic," coercion of the
"sword" becomes necessary); Epstein, supra note 68, at 38-39 (describing and analyzing
Hamilton's argument).
478. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton); see Missouri
v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1990) (holding that a district court order increasing taxes to
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pered in seizing the resources that often are needed to remedy injustices.
As Judge Bazelon wrote, where "the real problem is one of inadequate
resources,

..

. the courts are helpless ..

.

2. The Courts' Dangerous, Enervating Distance from the People. - In
Madison's view, the main reason courts are unreliable protectors of tyrannized minorities is their distance from the people-the source of the
greatest power, and danger, in a republic. Whereas power under the Articles of Confederation was distributed according to the consent of the
states, Madison wrote of the new Constitution, "the real power lies in the
majority of the Community." 48 0 When the people are the sovereign and,
one way or another, are the source of all the branches' power, any agency
of government that attempts to mete out justice against the will of the
people does so at its peril.
But recall that the source of faction also "lies among the people
themselves." 48 1 The liberty exercised by the people and their diversity of
views and interests leads first to one-on-one conflict. Submission to a governing authority solves this problem by giving the few in command a monopoly on force. But that step places the liberty of the many at the mercy
of the few who rule. Republican governments solve this problem by letting the people govern themselves through their elected representatives.
But this solution comes at the expense of injustice against the few (minority factions) at the hands of the many. Left to their own devices, "the
majority of the Community" and their representatives will exercise the
republic's powers, not in pursuit of the public good, but under the "pestilential influence of party animosities," "betray[ing] the interests" of the
minority.

48 2

The major instrument of the majority's power to rule and oppress in
a republic is the legislature. Because legislators "dwell among the people
at large" and have "connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance" with the sovereign people, the legislative branch draws the most
fund a school desegregation remedy violated principles of comity and federalism and
stating in dicta that the district court could instead order the locality to implement its own
funding remedy).
479. David L. Bazelon, Foreword to A Symposium: The Right to Treatment, 57 Geo.
L.J. 676, 676 (1969).
480. Madison, Oct. 17 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 191, at 211; see The Federalist

No. 20, supra note 10, at 146, 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that "the people of
America" are the "pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority"); Beer, supra note 7,
at 254-55 (describing theories of national sovereignty and nationalist thought); Edmund
S. Morgan, Inventing the People:

The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in

England and

America 267 (1988) (arguing based on Madison's appeals to popular sovereignty that "the
people of the United States as whole . . . alone could be thought to stand superior to the
people of any single state").
481. Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 355; supra notes 199, 231 and accompanying

text; see also Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1045 (1997).
482. Madison, Oct. 17 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 191, at 211; The Federalist No.

37, supra note 10, at 231 (James Madison); id. No. 10, at 82 (ames Madison).
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legitimacy and power from that sovereign. 48 3 "[I] nspired by a supposed
influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own
strength," 484 and "alone" endowed with "access to the pockets of the people" and controls over the salaries of the other agencies of government,485 the legislature tends to "draw[ ] all power into its impetuous
vortex." 48 6 It is not surprising, therefore, that Madison believed that state
legislatures were the site of the worst republican abuses against minorities, 48 7 and that any effective effort to check them and the majority factions controlling them would have to come from an institution of similar
strength that likewise derived its power directly from the people. The
same reasoning left Madison dubious about relying on a nonlegislative
branch to reckon with state factional abuse.
In Madison's view, courts in particular are no match for state legislatures. Because judges "are few in number," they "can be personally
known to a small part only of the people. ' 48 8 Because judges with a "will"
sufficiently "independent of the people" to dispose them to resist majority oppression had to be appointed and life-tenured, they inevitably "are
too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions"
489
and to partake of their trust.
In so saying, Madison recognized the countermajoritarian difficulty. 4 9 0 He knew that the kinship of unelected, life-tenured judges to
lords and princes 49I and their questionable consistency with "the republican form [ ]"492 invited the argument (in Hamilton's words) that "courts,
on the pretense of a [law's] repugnancy [to the Constitution], may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature." 493 But Madison was far more troubled by the opposite consequence of the judiciary's distance from the people and the power that
flows from their trust and support. However strongly disposedjudges may
otherwise be to counter majority injustices, their lack of popular support
deprives them of the power and thus the courage needed to do so. It was
the confirmation of this fear that drove Madison toward state interposi483. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 10, at 316 (James Madison).
484. Id. No. 48, at 309 (James Madison); see id. at 310 (arguing that legislative powers
are less circumscribed than those of the other departments and that legislators can easily
disguise the purpose or nature of their actions).
485. Id. at 310.
486. Id. at 309.
487. See Madison, Vices, supra note 140, at 354.
488. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 10, at 316 (James Madison).
489. Id.
490. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16 (1962).
491. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 321, 324 (James Madison); Madison,
Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 211.
492. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 321, 324 (James Madison); Epstein,
supra note 68, at 190-92 (locating the unelected judiciary "at the edge of the strictly
republican regime").
493. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 10, at 468-69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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tion at the time of Virginia Resolutions. As he then argued, the federal
judiciary's "concurrence" in the powers "usurped" by the Alien and Sedition Acts could not be permitted to "subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very constitution, which [it was]
instituted to preserve." 494 The Acts thus presented one of the "great and
extraordinary cases" in which the states had to serve as an "intermediate"
4 95
institution to arouse public opinion in opposition to the federal Acts.
Most troubling to Madison, however, was the confluence of both
countermajoritarian difficulties-that of keeping judges accountable to
their constitutional obligations even though they were not directly accountable to the people, and that of giving judges the confidence and
authority needed to protect minorities and disappoint majorities when
that was judges' constitutional obligation. As Madison said, judicial review is only a "precarious security" because judges' independent power
"may as well" align itself with the unjust majority as with "the rightful
interests of the minor party" when that alignment suits the judiciary's
own ends. 49 6 Those ends might well be served, moreover, by attempting
494. Madison, Report of 1800, supra note 353, at 311-12.
495. Id. at 311, 350. In his Report of 1800 on the Virginia Resolutions, Madison
wrote:
However true therefore it may be that the Judicial Department, is, in all questions
submitted to it by the forms of the constitution, to decide in the last resort, this
resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the
other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties
to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other
departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation
ofjudicial power, would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of
this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and
beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very constitution, which all
were instituted to preserve.
Id. On the need for the states to fill the "intermediate" role the courts had defaulted,
Madison wrote:
It cannot be forgotten, that among the arguments addressed to those, who
apprehended danger to liberty, from the establishment of the general
government over so great a country; the appeal was emphatically made to the
intermediate existence of the state governments, between the people and that
government, to the vigilance with which they would descry the first symptoms of
usurpation, and to the promptitude with which they would sound the alarm to
the public.
Id. at 349-50.
496. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 324 (James Madison). This passage
makes the important point that it is not only the majority but the minority who may be
oppressed by judges disposed to favor their own interests. Over most of their history,
federal courts in this country have protected the elite, not other kinds of minorities. See
JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting
Right, 5 UCLA Women's L.J. 103, 107 (1994) (describing the Court's role, during one
hundred years of women's suffrage efforts, in denying women the franchise, and in
"entrench [ing] a political process resistant to the demands of women and others for power
sharing"); S. Sidney Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: Litigant Status in
The Warren and Burger Courts, in Courts, Law, and Judicial Processes 284, 286-87,
294-95 (S.Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981) (concluding that even the Warren and Burger Courts
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to curry favor with a popular sovereign, even an unjust one, whose support for judges is otherwise weak. 497 Without sorting out all the causes
and effects and motives, it seems certain that the confounding countermajoritarian difficulties Madison anticipated have contributed to the Supreme Court's dramatic flip-flops on the Equal Protection Clause-from
a century of nonenforcement, 498 to a quarter century of concerted, if
often ineffective enforcement, 499 to the current Court's determined
500
retreat.
3. The Thin Admonitory Force of "Parchment" Generalities. - Madison
worried about the weakness and inconstancy not only of judges but also
of admonitory law as a means of mobilizing virtuous behavior by majorities and their representatives. In Madison's view, the main value of law as
an exterior constraint is not in empowering effective judicial intervention
after the fact, but in inculcating virtue before the fact, tempering abuses
of minorities by popular majorities before they occur.5 0 1 Madison realized that it is relatively easier to form the habit of exercising virtue consistent with self-interest than contrary to it. This accounts for his strong preference for structural constraints that aligned virtuous behavior with selfinterest. 50 2 And it explains his belief in the power of exterior constraints
to mobilize majorities to rise up against government oppression of the people at large-as he encouraged "interposing" states to do at the time of
the Virginia Resolutions. 50 3 Madison had much less faith, however, in the
power of exterior constraints-mere "parchment barrier [s] "-to operate
effectively in "teaching the people to curb 'the impulses of interest and
passion.' "504
As we already have noted, one of the main difficulties is making the
law's exterior admonition broad enough and yet clear enough to guide
public action in virtuous directions. 50 On the one hand, Madison recognized that a declaration of particular rights could never be "sufficient" to
granted petitions of elites far more often than "[u] nderdogs"); cf. Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15
B.C. Third World L.J. 1, 7 n.25 (1995) (describing infrequent interaction of the Justices
with African Americans).
497. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 Geo. L.J. 1 (2002).
498. See infra notes 541-543 and accompanying text.
499. See infra Part V.C.
500. See infra Part VI.
501. See Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 77; supra Part IIIA; supra notes
334-336 and accompanying text.
502. See supra Part III.A.
503. See supra notes 255, 353, 495 and accompanying text. Madison also used the
Virginia Declaration of Rights to mobilize the people against a 1785 Virginia act that
imposed a tax to support Christian teachers. See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying
text.
504. Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at 77 (emphasis added) (quoting Madison,
Oct. 17 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 191, at 295-97).
505. See supra notes 312-314, 458 and accompanying text.

2004]

MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION

anticipate and ban every unjust and "partial" law that could be "effected
by... [the full] infinitude of legislative expedients." 50 6 But he knew, on
the other hand, that a more general and encompassing admonitory constraint would be "unavoidabl [y]" weak in proportion to the complexity of
the ideas it was meant to convey and the ambiguity of the words used to
convey the ideas. 50 7 Language is a "cloudy medium" in which meaning
remains "dim and doubtful. ' 50 At best, meaning becomes "liquidated
and ascertained" after a long and painstaking "series of particular discussions and adjudications"; at worst, meaning remains "more or less obscure and equivocal" despite the "experience of the ages, with the continued and combined labors of the most enlightened legislators and
50 9
jurists.
This "fresh embarrassment" 51 0 is nowhere better illustrated than in
the jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause. As noted, Supreme
Court interpretations of the Clause's "majestically inclusive" words have
varied wildly. 51 1 Within decades of the Clause's adoption, the Court variously limited it to situations in which states had "discriminated with gross
506. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212; see supra notes
312-314 and accompanying text.
507. The Federalist No. 37, supra note 10, at 229 (James Madison) (concluding that
the inaccuracy of words or phrases "unavoidabl [y]" increases as they are applied to more
complex ideas).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 232-33. Madison's views about the "indeterminate" nature of legal
constraints are strikingly consistent with the modern view:
The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the most
enlightened legislators and jurists, has been equally unsuccessful in delineating
the several objects and limits of different codes of laws and different tribunals of
justice.... [Even in] Great Britain, where accuracy in [legal] subjects has been
more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world[, t]he juisdiction
of her several courts ... is not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions,
sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits by which they are
circumscribed. All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by
a series of particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising
from the complexity of objects and the imperfection of the human faculties, the
medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds
a fresh embarrassment.
Id. at 228-29. Of course, Madison's colleagues at the Convention expressed similar
worries in regard to the standards Congress would have had to use in exercising the
national veto. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 117; supra notes 362-363 and accompanying
text.
510. The Federalist No. 37, supra note 10, at 229 (James Madison).
511. Michael Doff, Equal Protection Incorportation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 958 (2002);
see Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 Geo. L.J. 2273, 2290-91 (1999) (reviewing Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (1998)) ("A great constitutionalist,
ajames Madison, does not leave loose language and ill thought-out enforcement structures
for his posterity. John Bingham [drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment] left us with
both .... ).
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injustice and hardship" against blacks, 5 12 defined it (in a case brought by
Chinese Americans) to afford all citizens "the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens," 5 13 and in Plessy v. Ferguson, interpreted514both
glosses to permit explicit state-mandated segregation of the races.
A more muscular antidiscrimination principle emerged in the three
decades after Brown 515 overruled Plessy, although its formulation-that
"[lthe central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the
5 17
The
basis of race" 5 16-was not terribly different from the former ones.
and occasional emanations of still
protection,"
equal
result of this "new
"newer" ones, 51 8 has been multiple levels of judicial scrutiny (strict, medium, and deferential) of public action that expressly distinguish among
individuals on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, sexual
preference, and the like. The Clause has stemmed countless battles over
which classifications aimed at what disadvantaged groups should receive
which level of scrutiny, 5 19 and caused vexing questions about explicit ra512. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
513. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
514. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896).
515. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
516. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see supra note 440 and
accompanying text.
517. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1976).
518. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (applying what is arguably more
than rationality review to overturn a state law invalidating all local ordinances designed to
protect homosexual individuals from discrimination); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding there was no rational basis for city ordinance
restricting housing for those with mental disabilities, although ordinance likely would have
survived traditionally deferential "rational basis" scrutiny); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (according gender classifications an intermediate level of
scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (same). See generally Gunther, supra
note 56, at 12-20.
519. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-68 (2001)
(holding that strict scrutiny does not apply to persons with disabilities); Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (holding that "irrational and wholly
arbitrary" treatment of one person, not based on membership in a class or group, is
'sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis"); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (holding that age discrimination does not
deserve strict scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that
alienage and nationality are subject to strict scrutiny); Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at
145-70 (considering several explanations for why certain classifications are suspect and
thus deserving of strict scrutiny); Eskridge, supra note 447, at 2251-69 (2002) (detailing
the emergence of tiers of scrutiny and the history of efforts to secure enhanced scrutiny for
different disadvantaged groups, from the NAACP's efforts regarding race-based
classifications, through efforts regarding sex-based discrimination and discrimination
regarding class, illegitimacy, disability, and sexual orientation).
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cial and other classifications that are arguably "benign."520 A throng of
still more difficult questions arise when the classification drawn is not explicitly based on race or other problematic status and was never verbally
defended on those grounds, but nonetheless has a disparate effect (often
a blatantly harmful and self-evidently unequal effect) on individuals with
one of those statuses. 52 1 Most importantly, evaluating those classifications requires courts to decide whether the real equal protection harm is
the fact of subordination, a publicly conveyed message of subordination,
or the actor's (or actors') intent to subordingate. 52 2 The "new equal pro520. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995)
(rejecting "the surface appeal of holding 'benign' racial classifications to a lower standard
[of scrutiny]" and applying strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action program); id. at
243-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that affirmative-action programs are not invidious
discrimination); id. at 273 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing permissible
governmental use of race); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08
(1989) (applying strict scrutiny to an affirmative-action program). For criticism of the
Court's approach, see generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale LJ. 427
(1997); PeterJ. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach
to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
521. See, e.g., Garrett,531 U.S. at 372-73 ("Although disparate impact may be relevant
evidence of racial discrimination .... such evidence alone is insufficient even where the
Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 291-99 (1987) (rejecting statistical proof of discrimination in the application of
Georgia's capital punishment statute as insufficient to show purposeful discrimination);
Washington, 426 U.S. at 239, 248 (noting disparate treatment without invidious intent is not
subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny). But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000)
(asking whether state satisfied an "obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment");
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (finding an equal protection violation
based on redistricting which created a 28-sided district that excluded 395 of 400 black
residents while excluding no white residents). For criticism, see Theodore Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36 (1977); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1987) (arguing that "a
motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination places a very heavy, and often impossible,
burden of persuasion" on plaintiffs, because intent may be unconscious); MichaelJ. Perry,
The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540
(1977).
522. On the subordination principle, see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All:
Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1012-16 (1986) (contending that
the anti-subordination principle explains substantial amounts of equal protection doctrine
and should be explicitly incorporated into that doctrine); Crenshaw, supra note 78, at
1377-87. On the theory that a message of inferiority is the real equal protection harm, see
Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
13-14, 34-35 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno,
92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 506-16 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27J. Legal Stud. 725, 754-60
(1998); cases cited supra note 72. For the argument that it is the fact of subordination or
chronic disparate treatment that matters, see Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725 (holding that nursing
school denial of admission to men violated equal protection because it reflected "archaic
and stereotypic notions" of the "roles and abilities of males and females"); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Blackmun,J., concurring) (finding equal protection violation in
denial of education to illegal immigrant children based on statute's creation of "a discrete
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tection" has caused disagreements about the kinds of arguably "public"
action that are encompassed by the Clause's admonition to "State[s]" not
to withdraw the "equal protection of the laws,"'5 23 as well as disputes between Congress and the Court over the former's capacity to supplement
the latter's interpretation of the Clause, at least in service of expanded
52 4
protection for minorities.
The meaning of the word equality as a potentially enforceable legal
category is itself elusive. 525 And all of these ambiguities in the legal doctrine are only the preliminaries; if the judge does find an equal protection violation, still more intractable problems arise at the remedial stage,
such as the questions of causation, right-remedy coherence, federalism,
separation of powers, institutional advantage and disadvantage, duration
of judicial involvement, and the like. 526 So, although generality is necessary to enable the Equal Protection Clause to reach the many types of
majority oppression at which it was aimed, the same generality inevitably
dilutes the Clause's admonitory power to the point where little remains.
C. The DisappointingHistory of Our Un-MadisonianEqual Protection Clause
Madison's doubts about parchment barriers are borne out by the recent history of the Equal Protection Clause, in the wake of its enforcement heyday. Although for a time during the 1950s and increasingly durunderclass" and perpetuatuation of a "'subclass of illiterate persons'"); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2430 (1994) (arguing that the harm is
maintaining the systematic disadvantage of one group relative to another). Defending a
requirement of purposeful discrimination are, e.g., Brest, supra note 517, at 43; John Hart
Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1155, 1160-61
(1978); Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory
of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1041,
1097-1107 (1978). For the theory that it is the social meaning of discrimination that
defines equal protection, see Lawrence, supra note 521, at 355-56 (advocating an equal
protection test that would focus on not just racial stigma, but the "cultural meaning" of the
alleged racial discrimination); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1114 (1997)
(arguing that status regulation and discrimination evolve and that legal standards fail to
keep pace); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-11 (1977)
(proposing that a principle of equal citizenship guide equal protection doctrine).
523. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 27-32 (1959) (noting
also that "the words [of the Fourteenth Amendment] are general and leave room for
expanding content as time passes and conditions change"). See generally Richard S. Kay,
The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of
Constitutional Law, 10 Const. Comment. 329 (1993).
524. See infra Part VI.
525. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Getting Over Equality: A Critical Diagnosis of
Religious Freedom in America 13-17 (2001); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). But see Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1167 (1983).
526. See infra notes 548-558 and accompanying text.
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ing the 1960s and 1970s, events seemed to bear out Justice Brennan's
hopes for a federal judiciary mobilized in the ways Hamilton and other
527
Federalists had envisioned as a reliable alternative to the national veto,
more recent events raise all the Madisonian red flags.
A brief Hamiltonian history of the Civil Rights era might go as follows. When it became clear following the Second World War and the
onset of the Cold War that the broader public interest lay in jettisoning
the embarrassment of racial segregation 528 and, with it, the apartheid regime through which powerful majority factions in substantial reaches of
the nation had systematically oppressed their minority populations for
many decades, 5 29 it was the Supreme Court that ordered the change and
the lower federal courts that undertook to implement it.530 From their
"intermediate [position] between the State legislatures and the people,"
and vigilance in "watching the conduct of the former [lest] violations...
remain unnoticed and unredressed," 53 1 the courts not only forced local
majorities to cease segregating everything from schools 5 32 to swimming
pools, 533 but eventually mobilized the full powers of the other two
branches of the extended republic's government to support and extend
the effort. 534 When national popular majorities weighed in, they provided courts with additional tools for using lawsuits brought by public and
private parties to police the day-to-day decisions of local majorities and
their representatives for injustices against minorities in the operation not
only of schools and swimming pools, but of police departments and prisons and indeed of entire spheres of local governmental action such as the
535
administration of criminal justice and the provision of social services.
The broad remedial decrees that resulted helped, in turn, to inculcate
"equal concern" virtue in local political actors and activity where it had
not previously been manifest-giving far-thinking local officials the politi527. See supra Part IV.C.1-2.
528. See, e.g., Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights 250-51 (2002); Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
518, 524-25 (1980).
529. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale
L.J. 421, 424 (1960).
530. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (ruling school
segregation unconstitutional); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (giving
lower federal courts important responsibility for enforcing the edict of Brown 1).
531. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 10, at 286 (James Madison).
532. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per
curiam).
533. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1971). See generally Jack
Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts 380-81 (1994).
534. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education 102-51
(1969) (giving most of the credit for bringing about actual desegregation of Southern
schools during the 1960s to the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
acting under the authority of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
535. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (1998).
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cal "cover" they needed to effect desired but controversial improvements
in the lot of minority citizens; 536 prompting complex forms of structural
relief with broad avenues for local public input. 537 New racially and socially diverse coalitions of citizens and officials who were habituated to
treat each other with concern and respect were then emboldened and
empowered 538 to adopt a wide array of creative, other-concerning innovations in local practice; 53 9 and federal district courts themselves were cast,
in their remedial role, as public-minded national institutions that considered the interests of all relevant groups in the process of solving local
5 40
social problems.
A first objection to this rosy Hamiltonian account of the disposition
and power of the federal judiciary to protect local minorities may be
framed as a mostly rhetorical question: If the federal courts are such a
reliable source of protection of minorities against "partial" and "oppressive" state legislation, where were those courts between 1868 and 1954?
Of course, the answer, by and large, is that the federal courts were on the
side of the oppressive local majorities. For example, when Louisiana
butchers attempted early on to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
against self-evidently "partial" state legislation granting the most naked
monopolies to powerful local interests absent any concern for the public
good, the Court limited the Clause to discrimination against a different
group: emancipated slaves. 5 41 Yet, when that minority group attempted
to enforce the Clause against racial segregation, and to use federal legisla536. Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 102-03; see also supra note 471.
537. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. LJ.
1355 (1991).
538. See, e.g., Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1601-35; supra
notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
539. See Jennifer Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and
School Desegregation 80-82 (1984); Jeffrey Raffel, The Politics of School Desegregation:
The Metropolitan Remedy in Wilmington 120-53, 208-17 (1980); Colin S. Diver, The
Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions,
65 Va. L. Rev. 43 (1979) (exploring the courts' role in institutional reform litigation vis-Avis local officials); Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 79, at 200 (describing
the role of federal courts in multidistrict desegregation cases during the civil rights heyday:
"[F]ederal judges in Wilmington, Delaware, Charlotte, North Carolina, and Louisville,
Kentucky for a time energized surprising and effective coalitions of actors, both inside and
outside the schools.").
540. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281, 1282-84 (1976).
541. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-83 (1872) (giving the
Equal Protection Clause an extremely narrow scope in the Court's first comprehensive
analysis of the provision). For subsequent narrow interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1980); New
Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955). If Chief justice Rehnquist had his druthers, the nation would return to the
circumscribed Equal Protection Clause of the Slaughter-House Cases. See Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the equal
protection forbids only classifications based on race and national origin).
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tion adopted under it against a variety of local tyrannies, the Court
was quick to find the Clause inapplicable5 4 2 and the legislation
3
unconstitutional.

54

As often as not, moreover, the reason the Court gave for these outcomes was the one Madison had predicted: "[I]n the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt,"
unelected judges, at a great distance from the power bestowed on state
governments by the people, were unprepared to "fetter and degrade the
State governments" or "radically change[ ] ... the relations of the State
and Federal governments to each other . . . . ,544 Whether or not it is
accurate to say, therefore, that "Madison erred in underestimating the
authority of the judiciary and the import of the supremacy clause" as
manifested during the Clause's enforcement heyday in the mid-1950s to
the mid-1980s, 54 5 his prognostication cannot be faulted when the century
preceding (and, as we will see, the decades following) that heyday are
considered.

5 46

A second possible objection to this account of the judicially enforced
Equal Protection Clause during the Civil Rights era is that it may be less a
history of what actually happened across the board and more an optimistic projection of possibilities revealed by the era's occasional, often temporary, successes. 54 7 Even the outcomes of canonical instances
of equal protection and related litigation in areas such as urban school
desegregation, 54 8 the assignment of children to special education pro542. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting
how little scope the majority's decision approving state-sponsored racial segregation gave
to the Equal Protection Clause, notwithstanding the Clause's clear intent to "[add] greatly
to the dignity and glory of American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty").
543. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (interpreting narrowly the
power of Congress under the post-war amendments to ban private discrimination).
544. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78; accord, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39-44 (1973).
545. Rakove, Madisonian Moment, supra note 25, at 498.
546. See Calabresi, supra note 511, at 2291 (concluding that the result of the
irresponsibly ambiguous and ill-considered drafting of the Equal Protection Clause "is that
for 130 years now the U.S. Supreme Court has done that which it ought not to have done
and it has left undone that which it ought to have done").
547. For other accounts that are equally sympathetic to the goals of the Civil Rights
Movement but less sanguine about the contribution the courts made to it via traditional
equal protection and related litigation, see, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 1-42; Ross
Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run
Government 117-38, 153-61 (2003); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:
Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 695-97 (1982); Gewirtz,
supra note 59; Sabel & Simon, supra note 79.
548. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78-79, 82-83 (1995) (describing a
dearth of evidence of progress towards the district court's goal of closing the achievement
gap between white and black children following a decade of remedial orders costing
billions of dollars); Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 315-17, 321 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming
the district court's abandonment of efforts to achieve racial balance in the Boston public
schools upon finding that that segregation was rooted in "intractable demographic
obstacles"); Bell, supra note 78, at 112-13 (expressing skepticism with respect to the
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grams, 549 and big-city housing discrimination, 550 reveal disturbing
failures to improve the conditions of the minority plaintiffs.
A third objection, also anticipated by Madison, is that however far
the federal courts went in protecting minorities from factional oppression in the decades following Brown, their efforts eventually got the courts

into big trouble with the people. 55' Their efforts also drowned them-

selves and the people in a sea of conflicting interpretations and theories

about what the Clause's glittering generalities require. 5 52 The resulting

confusion and backlash largely overwhelmed, and certainly kept from becoming habitual, any virtuous dispositions the litigation prompted among
public actors. 55 3 Negative reaction and jurisprudential uncertainties also
led the courts to adopt a range of limitations on justiciability5 54 and Hijudicial role in desegregating schools); Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 9, 28; Liebman &
Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 79, at 195-200 (discussing federal courts' increasing
reluctance to address the thornier questions desegregation presented when litigation
moved from the rural South to urban areas, particularly in the North and West).
549. See, e.g., Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 547, at 45-97 (discussing protracted
but largely fruitless litigation over the method by which children in New York City are
assigned to special education programs and the services they receive).
550. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 79, at 1047-52 (describing failure of housing
desegregation decrees); see also Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches
to Housing Segregation, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289, 324-64 (2002) (discussing largescale and acrimonious housing and school desegregation litigation, with disappointing
results, in Yonkers, New York).
551. Documenting serious and widespread doubts about the democratic legitimacy of
the courts' countermajoritarian interventions on behalf of minorities are, for example,
Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (1975);
Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 547, at 117-38, 153-61; Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1738-44 (1996); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as
State Reformers, 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 949, 951-53, 976 (1978); Robert F. Nagel,
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661,
661 (1978); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1121 (1996). Critics ofjudicial
efforts to manage complex institutions and reforms in the name of antidiscrimination and
related principles include, for example, Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme
Court Decisions on Race and the Schools 258-83 (1976); Rosenberg, supra note 78, at
42-71; Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1265-69.
552. See, e.g., Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 66, at 1476-1540.
553. See, e.g.,J. Anthony Lukas, Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives
of Three American Families 232-51 (Vintage Books 1986) (1985); Rosenberg, supra note
78, at 127-31; Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 547, at 117-38, 153-61; Gewirtz, supra
note 59, at 614-17, 628-59.
554. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-08 (1983) (holding that,
to establish standing for an injunction against abusive police practices, the plaintiff must
show not only that he has been the victim of abuse but also that there is a high probability
that he himself will again be subjected to similar abuse in the future); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (holding that federal judges may not enjoin state
civil proceedings); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (suggesting that federal
courts should avoid ongoing intrusion into the policies of state law enforcement agencies;
"'the principles of equity, comity, and federalism' must . . . restrain a federal court"
(quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972))); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,

2004]

MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION

malayan standards of proof5 55 and to curtail drastically their notion of
appropriate equitable discretion. 556 In other cases, the courts simply refused to take the next logical steps. 55 7 And in still others, Congress
5 58
slashed the courts' remedial powers.
501-02 (1974) (denying relief on ripeness grounds and stating that federal court
monitoring of state courts would violate principles of federalism); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (holding that federal courts must generally dismiss suits for equitable
relief against pending state criminal proceedings). See generally Fletcher, supra note 547,
at 635-49 (cataloging various ways in which trial courts attempt to avoid the exercise of
remedial discretion); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 41, 74-80 (2001) (criticizing federal courts' dismissal of lawsuits affecting local law
enforcement at the outset based on justiciability, although the decisions appear to largely
turn on unarticulated remedial concerns).
555. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (holding
that to secure federal judicial relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against local government or
senior state officials on the basis of misconduct by subordinates, plaintiff must show that
misconduct was a matter of explicit "policy" or a tacitly condoned "pattern and practice");
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362 (holding, in order to effectuate federalism values, that nineteen
specific incidents of unconstitutional police brutality did not warrant issuance of an
injunction requiring the police department to establish a procedure for handling citizen
complaints because that number of incidents did not demonstrate official authorization or
condonation). Sabel and Simon criticize the "objective limitation" the Supreme Court has
placed on relief in school desegregation cases, in order to tighten the link between right
and remedy, that decrees must be limited to undoing the "the incremental effect that
segregation has had on minority student achievement or the specific goals of the quality
education programs": "The effort to isolate such effects poses insuperable fact-finding
burdens ....It is highly unlikely that courts could ever command the necessary evidence
or methodology to isolate the effects of particular unlawful decisions." Sabel & Simon,
supra note 79, at 1085 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995)).
556. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (reversing prison order as
"inordinately-indeed, wildly-intrusive"); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 83-90 (condemning, as
vastly beyond the district court's remedial powers, a plan to desegregate the Kansas City
schools by inducing white suburban children to transfer voluntarily into the city district);
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (urging "restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers
engaged in the administration of the States' criminal laws"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
562 (1979) (disapproving orders that "enmeshed [lower courts] in the minutiae of prison
operations"); see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J.) ("[fl t is not the role of courts, but
that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to
comply with the laws and the Constitution.").
557. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-40 (1973)
(retracting much of what the Court had said in Brown v. Board of Education about the
fundamental interest in an adequate public education in the process of refusing to address
the constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of funding and outcome disparities
in public education).
558. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (cutting back substantially
on federal courts' capacity to remedy constitutional violations in the process of convicting
state prisoners of criminal offenses); Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915,
42 U.S.C. § 1997, and other scattered sections) (imposing an array of procedural restraints
on prison reform litigation in the federal courts). See generally John Boston, The Prison
Litigation Reform Act, in 16th Annual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation (PLI Litig. &
Admin., Course Handbook Series No. H.-649, 2000); David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of
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Witnessing the opening stages of this retreat, even Justice Brennan
acknowledged that "the Court [was] involved in a new curtailment of the
Fourteenth Amendment's scope."5 59 Whether the courts retreat all the
way back to the pre-1954 status quo, 5 60 the Equal Protection Clause's hisbartory vividly confirms the raggedness and unreliability of "parchment
56 t
riers" and "exterior" constraints that Madison had predicted.
VI.

DILUTING THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC'S (INCOMPLETE)

STRUCTURAL

EQUAL PROTECTION

As we have just seen, the modern Supreme Court has borne out
Madison's low regard for the ability of the judiciary to check majority
oppression of minorities, in applying the Constitution's thin "exterior"
Equal Protection Clause constraints. Adding serious injury to this backhanded compliment, the modem Court has systematically degraded the
incomplete "interior" constraints on factional tyranny that Madison did
manage to install in the Constitution via the extended republic-that is,
the security for civil rights that Madison supposed would emerge from
the enlarging and interest-broadening effect of locating important powers in Congress. Adding insult, the Court has frequently justified these
decidedly un-Madisonian decisions by wrapping itself in the mantle of the
"Father of the Constitution."
A. Federal Versus State Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Programs
The Court's most direct defection from Madisonian equal protection
has come in the affirmative action context. Things began propitiously
from a Madisonian perspective when the Court in City of Richmond v.
Croson56 2 recognized a sharp distinction between avowedly benign raceconscious affirmative action rules adopted by state and local lawmakers,
whose impartiality and freedom from factional capture was suspect, and
similar legislation adopted by agents of the more general and broadly
representative extended republic, where partiality and parochialism were
Correction: The "Iron Triangle" of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
1681 (2001).
559. Brennan, supra note 27, at 546. Justice Brennan hoped state courts would step
in to safeguard rights of minorities. See id. For evidence that state courts are beginning to
accept Brennan's challenge, see Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection,
supra note 8 (manuscript at Part VII).
560. For proposals to do just that, see, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86
(1977) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); William Bradford Reynolds, An Experiment Gone Awry,
in The Affirmative Action Debate 130 (George Curry ed., 1996); William Bradford
Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale L.J. 995, 1001-02
(1984) (arguing that civil rights movement's pursuit of "equality of results for groups"
rather than "equality of opportunity for individuals" is "without constitutional
justification").
561. See supra Part III.A.
562. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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structurally far less likely. 563 Citing Madison's The FederalistNo. 10,Justice
Scalia made the Madisonian point most directly in his separate opinion,
which concurred in the majority's decision to scrutinize strictly and strike
down a program of racial preferences for African Americans adopted by a
city counsel on which African Americans were a majority:
[R]acial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and local than at the federal level. To the
children of the Founding Fathers, this should come as no surprise. An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political
564
units dates to the very beginning of our national history.
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor made a similar distinction
based on Congress's mandate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "define" situations in which "prophylactic rules" are needed to
protect constitutional "principles of equality":
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to "enforce" may at times also include
the power to define situations which Congress determines
threaten principles of equality 5and to adopt prophylactic rules
56
to deal with those situations.
When, however, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena566 offered the
Court the chance to consider affirmative action provisions adopted by the
extended republic, no member of the majority made mention of Madison
or the Founding Fathers, or even claimed to be their intellectual heirs.
On the contrary, the Court cited Croson as essentially decisive precedent
for holding that all public affirmative action programs, federal as well as
state, must be strictly scrutinized and almost always violate the Equal Protection Clause. 56 7 It fell to Justice Stevens in dissent to point out that the
Madisonian principles relied upon in Croson for the presumption that
state race-conscious affirmative action programs are unconstitutional
called for the opposite presumption in reviewing a federal affirmative action program: The Madisonian presumption of partiality and abusive factional capture that applies in the state context gives way in the federal
sphere to a presumption of impartiality and benign legislation for the
5 68
public good.
563. See supra Part III.B.
564. 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
565. Id. at 490.
566. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
567. Id. at 221-24.
568. See id. at 251-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Croson and citing The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 82-84 (James
Madison)); see also J. Christopher Jennings, Note, Madison's New Audience: The
Supreme Court and The Tenth Federalist Visited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 817, 854 (2002) ("That
Justice Scalia's use [in Croson] of Federalist No. 10 was taken and championed next in a
dissenting opinion [in Adarand], to support the same proposition thatJustice Scalia likely
abandoned, does little to solidify [No. 10] as a consequential constitutional expository tool
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B. The Power of Congress to Regulate State Injustices and Supersede or Harness
State Authority
Adarand's sin was one of omission: forgetting the "interior" protections provided by Madison's extended republic against the injustices the
Court thought it needed to prevent. In other contexts, the Court's sin
has been of commission: dismantling the Madisonian extended republic
and its partial interior check on state majority tyranny, with the result that
minorities in the states are even more vulnerable to that tyranny than
5 69
Madison feared they would be in the absence of the national negative.
In consistently anti-Madisonian fashion, the Court has (1) diminished
Congress's capacity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
"enforce, by appropriate legislation," the assurance that the states will afford persons the equal protection of the laws, in the process vastly broadening the scope of the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
from private lawsuits to enforce federal statutes barring discrimination
and unfair practices by the states; 570 (2) narrowed Congress's regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause, delivering larger spheres of legislation into exclusive state control;5 71 and (3) forbidden Congress to re572
quire the assistance of state and local officials in enforcing federal law.
In each of these contexts, "the present Court's zeal for intervening
on behalf of states is clearly animated by the conviction that, in doing so,
it is acting virtuously to recapture the 'real' Constitution."5 73 And in each
case, the constitution the Court claims expressly to be recapturing is
Madison's. In fact, however, the Court in each case has seriously undercut the interior equal protection that Madison himself considered his
most important-if only partly realized-contribution to the constitutional structure.
in the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence."). The affirmative action program at issue
in Adarand was administrative, not legislative, which might have provided the Court with a
basis for rejecting a Madisonian preference in its favor. One might argue, to the contrary,
that the extended republic's ameliorative effect on national administrative regulations is at
least no weaker than its effect on national legislative acts. The main point, however, is that,
rather than considering the Madisonian implications of the differences between the state
program in Croson and the federal one in Adarand, the members of the Adarand majority
simply ignored the extended republic altogether.
569. See supra notes 238-239, 286 and accompanying text.
570. See cases cited infra notes 581-589.
571. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act on the
ground that it exceeded Article I Commerce Clause power).
572. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the
Brady gun control law that required state and local governmental officials to assist in
executing a federal statutory requirement of background checks for prospective buyers of
firearms); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 168 (1992) (invalidating "taketitle" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, finding that it
unconstitutionally compelled states to enact legislation).
573. Kramer, Putting the Politics, supra note 256, at 290.
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1. State Sovereignty Versus Congressional Sovereignty.
a. CongressionalPower to Define Actionable State Injustices. - In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Court overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993'5 4 in which Congress had relied upon its authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid a broader array of
state limitations on the free exercise of religion than the Court's recently
curtailed First Amendment jurisprudence then banned. 575 In the Court's
view, Section 5 authorizes Congress to define remedies but not "to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." 5 76 The latter function,
577
the Court held, belongs exclusively to it.
In so holding, the Court drastically narrowed its earlier holding in Katzenbach v. Morgan that,
"l[c] orrectly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
'578
Amendment.
b. Congressional Power to Regulate State Injustices Free of State Sovereign
Immunity and Other Federalism-Based Constraints.- Initially, there was reason to doubt the effect of City of Boerne's limitation on the power of Congress to adopt laws protecting state minorities against what "generalizing"
coalitions of the extended republic's "people" identified as unjust state
laws and practices. 579 The breadth of Congress's Commerce Clause
power to adopt laws regulating activity with a "substantial" cumulative effect on interstate commerce, including civil rights laws not primarily
aimed at regulating commerce, 580 seemed to render City of Boerne a minor matter of scrivening, not a monumental rearrangement of constitutional power. In the future, Congress simply had to cite the Commerce
574. 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000)).
575. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). The Court concluded:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior[,] paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and, like other acts ....alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it." Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that
would limit congressional power.
Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
576. Id. at 519; see also id. at 527 ("Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive,
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case
law.").
577. Id. at 519, 527-29, 536; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444
(2000) (suggesting that, while the Court may create a prophylactic constitutional rule,
Congress may not do so).
578. 384 U.S. 641, 651-52, 656 (1966) (holding that Section 5 authorized enactment
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because Congress's judgment that it was needed to secure
Fourteenth Amendment protections was reasonable); see Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise ofJudicial
Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 303 (2002).
579. See supra Part III.B.
580. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:837

Clause and identify a significant effect of the regulated practice on the
flow of goods and services across state lines.
This sanguine view ignored the interaction between City of Boerne
581
and the Court's decision the previous year in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
Seminole Tribe held that the Eleventh Amendment gave states immunity
from private lawsuits to enforce federal statutory bans on state discrimination and other unlawful state practices, even when Congress had expressly acted to abrogate the states' immunity from such suits. 58 2 The
only exception is for lawsuits against states pursuant to statutes adopted
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the analogous provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which trump the
Eleventh Amendment. 58 3 Under Seminole Tribe, therefore, it matters
greatly whether Congress properly adopted a statute under Section 5 (in
which case, the law binds the states and may be enforced by private lawsuits) or under some other constitutional provision (in which case, the
states are immune from judicial enforcement via private lawsuits).
In a string of subsequent decisions, the Court relied upon City of
Boerne and Seminole Tribe to overturn federal statutes authorizing private
civil enforcement lawsuits against states for discriminating against, among
other groups, disabled5 8 4 and older 58 5 individuals and for willfully denying female victims of violent crimes the protection of state criminal
laws. 58 6 In each case, the Court concluded that Congress had improperly
581. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
582. Id. at 76. For discussion, see DanielJ. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
583. 517 U.S. at 59; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
584. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-74 (2001). Garrett
invalidated the part of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that abrogated states'
sovereign immunity from suit to enforce the Act's ban of disability discrimination. The
Court concluded that the provision was not a proper exercise of Congress's Section 5
powers because the protection it afforded disabled plaintiffs against disparate treatment by
the states based on disability was broader than the protection afforded by the Court's
limited equal protection ruling in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442,
450 (1985). Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-74.
585. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67, 91 (2000). Kimel invalidated the
portion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) that abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity from suit to enforce the Act's ban of age discrimination. The Court
concluded that the provision was not a proper exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers
because the protection it afforded older plaintiffs against disparate treatment by states
based on plaintiffs' age was broader than the limited protection the Court had afforded in
its equal protection rulings in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991), Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1979), and Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1976) (per curiam). Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67, 91; see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 456-64 (narrowly interpreting ADEA to exclude state judges from
class of state employees to which Act applies in order to avoid federalism-based
constitutional questions that would be raised if Congress were permitted to regulate terms
and conditions of employment of state judges).
586. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 619-20, 625-27 (2000)
(invalidating provisions of Violence Against Women Act that authorized civil law suits
against states by females victimized by crimes as a result of states' under-enforcement of
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relied upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the protection the statute afforded against states exceeded that given by the Court's
own definition of a constitutional violation by state actors. 58 7
In the disability and age discrimination cases, the Court ruled that
the protection Congress afforded minorities against states was more than
was provided by the Courts' decisions refusing to treat disability and age
as suspect classifications and validating state laws and practices supported
by any rational argument. Nor did Congress's own findings convince the
Court that disability or age discrimination were sufficiently widespread
problems to justify departing from the Court's prior precedents.5 8 8 Absent a Fourteenth Amendment basis for the laws, Congress could not
withdraw a state's sovereign immunity from private suits brought to en58 9
force them.
their criminal laws, concluding that provisions were overbroad exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power and thus inadequate basis for abrogating states' sovereign immunity).
587. In addition to the cases cited supra notes 581-586, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712 (1999) (invalidating Congress's effort to abrogate state sovereign immunity from
law suits brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and holding states immune from suit
in state courts); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 691 (1999) (holding that Trademark Remedy Clarification Act had improperly
abrogated state sovereign immunity from private law suits); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630, 645-48 (1999) (holding that
protection afforded private litigants from state violations of Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act lacked the "congruence" and "proportionality" with
harms to constitutionally recognized patent interests needed to justify Congress's exercise
of its Section 5 power). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972,
1981-82 (2003) (holding that state governments may be sued for violating the Family and
Medical Leave Act provisions regarding leave to care for ailing family members because
Congress justified provisions as remedies for longstanding gender discrimination, which
the Court has subjected to higher level of Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny than
discrimination at issue in the Court's earlier decisions). See generally Ernest A. Young,
State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2.
588. In regard to Congress's efforts to provide a private right of action against states
for disability discrimination, for example, the five-person majority held that:
Congressional enactment of the [ADA] represents its judgment that there should
be "comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities." Congress is the final authority as to desirable
public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money
damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the
States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by
Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those
requirements are not met here, and to uphold the Act's application to the States
would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by
this Court in Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional
authority.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (citation and footnote omitted).
589. Of course, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not bar injunctive
suits against state officials in their individual capacity, nor suits against municipalities as
opposed to states. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 699-701 (1978)
(holding that state sovereign immunity does not extend to municipalities); Henry Paul
Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 Harv. L. Rev. 102, 103 (1996)
(pointing out that, despite Court's state-autonomy rhetoric in recent state sovereign
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The other shoe dropped in United States v. Morrison.5 90 Morrison
ruled unconstitutional the federal Violence Against Women Act, which
established a civil remedy against private perpetrators of gender-motivated violence. 591 Congress based the Act on "numerous findings" documenting the longstanding failure of local law enforcement officials to
protect female victims of cross-gender violence and on "the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families"
and on interstate commerce. 592 Notwithstanding these findings, the
Court ruled that the remedy was beyond Congress's power to adopt
under the Commerce Clause. 59 3 Drastically curbing Congress's ability to
use the commerce power to assure groups frozen out of local majorities
the equal protection of state laws, the majority abandoned the longstanding assumption that "Congress may regulate noneconomic . . .conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." 59 4 In the majority's view, only a circumscribed set of "economic"
activities are "truly national" and thus subject to congressional regulation
if they substantially affect interstate commerce. 59 5 The Court thus
deemed large "areas of traditional state concern," including the enforcement of the criminal law, to be "truly local," and thus beyond Congress's
commerce power no matter how large their incidental effects on
5 96
commerce.
c. Congress's Power to Harness State Regulatory Capacity in Service of Its
Own. - In New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a federal statute requiring states, either individually or through regional compacts, 5to
97
regulate the disposal of nuclear waste generated within their borders.
"'[T]he Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' an outcome that has never been understood to lie within the auimmunity cases, states in practice are accountable for violations of federal law through suits
against officials in their individual capacity); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 75-76 (1996) (noting same). There is no question, however, that forbidding Congress
to create compensatory remedies against states and state actors-particularly in an era in
which the Court is treating more and more officials previously deemed to be local as
instead state officials, see McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997) (defining
locally elected county sheriffs as state officials because they generally follow state rather
than local imperatives)-reduces Congress's capacity to deter and remedy state injustices
towards local minorities.
590. 529 U.S. 598.
591. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
592. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; see id. at 629-36 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court
ruled other provisions of the Act unconstitutional as exceeding Congress's powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 619-27; supra note 586.
593. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
594. Id. at 617. For prior decisions supporting the longstanding assumption, see
supra note 580 and accompanying text.
595. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19.
596. Id. at 611, 617-19.
597. 505 U.S. 144, 176, 188 (1992).
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thority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. '5 98 In Printz v.
United States, the Court expanded the ban on federal "commandeering"
to include state administrative officials, barring Congress from requiring
state police officers to assist in administering federal firearm legislation
by conducting background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 599 In both New York v. United States and Printz, the Court rejected not
only the Commerce and Spending Clauses, but also the Supremacy
Clause, as a basis for requiring state officials to uphold and enforce federal legislative mandates. Acknowledging that the last-mentioned clause
"permit[s] imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions relate[ ] to matters appropriate for the judicial power," 60 0 the Court concluded that only this one
"sort of federal 'direction' of state [officers] is mandated by the text of
'60 1
the Supremacy Clause.
2. The Modern Court and the Madisonian Constitution. - Sharp dissents
have greeted the Court's decisions forbidding Congress to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause more broadly than the Court had done, to regulate the relationship between states and their employees, and to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 60 2 In large measure, the ensuing debate has been over whether the majority or dissenting Justices are truer to James Madison's constitution.
In support of its limitations on Congress's power to regulate certain
forms of discrimination, the majority cites Madison's statement that
" [t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined," while "[t] hose which are to. remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite." 60 3 Against federal
commandeering of state administrative officials, the Court asserts that
"[i]f it was indeed Hamilton's view that the Federal Government could
direct the officers of the States, that view has no clear support in
Madison's writings, or as far as we are aware, in text, history, or early
commentary elsewhere." 60 4 In support of broad state sovereign immunity, the Court quotes Madison's statement at the Virginia ratifying con-

598. Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
599. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
600. Id. at 907.
601. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178-79 ("Federal statutes enforceable in
state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal
'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.").
602. See, e.g., dissenting opinions discussed supra notes 568, 592 and accompanying
text.
603. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing The Federalist No. 45,
supra note 10, at 292-93 (James Madison)).
604. Printz, 521 U.S. at 915.
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vention that "[i] t is not in the power of individuals to call any state into
60 5

court."

The dissenting Justices reply in kind, claiming Madison as their own.
They, for example, call the absolutism of the Court's notion of state sovereign immunity "antirepublican" and "more akin to the thought of
James I than ofJames Madison." 60 6 And they argue that "assigning roles,
powers, or responsibility, not just to federal administrators, but to citizens . . . [through] a private remedy against a State" is consistent with
Madison's and the other Federalists' "unchanging goal: the protection of
[individual] liberty. ' 60 7 The dissents have provoked the majority to
name-call back, juxtaposing Madison with another European dictator
with blood on his hands:
The proposition that "the protection of liberty" is most directly
achieved by "promoting the sharing among citizens of governmental decisionmaking authority" might well have dropped
from the lips of Robespierre, but surely not from those of
Madison . . .whose north star was that governmental power,
even-indeed, especially-governmental power wielded by the
people, had to be dispersed and countered. And to say that the
degree of dispersal to the States, and hence the degree of check
by the States, is to be governed by Congress's need for "legislative flexibility" is to deny federalism utterly. 60 8
It is a risky business to project Madison's view of the constitutionality
of statutes adopted 200 years after he developed his political science. 60 9
605. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70 n.12 (1996) (quoting 3 Jonathan
Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 533 (2d ed. 1836) (statement of James Madison
at the Virginia ratifying convention)).
606. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
704 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
607. Id. at 702; see id. at 705 ("[B]y making that doctrine immune from
congressional Article I modification, the Court makes it more difficult for Congress to
decentralize governmental decisionmaking and to provide individual citizens, or local
communities, with a variety of enforcement powers.").
608. Id. at 690; accord New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (noting
that "[s]tate sovereignty is not just an end in itself" because "the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals");
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59 ("Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
609. On the question of how much weight Madison's views are due in constitutional
decisionmaking, especially views expressed in The Federalist and elsewhere outside the
Convention itself, see, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 613 n.7 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disparaging the majority for relying on
views Madison expressed at times distant from the Convention); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1301, 1323 (1998) (providing justification for Court's reliance on The
Federalist);John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1337, 1365 (1998) (arguing that The Federalistshould
be a source of persuasive support but is not authoritative on constitutional meaning);
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This is especially so when two of the key constitutional provisions, the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, post-date Madison's days as a
Framer and political scientist. We are confident about one conclusion,
however: The Court's "federalist" majority has James Madison all wrong.
The Court is clearly wrong to assimilate Madison's views to its own on
a variety of specific issues. For example, contrary to the Court's billiardball notion of the distribution of power among the branches of government and between the national and state governments, Madison the political scientist is famous for his "deviations" from that naively Montesquieuian view, and for advocating the sharing of powers among the
different organs and levels of government. 610 Just as the President could
veto legislation, Senators could reject presidential nominations and the
judiciary could overturn legislation approved by both political branches
6 11
in Madison's "neither wholly national nor wholly federal" government.
Federal judges could invalidate state legislation or direct state judges to
do so; state legislatures could name members of the national Senate; and,
of course, if Madison had had his way, Congress would have had the
power to veto state legislation in "all cases whatsoever. '6 12 When a fellow
member of the first House of Representatives took something like the
current Court's inflexible view that "it would be officious" for Congress to
intrude on the courts' role by independently interpreting the Constitution, 6 13 Madison was quick to say that "it is incontrovertibly of as much
importance to this branch of the Government as to any other, that the
constitution should be preserved entire. It is our duty .... ,614
Given the Madisonian assumption of overlapping powers among the
organs of government, it is not at all clear that Madison's belief that individuals could not haul states into court implies that Congress lacked power
Jennings, supra note 568, at 839 (criticizing the Court's "refusal to engage the text of
FederalistNo. 10" and its frequent misuse of that document); see also Ira C. Lupu, Time, the
Supreme Court, and The Federalist,66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1324, 1328 (1998) (collecting the
Court's citations to The Federalist). It is difficult to improve uponJohn Marshall's answer to
this question: Although the authors of The Federalist are entitled to "great respect," "in
applying their opinions to the cases which may arise in the progress of our government, a
right to judge of their correctness must be retained; and to understand the argument, we
must examine the proposition it maintains, and the objections against which it is directed."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
610. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 10, at 321 (James Madison); see supra notes
244-248 and accompanying text.
611. The Federalist No. 39, supra note 10, at 246 (James Madison); see also id. at 246
("The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its
antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a
composition of both."); sources cited supra notes 244-248.
612. See supra notes 311-316 and accompanying text. For Madison's rejection of the
idea of absolute separation between the two levels of government, see supra notes 244-248
and accompanying text.
613. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong.
519 (Joseph Gales, Jr. & William W. Seaton eds., 1789)).
614. 1 Annals of Cong. 520. The City of Boerne majority noted Madison's statement
but gave it little scope. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
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to require states to appear there. 6 15 Recall as well that for Madison, the
core goal of all governing arrangements is the protection of human liberty.6 16 And in a republic, the greatest risk to liberty is from tyranny by
the majority faction, exercising its power over state governments against
the chronically weak minority factions. 6 17 Given these views, Madison
would surely be surprised by the current Court's view that Congress has
greater power to regulate the exercise of individual liberty by, for example, authorizing disability and age discrimination suits against private employers, than it does to use the same method of regulating discrimination
61 8
by the states through their employees.
On the "commandeering" question, Madison, no less than Hamilton,
expected the national government to administer its programs with the
assistance of state officers. Madison assumed that the "collection [of
taxes], under the immediate authority of the Union, [would] generally
be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the
several States," and that "it is extremely probable that in other instances, . . . the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. '61 9 Nor was Madison operating under the
naive "assumption that the States would consent to allowing their officials
to assist the Federal Government." 620 For Madison, the ongoing availability of state officers to fulfill federal administrative tasks was not a choice of
the states, but a structural protection of the national government and
local minorities against the states. As Madison wrote in The FederalistNo.
46, the purpose of the national government's employment of state officers was to dispose them to make the generalizing interests of the Union
"the objects of their affections and consultations," 621 which is not an objective Madison would have left to the mercy of the states. A requirement
615. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 112-16 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing history of Eleventh Amendment suggests Founders intended it to allow citizens to
sue states in federal court where federal questions are at issue).
616. See supra Part II.B.1.
617. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
618. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
619. The Federalist No. 45, supra note 10, at 292 (James Madison); see supra notes
347-353 and accompanying text. As Justice Stevens wrote in dissent in Printz:
"At the time the Constitution was being framed... Massachusetts had virtually no
administrative apparatus of its own but used the towns for such purposes as tax
gathering. In the 1830s Tocqueville observed this feature of government in New
England and praised it for its ideal combination of centralized legislation and
decentralized administration." This may have provided a model for the
expectation of "Madison himself... [that] the new federal government [would]
govern through the state governments, rather in the manner of the New England
states in relation to their local governments."
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 946 n.4 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alterations in
original) (quoting Beer, supra note 7, at 252).
620. Printz, 521 U.S. at 911 (citations omitted).
621. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296 (James Madison); cf. Kramer,
Putting the Politics, supra note 256, at 291 (concluding that "the interlocking state-federal
structure of the [national] administrative bureaucracy... safeguard[s] state sovereignty").
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of state consent also would have undermined Madison's goal of placing
"local information" and the "assistance of the State codes" routinely at
62 2
the disposition of the national government.
The Court also misunderstands the primary mechanism by which
Madison expected the states to protect themselves against the national
government. Madison's mistrust of the judiciary's capacity and disposition to constrain popular majorities and the legislatures they elect 623 was
matched by his respect for the power of the states in Congress and his
ability to mobilize the people against Congress as he did with the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions. 624 Madison, therefore, would probably have
agreed with the dissenting Justices that the Court's current majority is
wrong (as were "the old judicial economists" of the Lochner era) "in saying
that the Court should somehow draw the line to keep the federal relationship in a proper balance." 6 25 Instead, "Madison . . .sensed [that]
national politics [would] protect[ ] the states' interests. The National
Government '[would] partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the states], to
be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments.'"626
But these Madisonian points of contention between the modem
Court's majority and dissent are small potatoes compared to a point both
sides have ignored. For Madison, the principal objective of the new Constitution, even without the national negative, was to empower the extended republic to forestall tyranny by state majorities against minorities. 6 27 Yet, at each step of the way, the modern Court has broadly
obstructed the means by which Madison expected that responsibility to
be exercised to protect minorities from factional injustice.

622. The Federalist No. 56, supra note 10, at 347-48 (James Madison); see supra
notes 211-212, 354-356 and accompanying text.
623. See supra Part V.B.1-2.
624. See supra notes 255-256, 353, 495 and accompanying text.
625. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
626. Id. at 647-48 (quoting The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 297 (James
Madison)). The Tenth Amendment, drafted by Madison, is not to the contrary. Madison's
careful language in drafting the Amendment was designed to expand, not diminish

Congress's power. The Amendment's (we can safely assume) self-consciously "cloudy,"
"dim and doubtful" language, The Federalist No. 37, supra note 10, at 229 (James
Madison), is notably different from the specific prohibitions in the other bill of fights
provisions Madison drafted. Madison's language-"The powers not delegated by this
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively"-

omitted the word "expressly" before "delegated." 1 Annals of Cong. 453 (Joseph Gales, Jr.
& William W. Seaton eds., 1789). Under the Articles of Confederation, the national
government's powers were limited to express grants. "In a clever act of statesmanship,
Madison acceded to the Anti-Federalist request of including . . . an amendment [that
tracked the analogous clause in the Articles of Confederation], but left out the one word

that would have given the provision any substantive meaning." Staab, supra note 232,
at 240.
627. See supra Part III.B.
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Where Madison expected Congress's exercise of its legislative jurisdiction to preempt important areas of public activity that otherwise would
be at the mercy of "partial" majority factions at the state level, 62 8 the modern Court has walled off entire areas of "noneconomic" activity from congressional jurisdiction. Where Madison hoped Congress's relatively
greater disposition toward general and impartial legislation for the public
good would serve as a caution and a model to state majorities otherwise
bent on tyrannizing local minorities, 629 the Court's sovereign immunity
decisions have forbidden Congress to impose enforceable standards on
state actors for the impartial treatment of, for example, older Americans,
the disabled, religious minorities, and female victims of violations of
under-enforced state criminal laws. Where Madison counted on Congress's power to use state officials to administer federal programs to provide another method of attracting those officials' affections toward the
generalizing spirit of the extended republic while supplying the national
government with important information about local conditions, 630 the
modern Court has rigidly banned the federal "commandeering" of state
employees. The federal relationship, defined by both the extended
sphere and the national negative, was envisioned by Madison to be dialectical, or interactive-cycling state activity through federal referees who
model a generalizing and educative breadth and impartiality of consideration, and directing federal activity through state administrators with
practical data about a wealth of approaches to legislation and administration that did and did not work locally. 63 1 Yet the Court has walled off the
two levels of government into discrete strongholds, with suspicious judges
occupying the space between them.
It was Madison's strong belief that federal judicial enforcement of
the Constitution's "parchment" limitations on state oppression of minorities was a pallid substitute for the real power to accomplish this goal,
which lay in the day-to-day exercise of responsibility by the strongest (because elected) and most "impartial" and generalizing (because most
broadly representative) organ of the national government: the legislature. 63 2 But the modern Court has ruled that its own interpretations of
the "parchment" constraints preempt Congress's power to reinforce its
6 33
own interpretations with effective enforcement mechanisms.
628. See supra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
629. See supra notes 272-274 and accompanying text.
630. See supra Part IV.C.4.
631. See supra Part IV.C.4.
632. See supra Part V.B.1-2.
633. Cf. Dorf, supra note 511, at 1015-16 (arguing that there are some areas over
which Congress is institutionally better suited than the courts to define the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Sager, supra note 477, at 1264 (concluding that "Congress is
empowered by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the equal protection
clause at those margins which are unenforced by the federal courts"). For evidence that
Congress historically has led rather than followed the Court in defining, as well as
providing remedies for, violations of that equal protection principle, see Robert C. Post &
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Madison, finally, was convinced that the states had more than ample
political protection against Congress through their influence over the
composition and policies of the national government and through their
ability to mobilize the most powerful organ of government, the people.
For Madison, it was the ability of local minorities to protect themselves
634
against the states that was the weakest link in the new government.
This was specifically due to the defeat of the national negative, which
forced minorities to rely on a fickle judiciary far distant from the power of
the people for protection. 635 As if to confirm this belief in the unreliability of the judges as protectors of local minorities, the modern Court has
turned Madison's extended republic on its head, assiduously using its
power to immunize the states against enforcement of antidiscrimination
norms that Congress adopted to protect local minorities against majority
636
injustice in the states.
Whatever the validity of the Court's decisions as interpretations of
constitutional amendments that Madison did not help frame, the decisions are not justified in assuming the mantle of "the most profound,
original, and far-seeing among [the Framers]. "637 Instead, the decisions
go a long way toward obliterating Madison's constitutional design. This is
true even of the Constitution we have, without the national negative. But
this is especially true of the constitution Madison wanted, with a power in
Congress "in all cases whatsoever" to subject State law to the generalizing
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441, 520 (2000) (giving examples of Congress
precipitating or at least anticipating the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
The Court's prior "ratchet" doctrine, barring Congress from diminishing Fourteenth
Amendment rights while permitting it to extend those rights, and giving the Court the
authority to determine what constitutes diminution and extension, see Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-52, 656 (1966), provides a far more Madisonian meshing of
congressional and judicial power than the City of Boerne analysis. Interestingly, the
potential conflict between excessive extensions of the constitutional free exercise
principle-inviting numerous exceptions to regulatory statutes for identified religious
activities and organizations-and the constitutional anti-establishment principle might
very well make the Religious Freedom Restoration Act a good candidate for judicial
rejection under the "ratchet" doctrine on the ground that it could not unequivocally be
said to have extended, as opposed to diminished, constitutional protections.
634. See supra notes 238-239, 286 and accompanying text.
635. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
636. As Herbert Wechsler wrote a half century ago, the Supreme Court is "on weakest
ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the
interest of the states." Wechsler, Political Safeguards, supra note 214, at 559. For the even
stronger view that the Founders believed the Court had no business reviewing the
constitutionality of congressional acts, see Kramer, Putting the Politics, supra note 256, at
237 ("Permitting judges to resolve legitimate disagreements about the meaning of the
Constitution would have violated core principles of republicanism, which held that such
questions could only be settled by the sovereign people."); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins
of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 787, 796-99 (1999).
637. Rakove, James Madison, supra note 1, at x (quoting Michael Kammen).
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test of the congressional veto. 63 8 Madison understood the incapacity of
the federal judiciary to protect minorities far better than the current
Court understands him and his constitutional aspirations.
VII. LOOKING FORWARD

Madison's abiding and underappreciated preoccupation with local
factional injustice and the need it creates for structural equal protection
provides a penetrating diagnosis of what ails current equal protection
doctrine and our centuries-old constitutional structure. Whether it also
points the way to a current, realistic cure is a topic for a later article. 63 9
The question does, however, merit brief consideration here in concluding our analysis of Madison's own cure-the national negative-which
his colleagues rightly rejected because it was unrealistic, even then.
A. MadisonianForesight
As Madison recognized, republican self-government provides the
6 40
best protection available for liberty, but only the liberty of the majority.
To extend the protection to minorities requires an at least weakly fraternal recognition on the part of all, even the majority, of their own vulnerability to factional oppression and of the interest all share in the govern64 1
ment's concern for the libertarian capacities of each person.
Effectively achieving that recognition, however, requires more than mere
admonition-even constitutional admonition backed up by judicial intervention after defections occur. 642 Yet, with or without an Equal Protection Clause, mere admonition and after-the-fact judicial intervention is all
our Constitution has ever assured.
To begin with, despite his best efforts, Madison could not convince
his colleagues at the Convention of the need for a continuous, before-thefact defense against state-level factional tyranny-one that structures
equal protection and the recognition of each individual's stake in the
government's concern for his or her libertarian capacities into the everyday operation of government. Or more precisely, he could only convince
his colleagues to adopt half of his two-fold equal protection solution.
The first half of Madison's solution was the creation of an extended
republic and a layer of government beholden only to it.643 Second were
mechanisms to connect local officials to national ones in ways that habituate the former to the latter's broadening, generalizing dispositions. Chief
among these mechanisms was the national negative-a power in Con638. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 383.
639. See generally Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, supra
note 8.
640. See supra Part II.B.4.
641. See supra Part II.B.4.
642. See supra Part V.
643. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296-97 (James Madison); id. No. 51, at
325 (James Madison); see supra Part III.B.
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gress to veto "unjust" state legislation, thus inducing local legislators to
augment their parochial, faction-driven concerns by anticipating and internalizing the objections of their less "partial" counterparts at the
center. 6 44 Carrying this "dialectical" or "interactive" federalism 645 a step
further, Madison hoped that by investing state and local officials with primary responsibility for administering national initiatives, Congress could
marshal the "affections and consultations" of local executive officials in
service of the national government's "more enlarged plan of policy,"
while also allowing national officials to craft those initiatives using "local
646
information" and "the assistance of State codes."
Although the Constitution did establish Madison's extended republic, it omitted his national negative. And the result he most feared in the
absence of the negative has repeatedly come to pass. Reliance on occasional federal judicial review of state action for injustice has "neither effectually answer[ed] the national object" of avoiding factional tyranny in
the states "nor prevent[ed] the local mischiefs which every where excite
disgusts agst the state governments." 64 7 Forecasting the nation's worst
cataclysms, Madison warned that the result would be "a constant tendency in the States ...to oppress the weaker party within their respective
jurisdictions," and that the national government's "only remedy wd. lie in
648
an appeal to coercion."
Later, of course, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did at
least attempt to bar (in 'Madison's phrase) the entire "infinitude
of... expedients" through which majorities oppress minorities. 6 49 But
even the Radical Republicans' solution failed Madison's test.65 0 In place
of his continuous, structural prophylaxis, they adopted precisely the kind
of "exterior" remedy whose "ineffectual" character he repeatedly denounced: episodic after-the-fact enforcement, carried out by unelected
officials operating at a debilitating distance from the people, of "dim and
doubtful" words penned on "parchment barriers. '65 1 Confirming
Madison's prediction of failure, the Equal Protection Clause has been enforced only fitfully by the courts and, even in its heyday in the 1960s and
1970s, was vulnerable to its own severe interpretive difficulties, to aggrieved minorities' lack of effective access to the courts, and to judges'
uncertain remedial competence, weak enforcement powers, and incon644. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 10, at 77 (James Madison); see supra notes
354-356 and accompanying text.
645. See supra Part IV.C.4.
646. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296-97 (James Madison); id. No. 56, at
347-48 (James Madison); see supra notes 211-212, 354-356 and accompanying text.
647. Madison, Sept. 6 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 13, at 163-64 (emphasis
omitted); see supra notes 238-239, 277 and accompanying text.
648. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
649. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
650. Id.
651. Madison, Oct. 17 Letter tojefferson, supra note 191, at 295, 297; The Federalist
No. 37, supra note 10, at 229 (James Madison); see supra Part III.A.
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stancy in the face of resistance from other branches and levels of government and the public. 652 Recently, the Supreme Court has made matters
worse by doubly truncating the extended republic-narrowing the range
of issues over which Congress may exercise preemptive or joint responsibility vis-d.-vis the states and forbidding Congress to require state officials
6
to administer federal programs. 53
B. MadisonianImpracticality, in Hindsight
Regrettably, however, Madison's prowess as a constitutional theoretician and prognosticator was not matched by his powers as a constitutional
architect. Notwithstanding his foresight in identifying the defects of a
constitutional order without an effective structural solution to the problem of equal protection, his own solution, the national negative, was manifestly impractical in its own day and would surely have collapsed under
the weight of the modern administrative state.
Particularly illuminating in this regard is the reaction of Thomas Jefferson, then the Confederation's ambassador in Paris, to Madison's Convention-eve letter outlining his national negative. Politically astute as always, Jefferson raised precisely the objections that would doom the
proposal at the Convention-and no doubt would doom any revival of
the proposal today. First were practical objections-the burden the negative would place on Congress in reviewing myriad state laws for an occasional deviation from a norm so vague that it would tempt Congress into
thousands of debates. "[U]pon every act there will be a preliminary question [,]" Jefferson complained: "Does this act concern the confederacy?
And was there ever a proposition so plain as to pass Congress without a
debate? '65 4 Far from being what Madison called "the mildest expedient
that could be devised for preventing these mischeifs [sic],"655 the nega65 6
tive was perceived by Jefferson as overkill.
Equally important were the states' political objections to the power
the negative would have given to the national legislature. Congress's
closeness to the people and its own legislative power were much more to
be feared than the occasional jurisdiction of geographically and politically distant federal courts. As Jefferson wrote to Madison:
652. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
653. See supra Part VI.
654. Jefferson, June 20 Letter to Madison, supra note 310, at 64.
655. Madison, June 8 Convention Speech, supra note 16, at 41.
656. Jefferson wrote:
It fails in an essential character, that the hole [and] the patch should be
commensurate. But this proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole
garment. Not more than 1. out of 100. state-acts concern the confederacy. This
proposition then, in order to give them 1. degree of power which they ought to
have, gives them 99. more which they ought not have, upon a presumption that
they will not exercise the 99.
Jefferson,June 20 Letter to Madison, supra note 310, at 64; see supra notes 370-371, 377
and accompanying text (discussing similar objections made at the Convention).
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It will be said that this court may encroach on thejurisdiction of
the state courts. It may. But there will be a power, to wit Congress, to watch & restrain them. But place that same authority in
Congress itself, and there will be no power above them to perform the same office. [Courts] will restrain within due bounds a
[legislative] jurisdiction exercised by 65
others
much more rigor7
ously than if exercised by themselves.
Madison's prediction of judicial "ineffectual [ness]" in reply to Jefferson 658 was more prescient over the long haul than the latter's prediction
ofjudicial "rigour[ ]." ButJefferson's prediction of what their colleagues
would do over the next few months in Philadelphia was dead on.
From a Madisonian perspective, the negative's breadth was its
strength. Any list of specifically banned state legislative acts-including
the "restraints agst. paper [money] emissions, and violations of contracts" 659 that the first Constitution actually included 66 0-is "not sufficient" to reach the "infinitude of legislative expedients" that states can
use to oppress local minorities. 6 61 Congress thus had to have a "negative
66 2
in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States."
But this inflexibly broad coverage was also the negative's downfall
among the other conveners. It was wildly impractical, and the hammer
over the states it would have given the most powerful federal branch
could gravely threaten the "security" against national oppression that the
states were supposed to afford the people. 663 With no 'jurisprudence"
limiting Congress's choice of when to exercise the negative, it created the
possibility that Congress might itself succumb to partiality and oppression 6 6 4 -as it soon did, in Madison's view, with the Alien and Sedition
Acts. The negative required a decidedly un-Madisonian leap of faith
about the angelic dispositions of men and institutions. And neither
Madison nor his colleagues could have fully anticipated the dangers
presented by the two-party juggernaut that developed in the next century,
and the power it gave mobilized minority factions within parties-includ657. Jefferson, June 20 Letter to Madison, supra note 310, at 64; see supra notes 372,
377, 382 and accompanying text (collecting similar views expressed at the Convention).
658. See supra notes 238-239, 286 and accompanying text.
659. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter to Jefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
660. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see also supra note 399.
661. Madison, Oct. 24 Letter tojefferson, supra note 179, at 212.
662. Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 16, at 383; see supra notes 234-235,
324-325 and accompanying text.
663. See supra text accompanying notes 253-255.
664. Madison wrote:
For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to
attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal
legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States
will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too
often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national
prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the
governments and people of the individual States.
The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296 (James Madison).
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ing the moneyed interests that Madison so detested. 665 The national negative not only invited arbitrary use against the states, but also could have
magnified factional oppression at the national level. If members of Congress have, as Madison feared, "too frequently displayed the character
rather of partisans of their respective States than of impartial guardians of
a common interest," 666 there is little reason to think they would have
done better with the negative. As powerful a threat as it posed to states
and their majorities, the negative also presented them with an opportunity, given their adeptness at influencing Congress's agenda. 66 7 For these
and other reasons, the negative might have provided insufficient protec668
tion to local minorities.
And as comprehensively as Madison's negative would have covered
state legislative enactments, it would not have applied at all to the ordinances and actions of the "counties and towns" whose influence over the
states Madison feared. Over time, "state legislation" might have been
read to encompass more than state statutory law-for example, state and
municipal administrative regulations, guidelines, and manuals, and, at
the limit, even the kinds of unwritten but systematic "policies" and "patterns and practices" that modern civil rights doctrine sometimes treats as
law.6 69 But it is hard to imagine any interpretation under which the
Madisonian negative could have reached a school board's decision about
where to assign particular children to attend school, 67 0 a warden's decision about which prisoners to discipline and which to afford medical
care, 67 1 a police officer's choices among cars or pedestrians to stop and

665. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
666. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296-97 (James Madison).
667. See supra notes 254-256, 354, 377 and accompanying text.
668. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 78, at. 1018-21 (discussing surprising absence of
cases holding federal government accountable for race discrimination, and offering that
federal courts, out of deference and acting in tandem with the other federal branches, may
be unwilling to act to prevent executive branch race discrimination).
669. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding that
municipal liability may be established for deliberate indifference in failure to train
employees); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that a
municipal government may be liable under section 1983 when injuries are caused
pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom).
670. Cf. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1979) (affirming
lower court decisions finding equal protection violations due to "systemwide segregation in
the... schools that was the result of recent and remote intentionally segregative actions of
the Columbus Board").
671. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (finding "obvious". the Eighth
Amendment violation where prison officials disciplined prisoner by painfully handcuffing
him to a hitching post for seven hours, in the hot sun, and taunted his discomfort and
prolonged thirst); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (holding that "deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" violates the Eighth Amendment and
states a cause of action under section 1983).
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when to frisk, 6 72 or a municipal board's decisions about whom to license
67 3
to operate laundries or to conduct parades.
Nor would Madison's proposal have had any way of reaching state
court or administrative decisions or of monitoring the discriminatory absence of action in providing for "the protection of the laws." Moreover,
with every expansion in the kinds of official action and inaction by the
fifty states and their administrative agencies that qualified as "legislation"
or was otherwise subjected to the veto- not to mention the actions of the
3,000 counties and their agencies and countless municipal entitieswould come an exponential leap in the amount of monitoring required
of Congress. As a number of Madison's colleagues recognized, his proposal was administratively impractical from the outset. Under modern conditions, his proposal is inconceivable. 674 As right as he was about "exterior" alternatives to the veto, perhaps Madison was wrong about his
preferred "interior" solution.
C. An Exercise in Madisonian Foresight
As powerful as they are, these criticisms of Madison's proposals are in
hindsight. They suggest the impossibility of Madisonian equal protection
in a world as it in fact developed over two hundred years in the absence
of the mechanisms and institutions that Madison proposed to shape the
governance landscape differently. It thus is worth momentarily considering the counterfactual-how the adoption of his proposals from the beginning might have avoided the critiques. To begin with, Congress's partisan character and transformation following the rise of the two-party
system might not be a mark against Madison's proposal but rather a product of the Convention's failure to adopt it in full. Whether or not
Madison fully anticipated the rise of a two-party system, he clearly saw the
possibility of powerful semipermanent coalitions at the national level,
and he vigorously opposed them. Such parties, or "factions," were indeed
the precise danger to which The FederalistNo. 10 sounded the alarm, and
were Madison's reason for proposing constitutional structures that were
designed to moderate partisanship among legislators (notwithstanding

672. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (suggesting that
"selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race" might
independently violate the Equal Protection Clause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)
(holding under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a stop and frisk search must
be justified at its inception on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
673. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that local
ordinance regulating laundry facilities violates Equal Protection Clause as it is "applied and
administered with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances").
674. See Rakove, Madisonian Moment, supra note 25, at 497 ("The significance of
[Madison's veto] proposal rests .. .on its logic rather than its obvious impracticality.").
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his own later role in the creation of the nation's first two-party
arrangement) .675
Nor did Madison believe that the broader perspective given members of Congress by the extended republic would suffice by itself to prevent factionalism in Congress. Additional preventative measures were
necessary. Among those measures was the national veto itself, which
might have further broadened the perspective of members of Congress
by keeping them focused on solving problems and not coalescing into
powerful permanent parties, by keeping constantly before their eyes the
full panoply of local problems and comparisons of the states' various responses to them, and by fostering continuous, collaborative relationships
with state and local institutions in solving local and, in the aggregate,
6 76
national problems.
Another important mechanism for reining in congressional faction
was to have been the Council of Revision. As proposed by Madison, the
Council would have been composed of federal judges and members of
the executive branch who would have been empowered to review all
pending national legislation and veto any that was tainted by a partisan
spirit. In particular, Madison expected the Council to veto unjust legislation that was harmful to minorities and also to forestall partisan exercise
of Congress's national negative against just state legislation. The result,
in Madison's words, was to have been an additional check that could "destroy the measures of an interested majority" and protect "the safety of a
minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and interested
677
majority."
675. See, e.g., J.R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the
American Republic 530-31 (1966). Pole states that:
[W]hen [Madison] discussed the problem of interests in the tenth number of
The Federalist, he was occupied immediately with the problem of so dividing the
government as to resist the formation of political parties.... Madison anticipated
the division of the country into conflicting and competing economic . . .
interests .... The political organisation of these interests he called factions, a
disparaging name for parties-but he hoped that parties would merely come and
go as their temporary objects dictated. By an irony which he cannot have either
anticipated or enjoyed, Madison himself soon became one of the leading agents
in the process by which interests were consolidated into parties ....
Id.
676. See supra Part IV.C.4.
677. Madison,June 4 Convention Speech, supra note 319, at 25; see supra notes 377,
423-424 and accompanying text (discussing the Council of Revision). Madison argued
that his Council of Revision proposal, modeled on New York's 1777 Constitution, would
provide "an additional check" against "unwise [and] unjust measures" at the national level,
James Madison, Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, Speech at the
Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 10 Papers of Madison, supra note 2, at 109,
109; would "introduce the Checks, which [would] destroy the measures of an interested
majority"; and was "not only necessary for [the executive's] own safety, but for the safety of
a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and interested majority," Madison, June
4 Convention Speech, supra note 319, at 25. In explaining the composition of the Council
to include judges as well as executive officials, Madison noted that "[t]he independent

2004]

MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION

As with Madison's national negative, the Council has not generally
been understood as a mechanism for achieving equal protection (in this
case at the national level), and instead has been treated as a means of
maintaining one or another balance of forces between the competing
branches of the federal government. 678 But both the negative and the
Council shared a similar operation and a similar, deeply interactive, equal
protection function. The Council would have engaged in the same sort
of prior review of congressional action as Congress would have exercised
over state legislation via the national negative. Moreover, the Council
would have protected the states from invidious or partisan rejection of
state legislation by curbing excessive exercises of the negative itself.
Whether these controls would have given Congress a more "impartial" cast is no less certain than any other counterfactual proposition. But
that was to be their function, and their defeat at the Convention provides
a strong Madisonian argument against the inevitability of congressional
partiality and a range of other governance pathologies that have been
convincingly laid at the door of political parties: the locking into power
of established local majorities (or minorities) that support the dominant
national party;6 79 Congress's resulting tolerance and even encouragement of local factional oppression; 68 0 and the subordination of local insticondition of the Ex. who has the Eyes of all Nations on him will render him ajustJudgeadd the Judiciary and you increase the respectability." Id.; see supra note 319 and
accompanying text; see also Madison, Letter to Wallace, supra note 423, at 351 (describing
New York's Council "[a]s a further security against fluctuating [and] indegested [sic]
laws").
678. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 701, 776 (contending that Madison intended the Council of Revision to
strengthen executive prerogatives). But cf. Rakove, Origins, supra note 28, at 1057 ("The
objective of both [Madison's arguments for the Council and the negative] was to
discourage the passage of unjust or ill-conceived laws, and in so doing, to protect private
rights and the public good against legislative impulse.").
679. For example:
Unions, business groups, the Christian Coalition, Jews, Cuban Americans, the
NRA, and the AARP often gain disproportionate influence [in a national twoparty system] because of their powerful presence in one of the parties. Extremist,
well-organized, or well-financed 'minorities' can capture a party and skew the
party's nominees and platform toward the preferences of a small faction.
Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 750, 809 n.215 (2001).
680. See, e.g., Gerald Leonard, Party as a "Political Safeguard Of Federalism": Martin
Van Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 221, 226
(2001) (arguing that the first modem mass political party was created to "replace
lawmaking by a Madisonian deliberative Congress with lawmaking by popular will through
the party," with the effect of insulating state governance from national regulation that
otherwise might have curbed local oppression). Districting battles-which often expose
the worst tendencies of party politics-provide a powerful example of the two-party
system's harmful effects on local minorities. See, e.g., Terry Smith, Reinventing Black
Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second
Reconstruction, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 277, 329-30 (1998) (discussing the effect of
partisan gerrymanders, and noting that in the South in particular, Republicans serve in a
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tutions, problems, and solutions to the national ones that are the focus of
national party politics. 68 Consequently, the criticism of Madison that,
for all of his talk at the time of the framing about the dangers of faction,
his constitution did nothing to prevent a virulently factionalized two-party
system from emerging, is misplaced. 6 82 More accurately, it was the other
Framers who assiduously ignored Madison's talk about the dangers of faction 683 -about the need for much more than the extended republic to
provide structural equal protection against minority oppression at both
the local and national levels-and then proceeded to reject all his reme68 4
dies for that most threatening of republican maladies.
Nor is it as certain as we suggest above that the national negative's
limitation to state legislation would have deprived a fully Madisonian regime of an effective response to factional oppression in the broad array of
private and public activities that are regulated administratively, not legislatively, or are regulated at the municipal, rather than state, level. As
Madison thought would occur, it is possible that the kind of mutual institutional engagement Madison envisioned at the national level in Conmajority of congressional seats despite "virtually no Black support," and that whites may be
increasingly moving to the national Republican ticket to avoid forming coalitions with
predominantly black Democrats; proposing that the problem be solved through the
creation of remedial Senate districts); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 588, 615-18 (1993); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an
Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1663, 1666-67 (2001) (proposing an "aggregate rights"
framework for mediating the conflict between individualistic and group conceptions of
rights)-; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 706 (1998) (posing question "whether the
emphasis in the 1990s on creating 'safe' minority districts has had the ancillary effect of
facilitating the election of more conservative legislators overall").
681. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 680, at 644, 716. For a disturbing account of
the increasing use and effectiveness of gerrymandering to prevent electoral districts
nationwide from being contested, particularly through sophisticated new technology, see
Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, New Yorker, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63; see also Robert
Allen Rutland, The Democrats: From Jefferson to Clinton (2d ed. 1995) (presenting a
history of Democratic Party machine politics that illustrates the power of a national party
system to cement oppressive local factional control). For the contrary view-that in a twoparty system in a nation as vast as our own, the "big tent" required of national parties
achieves the Madisonian goal of a broadened, embracing, and in the end relatively
impartial national perspective-see Kramer, Putting the Politics, supra note 256, at 269-71.
682. Cf. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 680, at 652; supra note 664.
683. See supra Parts IV.C.3, IV.C.5.
684. Although Issacharoff and Pildes note Madison's fervent opposition to national
parties, Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 680, at 713-15 & nn.297-300, they expressly
include him in their criticism of the Framers for falling to take effective steps to constrain
parties; cf. id. at 652 (arguing that "one of the great unappreciated ironies of the original
constitutional vision is that although the Framers were exquisitely sensitive to the need to
create formal checks and balances between governmental organizations, they failed to see
the need to ensure sufficient competition between political organizations"). To the
contrary, had the Framers followed Madison's plan for a national negative and Council of
Revision, they would have gone a long way toward realizing Issacharoff and Pildes's goal of
preserving competition between factions at both the local and national levels.
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gress could also have developed-under Congress's tutelage via the
threat of its exercise of the negative-in states, municipalities, and ad68 5
ministrative agencies.
As we develop in a companion piece, this claim is not entirely
counterfactual. The very dominance of party politics at the national legislative level, as a result of the rejection of Madison's Council of Revision
and his other constraints on factional control of Congress, may have the
effect of driving the kinds of governance mechanisms he promoted out of
the national legislative arena and into administrative, state, and local regimes. 6 86 The result may be tantamount to the adoption of yet another
Madisonian proposal-the creation of a multitude of Councils of Revision at the state (and, as things have developed, at the municipal)
level6 8 7-for infusing a broader, more impartial perspective and for integrating minority concerns and participation into local decisionmaking
and problem solving.
The chief remaining criticism of Madison's negative is the time and
energy Congress would have spent in reviewing each local measure
before it could take effect. Here, again, hindsight looms. In a world in
which the norm for state legislation is the kind of self- and faction-serving
outcomes that Madison abhorred, it is hard to imagine a conscientious
Congress having time for anything other than swatting down oppressive
state laws. But Madison hoped that the "happy effect" of the negative
would be the defeat of unjust proposals in the states in the first instance,
and that only a cursory review of state laws based on straightforward crossstate comparisons would be required to reveal the occasional unjust outlier. 688 The thrust of his theory thus was entirely practical: to avoid the
time-consuming, difficult, and potentially divisive after-the-fact review of
government action that has instead become a staple of our judicial enforcement of "exterior" admonitions to afford equal protection. 689
That being said, counterfactually, we have not had a Madisonian
world for over two centuries. How distraught, then, might we expect
Madison to be if he suddenly reappeared and undertook to review what is
commonly, if inaccurately, believed to be his handiwork?
D. The Legacy of Madisonian Equal Protection
Although the "Father of the Constitution" 690 begat neither the constitution nor the equal protection he desired, he might not be entirely
disappointed by the structures of government that have emerged. Arguably, aspects of the modern American administrative state suggest the pos685. See supra Part IV.C.4.
686. See Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, supra note 8
(manuscript at 24-25).
687. See supra notes 377, 423-424, 677 and accompanying text.
688. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
689. See supra Parts ILA, V.B.2.
690. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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sibility of a passably Madisonian, while thoroughly modem and workable,
method of preserving liberty and extending fraternity by protecting
69 1
equality against parochial majoritarianism.
The point of departure is the half of Madison's equal protection solution that he did convince his colleagues to adopt: the extended republic. Yet, particularly since the New Deal, that extended republic's centralizing effect has provided a degree of equal protection against local
majority factions that Madison thought only the broadened republic plus
the legislative veto could provide. 69 2 Although Congress-the engine of
Madison's extended republic-has turned out to be far more susceptible
to parochial and locally-influenced factionalism than Madison had
hoped,6 93 a different and potentially more promising set of interactions
between the federal and state governments has become a fixture of the
administrativeapparatus of the modem national state. Professor Beer, for
example, claims that there is a strong affinity between Madison's interactive federalism 694-what Beer calls "horizontal federalism"-and "the
huge expansion of conditional grants in aid by the federal government,"
which invite "state and local governments" to serve as "the administrative
agents of a vast array of national programs. '695 Related developments
include review of state and local administrative actions by federal agencies, 69 6 administration of federally-funded state programs according to
federal mandates, 69 7 and federal adoption of state standards developed
698
through cooperative processes of monitoring.
691. See supra note 79.
692. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-22 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("As we said in Ex parte Virginia, the Civil War Amendments were designed to
take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race or color and to be . . .
limitations on the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."
(internal citations omitted)); Sandalow, supra note 27, at 1191 (arguing that "pluralistic
politics furnish substantial safeguards to minorities" in many situations); supra Part V.A.2.
693. For discussion of Madison's fear that states were more likely than Congress to
suppress political minorities, and his solution to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the
states, see Ely, Democracy, supra note 27, at 79-87; Brennan, supra note 27, at 536-37,
539-40. Madison was clearly aware of the possibility of factional strife and control in the
national legislature. See The Federalist No. 46, supra note 10, at 296 (James Madison) ("A
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress than a national
spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States."). As happened with the
national veto, however, his proposed solution to the problem-a national council of
legislative revision-was defeated at the Convention. See supra notes 377, 390.
694. See supra Part IV.C.4.
695. Beer, supra note 7, at 252-53.
696. See supra notes 669-674 and accompanying text; see also Garrett & Liebman,
Experimentalist Equal Protection, supra note 8 (manuscript at Part VII).
697. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(q) (1) (A) (2000) (institutionalized persons); id.
§§ 1396a(a) (10), (a) (17) (general Medicaid statute). These sections require that state
plans to treat different populations must provide certain minimum allowances to meet
federal guidelines.
698. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001).
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MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION

The question then-to which we turn in a companion article 6 9 9 -is
whether modern forms of administration can in fact do the work of
Madison's failed national negative and the largely ineffectual Equal Protection Clause. More particularly, the remaining question is whether all
forms of modern locally and centrally interactive administration are the
same for this purpose. For example, to the extent that federal-state interaction is defined by a post-New Deal command-and-control structure, it
would seem to offend Madison's collaborative vision, while also risking
the liberty-threatening national hegemony that Madison's colleagues associated with his negative. Nor, however, would the alternative approach
in vogue today of decentralizing national administrative authority to
states and localities satisfy Madisonian equal protection. On the contrary,
by joining the current Supreme Court in dismantling the extended republic, 700 any such extension of unabated state and local authority over
matters previously thought to be of national concern might increase the
power of local majorities to oppress minorities in the manner that
70
Madison feared. 1

The constitutional structure Madison envisioned was thus neither a
top-down national hierarchy connecting a center and subservient instrumentalities, nor a bottom-up confederacy of independent states that occasionally conferred authority on a central body to act on their collective
behalf. Instead, Madison imagined continuous state-federal-state interaction running both ways between thirteen productively diverse states with
design and implementation responsibilities and a center with oversight
responsibility.7 0 2 Whether any aspects of modern intergovernmental administration approximate Madison's preferred governmental design-in
particular, whether the need for a vibrant cooperative federalism to solve
otherwise intractable public problems has driven national and local agencies of government voluntarily to establish interactive structures providing a modern-day Madisonian equal protection 7 03-remains an important question for future scholarship.
699. See Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, supra note 8.
700. See supra Part VI.
701. See supra notes 366-368 and accompanying text.
702. See supra Part IV.C.4.
703. Potentially more in line with Madison's vision is federal regulation through
conditional preemption, or what the Supreme Court itself has aptly dubbed "cooperative
federalism." Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
Under this form of administration, Congress imposes a default scheme of federal
regulation but invites the states to opt out of it if they adopt their own, experimental,
regulatory regimes that meet general federal minimum standards and that are subject to
approval mechanisms amenable to interstate comparison. In areas in which it has
authority to preempt state regulation, Congress may instead, without engaging in
impermissible "commandeering," offer states the choice of adopting a regulatory scheme
pursuant to federal standards or be subjected to preemptive federal regulation. See New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-63 (1992) (observing that conditional preemption
does not directly compel states to enact federal mandates, and thus does not violate the
Tenth Amendment); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (describing state
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CONCLUSION

If Madison is properly called the "Father of the Constitution,"7 ° 4 he
was justly disappointed in his progeny. 70 5 Absent an effective mechanism
for structuring equal protection into the daily operation of state and local
governments-of the sort upon which Madison staked his energy and
credibility at the Convention-the Constitution has repeatedly allowed
local majorities to perpetrate tragic injustices against minorities. Partly to
blame is the unfair treatment of Madison himself. Even given the undue
credit he has received for framing a constitution he disowned, and the
blame he deserves for his impractical proposals to improve it, Madison
deserves better than the indifference shown to his brilliant equal protection theory and prognostication by his colleagues at the Convention, the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, the academy, and the current
Supreme Court.70 6 What remains to be seen is how far we can go-or,
perhaps, how far the modern administrative state has already gone-toward completing Madison's constitutional project, avoiding the need for
cataclysmic constitutional change, and achieving Madisonian equal
protection.

707

water quality regulations as governed by federal standards in a constitutionally permissible
partnership relationship that does not violate the Tenth Amendment); Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-59, 764-65 (1982) (noting that "state
involvement in a pre-emptible area of energy regulation can be conditioned on mandatory
local consideration of federal standards"); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (noting that there is no
"commandeering" where states are allowed to opt out of federal programs, leaving the
burden of regulation on the federal government).
704. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
705. See supra notes 238-239, 286 and accompanying text.
706. As we develop above, even Madison's eloquent defense of the new Constitution
in The Federalist sounds a silent alarm. See supra Parts III.B, LV.C.4-VI.
707. Again, we indicate how experimentalist remedies can embody Madisonian equal
protection in a companion essay, Garrett & Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection,
supra note 8. For further suggestions on reading experimentalist techniques generally
into the existing Constitution, see Dorf & Sabel, Democratic Experimentalism, supra note
79, at 289, 469-73; James S. Liebman, Slow-Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and
Capital Punishment, 1963-2003, at 170-75 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Columbia Law Review).

